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This study investigates young Gambians’ social and economic aspirations. It considers how 
young Gambians’ aspirations are shaped and negotiated, and the strategies they employ to 
achieve their objectives. Whilst existing research tends to view young Gambians’ social and 
economic advancement through a lens of international migration, this study focuses on the 
aspirations and strategies of those who find themselves in a state of ‘involuntary immobility’ 
– that is, an aspiration to migrate but the inability to do so. The study looks at how two groups 
of young urban Gambians from low socio-economic backgrounds pursue local livelihoods. 
Known as ‘beach hustlers’ and ‘chanters’, these youths take advantage of the resources of the 
tourism sector and of opportunities provided by information and communication technologies 
(ICT) in an attempt to fulfil their aspirations. 
Drawing on data collected from multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2013 
and 2014 in Kololi, the country’s main tourism hotspot on the shore of the Atlantic Ocean, and 
Brikama, where internet use in cybercafés has rapidly grown over the past two decades, I use 
the cases of ‘beach hustlers’ and ‘chanters’ (cyber hustlers) to shed light on the life-trajectories 
of young Gambians. I discuss how ‘beach hustlers’ take advantage of the Gambia’s booming 
tourism industry by engaging in diverse informal economic activities. I then consider how 
‘chanters’ accumulate wealth by employing various methods and ruses in their interactions 
with toubabs (white westerners) through internet-mediated encounters. 
This study shows that the majority of young Gambians who find it increasingly difficult to 
migrate to the West pursue local livelihoods to fulfil their aspirations of social and economic 
advancement. The aspirations and strategies of the hustlers in this study are shaped and 
influenced by intervening social, cultural and religious obligations and expectations. The study 
argues that the formation of Gambian hustlers’ aspirations is the result of an interplay between 
familial and societal dynamics; such as generational and gender relations and reciprocal social 
exchange, and personal desires of upward social mobility. The study further shows that the 
strategies young Gambians employ are influenced by the structural constraints and 
opportunities that appear in specific space–time conditions. By doing so, this study contributes 
to the literature on the aspirations of urban youths in developing countries and the strategies 
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Attaya – Chinese green tea served with lots of sugar (M) 
Babylon – The emic name for western countries like the UK, US and other European 
countries. Mostly used by young people. (E) 
Barako – Blessing (M, A) 
Bitique – local shop selling small items from behind a wire screen (F) 
Depaas – Daily food allowance (F) 
Duwa – Supplications (M) 
Gele Gele – Commercial minibus (W) 
Grand palace – Places where young people congregate to socialise and past time. (F) 
Haftaan – A full-dress, ankle-length, long-sleeve religious and traditional clothing worn by 
Gambian men (W) 
Haram – Sinful (A) 
Koriteh – Muslin celebration to mark the end of fasting or Ramadan (W) 
Mbalax – popular form of Senegambian music (W) 
Mbaran – Having multiple partners for financial and material gain (W) 
Mo Barakalingo – A blessed person (M) 
Mo barakatango – A person with no blessing (M) 
Morro – spiritual leader (M) 
                                                 
1 The use of an ‘M’ and ‘W’ indicates that the word is in Mandinka and/or Wollof. ‘E’ and ‘F’ indicates that the 




Nawetaan – seasonal football tournament played during the rainy season (W)  
Nerves – The psycho-social condition of wanting to migrate without the ability to do so (E) 
Semester – A returning migrant (E) 
Tobaski – Islamic feast where a lamb is slaughtered (W) 
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Figure 1: Map of the Gambia showing major towns. Image taken online from 
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Figure 3: Map showing the Tourism Development Area and the locations of major 














1.1 Background: “There is no way but hustling” 
In 2012, I visited the Gambia for the first time as a doctoral researcher. My research 
then focussed on investigating the use and impacts of information and communication 
technology (ICT) on public sector performance. I had gone to the field with a focus on 
the developmental benefits of ICT, having read a lot about the dominant theories of 
‘ICT for development’. However, my frequent visits to cybercafés to access the 
Internet exposed me to the contextual and ‘non-developmental’ (Molony, 2008) uses 
of ICTs, mostly by young people. Deeply immersed in the chat rooms that appeared 
on their screens and not particularly perturbed by the humid and muggy environment 
of the cybercafé as I was, local youths appropriated the Internet in ways that supported 
their income generation and livelihood strategies. 
This type of ICT use, locally associated with ‘online hustling’ (Wyche, Forte and 
Schoenebeck, 2013), ignited my research interest in the everyday use of ICT by 
marginal populations to support their urban livelihoods – or making ends meet. In 
particular, I became interested in exploring the factors that drive specific users to adopt 
and appropriate technologies in particular ways. I returned to Edinburgh to carry out 
the bureaucratic process of changing my PhD topic. I went back to the field in 2013 to 
conduct research on Internet youth hustling. My primary objective was to investigate 
the hustling activities of Gambian youths in cybercafés. Hustling is a comprehensive 
term that has been used to describe both criminal and noncriminal economic activities 
of an increasing number of urban youth (Carmichael, 1975). In the Gambia, the term 
has been used to describe the livelihood strategies and informal income generating 
activities of young people.  
Back in the field, the first observations and interviews I carried out took place at the 
AON cybercafé, only a short walk away from the compound where I was staying. 
Located in a densely populated neighbourhood called New Town in Brikama, the AON 
cybercafé is typical of the sort found in other Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries 




an advert on Manchester United’s match jersey, as he was a fan of the football club. 
The AON cybercafé is situated in a small shop at the entrance of Fadera Kunda (the 
home of the Faderas), Alkali’s family home. The café is always full of young people, 
predominantly males, who sit attentively in front of personal computers (PCs) that are 
separated by wooden privacy partitions. Oblivious to surrounding activities, they chat 
with online partners in chat rooms such as Yahoo, Facebook, Skype and MSN. These 
partners are mostly toubabs (white westerners) living in either Western Europe or the 
United States of America (USA) as shown in their online profiles. 
My first visit to the AON as a researcher was uneventful. I arrived at 10 o’clock in the 
morning and the place was nearly empty, except for Alkali and his cousin Buba. They 
were sitting on a wooden bench placed on the veranda of the cybercafé. Alkali 
informed me that there was no electricity but it was expected to come back on at any 
time. As if he could predict the actions of the National Water and Electricity Company 
(NAWEC), the electricity came back on half an hour later. The resumption of 
electricity was immediately followed by excited cheers of ‘light natale’ (meaning 
electricity is back in the Mandinka language) in the neighbourhood. This precipitated 
the arrival of customers whose faces expressed a sense of urgency. Within minutes, all 
the available PCs were occupied and the AON was full to capacity. The customers 
who came a bit later sat themselves on one of the wooden benches placed on the 
veranda and waited for a PC to become available. 
As the majority of the café users left for their compounds just after 2pm to have lunch, 
a flock of secondary school students from the nearby Brikama Upper Basic School 
arrived. Perhaps excited that another school day had ended, they chatted happily as 
they settled themselves down on benches outside the AON. A few ventured inside the 
café to occupy one of the few available PCs. Dem, a tall and shy 18 year old boy was 
among the students. His physical features and his maturity indicated that he was far 
older than his classmates. I later learned from him that this was because he had to 
repeat classes a couple of times due to a combination of factors, including failed 
examinations and a lack of money to pay the examination fees. Alkali identified Dem 
as one of the more experienced hustlers who could provide me with valuable 




My attempts to talk to Dem that day were unsuccessful. With his friends around and 
paying attention to what he was going to say, Dem felt uncomfortable having a 
conversation with me on the issues I was interested in. I then proposed to meet him at 
a later date and in a more convenient place. We decided to meet the following day at 
a spot called Wales during his lunch break. Wales is a popular spot situated between 
the old Brikama cinema, the community radio station and the Upper Basic School. It 
is the grand palace, also called vous or ghetto (Gaibazi, 2010) (a place where groups 
of young males converge to listen to music, exchange news and rumours and share 
their social and economic frustration whilst drinking attaya3) for a group of youths 
who call themselves the bere boys.  
The spot is called Wales as most of the boys who sit there have ambitions and dreams 
to travel to Wales in the United Kingdom (UK). Gaibazzi (2010) also found that the 
youths he studied in Sabi, the Gambia, name their ghettos after different transnational 
icons, from hip hop music, to reggae, to European football teams, and popular migrant 
destinations such as “Barcelona Team, Hannover, Blessed Yard and Los Angeles”. 
The names of these ghettoes locate young people’s transnational aspirations in and 
through particular physical spaces (Crivello, 2015). Informal meeting points like 
Wales, where young men often converge to spend their free time have been found to 
be a common feature of the lives of urban youths in other African countries. For 
instance, similar patterns of socialisation are known as grin in urban and rural Mali 
(Jónsson 2008), bases in Ghana (Burrell, 2012) and fadas in Niger (Masquelier, 2013).  
I arrived at Wales five minutes before midday and sat myself under the neem tree on 
one of the wooden logs that the boys use as makeshift benches. The neem tree had the 
word ‘Wales’ graffitied on it in red paint. Wales is normally empty at this time of the 
day as the boys do not start their campe (social gathering) until late afternoon. At 
midday exactly, the school bell rang alerting students about their lunch break. From 
where I was sitting, waiting for Dem, I could hear the silence of the school compound 
rupture with students talking in excitement leaving their classrooms. Dem arrived a 
few minutes later, watching behind him to ensure he was not being followed by his 
friends. He sat himself on one of the wooden logs facing towards me with his back to 
                                                 




the school. He told me he had limited time and that his lunch break would only last for 
45 minutes. We therefore got straight to business. 
Dem started by launching into the details of his life history and then his online 
‘hustling’ activities. He has lived with his grandparents since he was five years old 
following the divorce of his parents. His grandfather is the local chief of Brikama. His 
grandparents initially paid for his education and supported him financially but old age 
and the rising cost of education and other consumables diminished their ability to 
provide these essentials for Dem. None of his relatives were willing to help when he 
sought assistance from them. He was subsequently left to his own devices to pay for 
his education, to buy his uniform and to support himself financially. He also took over 
the responsibility of taking care of his grandparents by buying them a bag of rice every 
month and paying for their medical bills. Dem recounted his problems of fulfilling his 
financial obligations and the dilemma he faced between continuing his schooling and 
supporting his grandparents. He gave an account of the period he considered quitting 
school to work as a carpenter to earn some money.  
Dem’s struggles took place during a period that coincided with the emergence of 
Internet access and its use in cybercafés in Brikama. Many youths, perhaps inspired 
by the beach hustlers who spend the off-season in cybercafés to maintain contact with 
the toubabs they established relationships with on the beaches of Kololi and 
Senegambia (the hub of the Gambia’s tourism industry), saw the Internet as a tool to 
form new, profitable relationships with foreign contacts online. Hence, cybercafés, and 
the Internet in particular, became spaces that provided young people with the 
opportunity to orchestrate encounters across distances and to accumulate foreign 
contacts. These encounters and the negotiations inherent within them became sources 
of income generation as youths started inventing ways and means to receive financial 
support from foreign contacts. Thus, the Internet opened up livelihood opportunities 
for many youths. Drawing on their study on Ghanaian youths’ engagement and contact 
with foreigners through Internet-mediated encounters, Slater and Kwame (2005) argue 
that Ghanaian youths’ Internet use is connected with existing long-term livelihood and 




This is not to say that Gambian youths’ initial encounters with the Internet were 
primarily done in the context of hustling. Some youths, like Dem himself, had long 
started hanging out in cybercafés using the Internet to play games or to watch YouTube 
videos. However, rumours of success stories that were sometimes visible through the 
socio-economic transformation of one hustler revealed the economic and material 
opportunities of online encounters with toubabs. With word of these opportunities 
spreading among youth circles, Dem started spending more time in the cybercafés ‘to 
try his luck’. “The Internet was making my friends rich. I saw my mates making money 
and taking care of themselves and their families so I decided to give it a try”. As among 
young Internet users in Accra, Ghana (Burrell, 2012: 82), rumours amplified instances 
of successful encounters with the Internet among the youths in Brikama. Through the 
retelling of rumours, many people in Brikama, who never use the Internet, expressed 
the conviction that it is being widely used by ‘clever boys’ to acquire loads of money.    
Dem proceeded to share his experiences and aspirations with me. He talked about his 
marginal status in society due to his poverty and how, due to his hustling activities, 
reactions towards him from the rest of society were defined by ambivalence. Whilst 
those outside his closed circle see him as an idle student who wastes all his time at 
cybercafés, others, particularly family members, see him as a young man fulfilling his 
social obligations. They would pray for him and assure him that his acts would be a 
source of blessing for him. With these prayers and assurances in mind, Dem is 
optimistic about his future. His dreams and aspirations are to get good ‘toubab 
contacts’ who will financially assist him to pay for his education, to build his own 
house, to renovate his grandparent’s compound and if possible to send them to Mecca 
to perform the Hajj or pilgrimage4.  
The ringing of the school bell announced the end of lunch break and abruptly 
interrupted Dem’s explications. This brought us back to the present as in recounting 
his experiences and aspirations we were both transported into the pendulum of his life. 
Dem paused and looked at me. I could see relief on his face. Perhaps the relief of 
having the chance to share his story. He told me, “I will come to see you at your 
                                                 
4 The annual Islamic pilgrimage to the city of Mecca, in Saudi Arabia. It is one of the five pillars of 
Islam and so it is a mandatory religious duty for Muslims. It must be carried out at least once in a 




compound after school”, got up and disappeared into the crowd of students rushing to 
enter the school gate before it closed.  
Dem’s story and those of other online hustlers, together with the narratives of a group 
of young men and women who make a living by engaging in diverse informal activities 
in the Gambia’s tourism sector, highlights the theme of this ethnography. Known as 
‘beach hustlers’, I had spent some time with them in Kololi during my previous visits 
to the Gambia. These narratives, which centred on economic hardship, strategies of 
survival, poverty and humiliation, experiences of marginality, family obligations and 
personal aspirations and supporting parents to be blessed and successful provide the 
ethnographic materials of this study. The study merges the lives and links the economic 
strategies and aspirations of ‘beach hustlers’ and cyber hustlers (who refer to 
themselves as ‘chanters’). The term aspirations as used here refers to hustlers’ wishes 
and goals of fulfilling family and societal expectations and attaining upward social 
mobility, whereas strategies are the activities and practices they employ in their 
interactions with toubabs to realise their aspirations.  
The hustlers in this study are unified in their struggles to survive and, in particular, 
their passions to meet toubabs either at the beach or online, who would help them with 
the financial support they need to fulfil their aspirations. They expressed their 
aspirations in terms of achieving ‘social and economic advancement’. For them this 
means having the ability and the economic capacity to fulfil socio-cultural obligations, 
to gain access to consumer goods and to attain upward social mobility. Socio-cultural 
obligations means providing subsistence and other material support for parents, other 
family members and others within the community. The combination of fulfilling socio-
cultural obligations and having access to consumer goods leads to enhanced social 
status.  
In a context of economic decay and increasing socio-economic restraints in neoliberal 
post-colonial Africa, youths have progressively faced difficulties in securing the 
means to fulfil the moral and financial requirements with respect to their parents, 
households and their communities, and thus be considered adults (Cruise O'Brien 
1996; Masquelier 2005; Vigh 2006; Roth 2008). This impasse has engendered a 




prompting some scholars to suggest that it has been a key factor in a number of violent 
conflicts in which young people have been the protagonists (Richards, 1996; Vigh, 
2006). The Gambia’s failure in postcolonial modernization and development 
compounded by socio-economic stagnation saw many young people becoming 
disenchanted about their future prospects. Even though a regime change in 1994 gave 
new hope to the youths, by the turn of the millennium these hopes vanished in the face 
of continued economic hardship. 
In contemporary Gambia, hustling seems to be one of the main ways in which young 
people have chosen to change their situation. In fact hustling has become a well-
entrenched livelihood strategy among urban Gambian youths. With the increasing 
scarcity of conventional economic opportunities to achieve their aspirations, the 
protagonists of this study resort to forms of informal economic activities or ‘hustling’ 
that provide opportunities for them to fulfil their aspirations. As Dem solemnly told 
me: ‘There is no way but hustling’. 
1.2 The Focus of the Study 
This thesis documents the hustling strategies of young urban Gambians who find 
themselves in a state of ‘involuntary immobility’, those who Gaibazzi (2015) refers to 
as the ‘stayers’. It explores the aspirations they want to achieve by engaging in 
hustling, and the factors that shape these aspirations. Specifically, this study is about 
how a group of young Gambians experience and respond to the constraints they face 
in their attempts to travel to the West to fulfil their aspirations of social and economic 
advancement. Drawing on Cape Verdean examples, Carling (2002) uses the term 
‘involuntary immobility’ to describe the situation of young people who wish to migrate 
to fulfil their aspirations but are unable to do so due to a number of constraints such as 
restrictive immigration policies and overwhelming travel costs. The notion of 
‘involuntary immobility’ captures well the situation experienced by many of my 
interlocutors.  
 
From the mid-1990s, the impact of neoliberal restructuring saw the consolidation of 
international migration among Gambian  youths, whose compelling aspiration to travel 




characterised by a lack of perspective in relation to self-realisation at home (Gaibazzi, 
2010). Thus, many rural (as shown by Gaibazzi on example of the Soninke in rural 
Gambia) and urban youths began to explore the prospect of migrating particularly to 
the West, to pursue education or to work. The Gambia does not seem to be an exception 
in this situation as many other youths in other African contexts were experiencing 
similar trajectories (Horst 2006; Mains 2007; Vigh 2009). 
 
In the years following independence from the UK, in the 1970s to be more precise, 
migration to the West, the UK and the USA in particular, was easier for the majority 
of Gambians than it is today. Gambian citizens were not required to have a visa to 
travel to the UK and obtaining a visa to the USA was much easier. With limited 
opportunities to achieve their aspirations at home, many young Gambians resorted to 
international migration. During this period, there existed primarily two established 
ways of achieving social and economic advancement among urban youths in the 
Gambia. The first was to migrate to Europe, the US and/or other countries like Libya 
and Sierra Leone and hustle and send money or return with the capital needed to buy 
a compound and build a house for one’s family and possibly invest in an additional 
small business. The second option was to go abroad (either UK, USA or other West 
African Countries like Sierra Leone and Ghana) for university-level education5 and 
return as a trained professional and work as a top civil servant in the Gambian 
government and state-owned enterprises or acquire a job in the private sector and 
international organisations.  
Hence, and broadly speaking, the majority of today’s middle-aged Gambians who have 
achieved social and economic advancement followed either or both of these 
trajectories. Beach hustlers, who were active in the tourism industry in the 1980s 
constituted the majority of young Gambians who took advantage of the visa-free 
regime to go and hustle in the West. Through their interactions and contacts with 
toubabs in the tourism industry, they not only became exposed to the opportunities 
available in the West, but also established the networks that facilitated their journey.  
                                                 




Consequently, the majority of the younger generation of Gambians anticipated their 
future prospects in terms of these options and possibilities. However, these 
possibilities have narrowed down due to strict visa restrictions. From the mid-1990s, 
just after the military took over power, restrictions on immigration to the West 
increased. A few days after the military coup in 1994, the UK government announced 
the imposition of visa requirements for all Gambians who wished to travel to the 
country. This led to the deportation of a flight half full of Gambians from the UK as 
they were already on the flight when the new regulations were announced and 
enforced. Following this, it became more difficult for Gambian citizens, young people 
in particular, to obtain either US or Schengen visas. This is compounded by the 
overwhelming cost of a plane ticket to the West6. Today, young Gambians’ prospects 
of pursuing the trajectory of previous generations by making a livelihood based on 
international migration are therefore bleak. As a result, many of the young Gambians 
I encountered during my fieldwork expressed a sense of ‘involuntary immobility’ - an 
aspiration to migrate, but inability to do so (Carling, 2002).  
Aware that their chances to migrate to the West are becoming ever slimmer, the beach 
hustlers and chanters of this study pursue local livelihoods by taking advantage of the 
resources (the tourism sector and internet availability and access in cybercafés) 
available to them and turn them into income earning opportunities in order to fulfil 
their aspirations of social and economic advancement. It must be noted that migration 
to the West still forms part of the idyllic life trajectory of social and economic 
advancement envisioned by most Gambian youths. For example, Mr. Fatty, one of my 
key interlocutors, is a school teacher who engages in chanting activities. Although he 
primarily considers chanting as providing opportunities to complement his meagre 
salary, he still anticipates the prospect of meeting a toubab who can help him ‘travel 
to the UK to further his studies’. Over a bowl of porridge, one Saturday morning, he 
confided to me that he will quit his job if he has the opportunity to travel to Europe. 
He admitted that he does not envisage this happening any time soon so he must ‘hustle 
to help’ his parents.  
                                                 
6 The cost of a plane ticket to Europe, for example, has quadrupled during the past fifteen years. A 
return ticket to the UK now costs around 35, 000 Dalasis, ten times more than the average monthly 




Conceptualising ‘Involuntary Immobility’ 
Involuntary immobility is a term coined by Carling (2002) to describe the plight of 
non-migrants, like Mr. Fatty, who wish to fulfil their migration aspirations but who 
are unable to do so. Binaisa (2011) draws on the term to describe the under-researched 
phenomena of those migrants in Britain who wish to return to Uganda but whose plans 
are frustrated by a range of factors. Carling’s model of ‘involuntary immobility’ is 
representative of the studies that try to explain the causes of immobility, though it takes 
into account the ‘consequences’ or implications of migration by drawing attention to 
the discourses and socio-cultural practices that make emigration more desirable and 
predictable. Nonetheless, the sheer number of people wishing to change their socio-
spatial configurations but not being able to do so indicates that ‘our times are 
characterised by involuntary immobility as much as by large migration flows’ 
(Carling, 2002: 14). Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of today’s migration order 
compared to the recent past, is the degree of conflict over mobility and the frustration 
about immobility among people in many countries of emigration such as the Gambia. 
Carling’s notion of ‘involuntary immobility ‘aptly describes the situation of the 
majority of young people I encountered during fieldwork in the Gambia, where fewer 
people are able to migrate to the West than the number who aspired to do so. It is also 
a condition that young Gambians seemed to share with many other youths on the 
continent, who longed for migration but were forced to indefinitely postpone their 
departures (Horst 2006; Jonsson 2007; Pandolfo 2007; Vigh 2009). Gaibazzi (2010) 
contends that migration scholars have paid only scant attention to the fact that people 
do not move, and have focused instead on outmigration as the element to analyse and 
explain the trajectories of postcolonial African youths.  
A study on the experiences of urban Gambia youths in a condition of ‘involuntary 
immobility’ requires some clarification of the concept of immobility. In common 
usage the term immobility is synonymous with non-migration. However, the term has 
also been used to describe social immobility. For instance, in Lusaka, Zambia, Hansen 
found that many of the young people she observed are likely ‘to get stuck in the 




they find themselves constrained are high. For this study, I use the term immobility to 
signify a condition of not being able to or not wanting to migrate.  
This thesis, therefore, is an attempt to understand how young urban Gambians 
experience and negotiate their social positions in a context of ‘involuntary immobility’ 
by engaging in diverse forms of hustling. In a setting where international migration is 
a longstanding feature of social life, resulting from the long tradition of migration due 
to its geographic location, which has seen many Gambians migrate abroad to study 
and/or work, the dynamics of staying behind are equally significant as people 
deliberately discuss the roles, duties and entitlements of those who stay.  
Consequently, in the Gambian context, immobility can be perceived as a threat to 
masculinity, ‘as a liminal period in which young men draw on available resources to 
move out of their place in order to move up the socio-generational scale’ (Gaibazzi, 
2010). Similarly, Jonsson (2012) has shown that in a Malian village, ‘immobile 
youths’ who are ‘stuck’ in the village and fail to experience progress are stigmatised 
as lazy or worthless people. Hence, ‘involuntary immobility’, in this respect, appears 
to be a multifaceted phenomenon. Not only may people be unable to move out of the 
country, but they may also be unable to secure a place at home, as if they were 
suspended between moving and staying (Gaibazzi, 2010). 
I am not claiming that all the hustlers I encountered during fieldwork in the Gambia 
are experiencing a state of ‘involuntary immobility’. The stories of a few hustlers, the 
most successful ones in particular, indicate that they are quite content to stay in the 
Gambia. And so, they are not actively pursuing mobility in the form of migration. 
Rather they pursue social mobility through hustling. Even those hustlers who consider 
themselves to be ‘involuntarily immobile’, restrictions on immigration looms so large 
that they have resigned to changing their situations through migration. Hence, aware 
that the ability to travel is becoming highly unlikely for them, if not impossible, they 
actively engage in hustling as a means to fulfil their immediate needs and long term 
aspirations. 
This form of adaptation to restrictions of migration is also informed by an 
understanding of the dynamics underpinning the intersectionality of hustling, social 




underpins the social structure of society. Notions of status and power are strongly 
associated with masculinity. To some extent hustling has altered the relationship 
between social position and gender nowadays. As income plays an important role in 
determining ones social position, the access to income through hustling by some 
women has led to less obvious gender demarcations of social status. 
It is worth mentioning that ‘involuntary immobility’ does not entail that constraints to 
migration are stopping young Gambians from migrating. Although many of the 
hustlers I encountered during fieldwork consider themselves as ‘stuck’, some still 
pursue mobility in the form of migration to the West. Certainly, many young Gambians 
still actively pursue their migratory dreams to the West through ‘irregular migration’ 
by taking the so- called ‘back way’ either through the Sahara or the Mediterranean. 
The people whose lives this study recounts are young Gambians who aspire to migrate 
legally and safely to their desired destinations, particularly the United Kingdom, the 
USA and other Western European countries. Several factors make these destinations 
more attractive to the majority of young Gambians, the majority of my interlocutors in 
particular, who expressed a sense of ‘involuntary immobility’. These include the 
perceived success of ‘semesters’7 or returning migrants from these destinations and 
the potential economic opportunities that cannot be matched by migration to other 
African countries or Asia.  
The Hustlers and the Wider Socio-Economic Context 
The ‘beach hustlers’ in this study consist of small entrepreneurs, principally peddlers, 
vendors and others who provide formal and informal services to toubab tourists within 
the Gambia’s tourism industry. Operating on the margins of the industry and 
employing diverse income generating techniques, they benefit both financially and 
materially from their interactions with toubabs. I examine how they achieve their goals 
by navigating tourist spaces, making use of contacts and networks. I also explore how 
they use dress, appearance and language to portray an image of themselves that not 
only elicits trust, but also sympathy from the toubabs. The second group, the online 
                                                 
7 Term is derived from Semester, which means holiday in Swedish. The term is used in the Gambia to 
refer to someone who has travelled to either Europe or the US, is considered to have accumulated 
enough wealth and has now returned home on holidays. Semesters can be distinguished by their style 




hustlers who call themselves ‘chanters’, entails a group of youths, like Dem, who 
engage in and make a living through Internet-related activities. Mostly found in 
cybercafés, they operate individually, competing for status and material success. I 
examine their ‘itineraries of accumulation’ (Ndjio, 2006) by exploring the techniques 
and strategies they employ to make money from the toubabs they establish 
relationships with online. 
Urban youth hustling in the Gambia takes place within the contexts of economic crisis, 
political uncertainty and social ambivalence (more in Chapter 2). Misplaced policy 
priorities have seen the country register its highest rate of youth unemployment. This 
is partly due to the lack of educational opportunities, such as skills training, beyond 
the national secondary certificate, engendering a mismatch between the available skills 
and the needs of the private sector market. Compounding this issue is the poor 
performance of the Gambian economy in the past 20 years due to both exogenous and 
endogenous factors. This has seen the majority of Gambians sliding into poverty with 
people struggling to make ends meet, particularly the unemployed. Saine, a Gambian 
Professor of Political Science living in the US, provided a compelling characterisation 
of the situation:  
The country is experiencing the adverse effects of the present 
serious economic crisis. This has resulted in hardship and 
increased poverty. The failure of the government to address the 
current situation will aggravate the already pitiful poverty 
status of the majority of Gambians (Saine, 2009: 92). 
As Saine rightly predicted, the situation indeed depreciated. Poor economic policies 
and fiscal indiscipline have precipitated difficult economic situations, pushing many 
Gambians into abject poverty. Unemployment is pervasive, salaries are low, and the 
cost of living is rising on a daily basis causing a sharp fall in the standard of living of 
many Gambians. The combination of these factors has contributed to constraining the 
free global movement of young Gambians as Western governments consider them to 
be economic liabilities.    
The majority of Gambians, young people in particular, responded to this situation by 
engaging in informal activities. They create their own ways and means of generating 




Anthropologists working in other contexts have shown how the people they studied 
responded to their socio-economic predicaments (see Thieme, 2010, 2013; Venkatesh, 
2006; Pryce, 1986; Smith, 2008; Macgaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga, 2000 amongst 
others). In particular, Sandbrook and Barker’s (1985) observation that the survival 
strategies adopted by many Ghanaians in the 1980s was as a response to the country’s 
economic crisis is consistent with the case of Gambian youths. The authors showed 
how Ghanaians coped with the collapse of their formal economy by engaging in 
informal economic activities. This recourse to ‘fend for themselves and getting by’, 
they contend, ‘is a creative adaptation to a deteriorating situation’ (pp.24). Gambian 
youths adapted to and invented ways to deal with the economic challenges that threaten 
not only their everyday livelihoods but also their social status.  
Conceptualising the Informal Economy  
The term ‘informal economy’ became current in the 1970s as a label for economic 
activities which take place outside the framework of corporate public and private 
sector establishments. As with many other social scientific issues, the theoretical 
underpinnings of informality or informal economic activities can be approached from 
a variety of perspectives which might include their emergence, their purpose and their 
social perception. Informal sector is a term coined by the British Anthropologist, Keith 
Hart in his ground breaking study of the low-income activities of unskilled FraFra 
migrants in Accra who could not find wage employment (Hart, 1973). Hart’s particular 
interest of inquiry revolved around whether the surplus mass of urban unemployed and 
underemployed ‘constitute a passive exploited majority’ or do their informal economic 
activities “possess some autonomous capacity for generating incomes”? He concluded 
that the masses who were surplus to the requirements for wage labour in African cities 
were not ‘unemployed’, but rather were positively employed and proposed that these 
activities be contrasted with the ‘formal’ economy of government and organized 
capitalism as ‘informal income opportunities’. 
Hart proposed that these activities be contrasted with the ‘formal’ economy of 
government and organized capitalism as ‘informal income opportunities’. Moreover, 
he suggested that the aggregate intersectoral relationship between the two sources of 




the long run. In particular, the informal economy might be a passive adjunct of growth 
originating elsewhere or its dynamism might be a crucial ingredient of economic 
transformation in some cases. 
This view of informality is increasingly being challenged by an alternative perspective 
which has developed since the early 1980s which saw an essentially structuralist 
approach which has shifted the focus from informality represented as a marginalized 
sector to ‘informalization’ conceived as a wider economic response to crisis (Meagher, 
1995). The informalization approach criticizes much of the conventional informal 
sector literature as being based on abstract and often idealized models that fail to grasp 
adequately the shifting social processes at work in the development of the informal 
economy, and the relationship of these processes to the broader context of the changing 
world economy. According to the informalization perspective, informality must be 
analysed, not as a product of bad state policy, but in terms of shifts in the possibilities 
for accumulation in the context of the current global economic crisis. 
Nonetheless, Hart noted that informal activities encompass a gamut of activities from 
marginal operations to large enterprises. He distinguishes between legitimate and 
illegitimate informal activities. The former includes primary and secondary activities 
such as farmers and self-employed artisans; tertiary enterprises such as housing and 
transport; small-scale distributors such as petty traders and street hawkers and those 
who provide informal services such as shoe shiners and barbers. The latter includes 
hustlers who trade in stolen goods, drugs and prostitution, confidence tricksters (e.g. 
money doublers) and gamblers.  
In the same vein, Roitman (1990: 679) defines informal economic activities as 
economic activities that are unmeasured and unrecorded. Hence ‘some of its activities 
are illegal, others are not illegal in themselves but are carried out in a manner that 
avoids taxation or in some way deprives the state of revenue’. Whether legitimate or 
illegitimate, legal or illegal, informal economic activities emerge in response to 
desperate situations. Individuals facing economic uncertainties are forced to create 
ways of acquiring the resources they need for their basic survival. In investigating the 
alternative economic strategies of youths in Nairobi’s largest and oldest informal 




informal waste economy was considered a ‘‘last resort survival and livelihood 
strategy” in the absence of access to legal spheres and formal modes of employment.  
It follows from this that informality is in the eye of the beholder (Hart, 2000). This 
means that the informal economy is multifaceted and has been perceived in a number 
of different ways. Different people in different contexts construct their own notions of 
informal economic activities. This is reflected in the multiplex use of the concept of 
informal economy, which includes but are not limited to, the black market, the hidden 
sector, the peripheral, shadow and un-official economy (Ferman et al, 1973; Guttmann, 
1977; Simon and Witte, 1982). In the Gambia, the concept has been indiscriminately 
used to refer to the activities of the hustlers in this study and the Lebanese and Indian 
businessmen who control large segments of the country’s economy. 
Although Gambian youths used the term ‘hustling’ to describe their informal economic 
activities, many other street expressions have been used to describe the concept or idea 
of hustling as relates to informality or the informal economy, particularly within 
Africa. For instance, in Senegal, Venables (2009) interprets the idea of gòorgòorlu as 
a means of ‘getting by’ or ‘making do’. In Kenya, it is called jua kali (a Kiswahili term 
meaning harsh sun) and refers to the creativity and resourcefulness of labourers in 
Kenya’s informal economy (King, 1996). Kalabule is the word used by Ghanaians to 
refer to their activities of getting by- a word both loaded and derogatory, signifying 
‘practices involving business undertakings that use foul means to achieve excessive 
economic gains’ (Adjibolosoo, 1995).  
With an emphasis on ‘getting by’ or ‘making do’, the above expressions invoke similar 
connotations with ‘je me débrouille’, a stock pharse commonly used by young people 
in Cameroon to explain how they cope with unforeseen everyday life situations and 
challenges in the urban social environment (Waage, 2006). For Reed-Danahay 
(1996:62), the term ‘se débrouiller’ possesses a ‘positive connotation of shrewdness 
and is connected with the value of social fluidity’. In essence, it suggests the ability to 
be resourceful and manipulative in equal measure, yet making the most out of difficult 
situations.  
The above expressions vividly convey the extemporaneous nature of the lives of young 




concept of bricolage, describing the bricoleur as someone who takes ‘advantage of 
situations presented to her/him’, is a useful analytical tool to understand the situation 
of the hustlers in this study.  For the protagonists of this study, informal economic 
activities such as beach hustling and chanting where toubabs are primarily targeted 
provided opportunities to respond to their social and economic challenges. These 
economic activities involve the use of certain tactics based on manipulation and taking 
advantage of circumstances to generate the income needed to fulfil their aspirations.   
These expressions, commonly used in urban African settings, signify a shared way of 
interpreting everyday challenges and precarious survival situations in a socio-
culturally complex society. They also reflect the common survival strategies and the 
ways by which they are negotiated through the social landscape (Waage, 2006). 
Through the narratives and everyday life challenges and strategies of beach hustlers 
and chanters, this thesis does not only contribute to the analysis of the flexibility and 
creativity needed to ‘make it’ in an urban milieu beset by socio-cultural inhibitions 
and economic decay, it also enriches our understanding of how young people use 
hustling to renegotiate their social position. 
The economic activities of the hustlers in this study entail income earning tactics that 
can to some extent be considered to straddle the line between the formal and the 
informal economy and at the same time transgress the boundaries between  the licit 
and illicit and the moral and immoral. Comaroff and Comaroff (2005: 38) aptly 
describe this situation: 
African youths find their own ways and means which 
sometimes involve the supply of hitherto unimagined services 
that may involve illicit or stigmatised forms of work blurring 
the lines of legality/illegality. 
Other Forms of Income-Generating Activities 
It is worth mentioning that beach hustling and chanting are not the only income 
generating opportunities available to Gambian youths to improve their social and 
economic conditions at the time of this fieldwork. Just as Fergusson (1999:78-79) 
underscores the variation of trajectories and strategies that draw on rural and urban 




Copperbelt, this study is also mindful of the ‘full house of variation’ (Ibid) that was 
available for Gambian youths to achieve social and economic advancement. During 
the period I was carrying out fieldwork in the Gambia, hustling among Gambian 
youths included a plethora of economic activities  Not drawn (both socially and 
economically) by the Gambian government’s clarion call to go ‘back to the land’ and 
engage in agriculture and fishing, and not tempted to take the ‘back way’, some young 
Gambians generated income by engaging in a gamut of economic activities, such as 
gambling, buying and selling of imported second hand goods like mobile phones, that 
can provide them the income they need to fulfil their aspirations.  
For instance, it has been reported that the strategic use of sexual relationships for 
financial and material benefits is being used by young Gambians, mostly female, to 
generate income. Locally known as mbaran, it involves establishing multiple and 
sometimes simultaneous relationships with financially superior partners. In a context 
where young Gambians feel that one relationship con no longer fulfil all desires, the 
young females I spoke with and who engage in mbaran emphasize that they need both 
affective connection and material resources, but that it is not always possible to obtain 
both from the same relationship. Like young women in Dakar (Nyamnjoh, 2005) and 
South Africa (Hunter, 2009), whose specific desires cause them to cultivate different 
relationships for different ends, so too, do the Gambian girls who engage in mbaran 
create multiple relationships that are both for economic gain and emotional attachment. 
Chant and Evans (2010: 353) explored the strategic use of sexual relationships in 
bolstering the ‘economic well-being’ of young low-income women in the Gambia and 
noted ‘the increasingly prominent place of cross-generational relationships in the 
livelihood strategies of young women struggling with unemployment in a constrained 
labour market often resulting in multiple, concurrent relations'. Young Gambian girls 
under pressure to support their families, to fulfil various basic survival needs and/or 
aspirations for socio-economic mobility enter into unions with older men or so-called 
“sugar daddies”. Other young people, like the ones Janson (2014:79) studied, sought 
solace in spirituality by joining the Tablighi Islamic movement where they attempt to 
‘escape the burden of their everyday reality in the Gambia, which is marked by 




Other young Gambians encountered during fieldwork did not pursue any particular 
economic activity to change their life trajectory. Instead, they resorted to hanging out 
in their vous fantasising about their dreams and chances of migrating to the West. 
Jonsson (2012) found similar forms of adaptations to ‘involuntary immobility’ among 
the youths she studied in the village of Kounda in Mali. In the Gambia, the nerves 
syndrome or simply nerves (Gaibazzi, 2010)  has come to epitomise the condition of 
the young Gambians who, mostly male, experience ‘involuntary immobility’ by sitting 
in grand palaces and talking about their aspirations, which hinge on travelling to 
Europe to achieve success and provide for their families, and their frustrations of not 
being able to migrate. I must underline that the nerves syndrome does not only reflect 
an aspiration to travel and a frustration about the inability to do so, but is also rooted 
in everyday hardship or ‘suffering’ as the majority of my interlocutors who declared 
themselves ‘to be suffering from nerves’ intimated to me during my field work. Thus 
the nerves syndrome can be seen as a variant or elaboration of the discourse on 
hustling, emphasising pro-active attitudes as a precondition to socio-economic 
success. 
 
The Somali word Buufis has been used by Cindy Horst (2006) to describe a similar 
phenomenon among Somali refugees living in Dadaab refugee camp, Kenya. Buufi is 
a Somali word that means ‘to blow into or to inflate’ and ‘indicates a longing or desire 
blown into someone’s mind’ (Horst, 2006:143). In Dadaab, buufis is used both to refer 
to someone’s hope, longing, desire and dream to go for resettlement and the 
aspiration for emigration and its failed attempts. This can increase the blowing of the 
buufis to such an extent that it becomes a form of spirit possession and a cause of 
madness (Horst 2006). Brad Weiss (2005) has described similar phenomena in his 
study of Arusha (Tanzania) young men. Weiss finds that everyday hardship generates 
a stream of thoughts in young men’s minds, which is perceived as pain and which he 
also associates to spirit possession. The concepts of nerves and buufis illustrate how 
the opportunities, constraints, hopes and dreams that Gambian youths and Somali 






1.3 Theoretical Contribution 
This ethnography offers to open up a new theoretical territory through which to 
understand young people’s aspirations and how they are fulfilled. The study suggests 
ways in which we can conceive of and investigate the aspirations of young urban 
Africans and how they are achieved through the ways in which they experience 
involuntary immobility. In doing so, the study contributes to the growing body of 
research that sought to understand the livelihood trajectories of urban youths (Nyanzi, 
Rosenberg‐Jallow, Bah & Nyanzi, 2005; Ebron, 2002; Wagner & Yamba, 1986; 
Brown, 1992 and Venables, 2009) by focusing on young people’s experiences of 
‘involuntary immobility’. 
I approach the topic by focusing on the importance of local livelihoods to the 
achievement of social and economic aspirations. Existing scholarship on the 
aspirations of urban youths in the Gambia and elsewhere in developing countries, and 
how they are achieved tends to put too much emphasis on international migration as a 
means of achieving social and economic advancement (see Cabezas, 2004; Venables, 
2009; Meiu, 2009; De Francisco, 2004 and Nyanzi, Rosenberg‐Jallow, Bah & Nyanzi, 
2005; Ebron, 2002 and Wagner & Yamba, 1986). These studies contend that young 
Gambians consider international migration as the only way to attain socio-economic 
advancement. For instance, the majority of studies on beach boys in the Gambia 
emphasise their ultimate wish to migrate out of their country to either Europe or North 
America through relationships with foreign women. Leaving for Europe, and changing 
their present condition, is seen as an opportunity to create a better life for themselves 
(Brown 1992:365). 
Whilst these approaches have provided useful insights through which to understand 
the aspirations of some young Gambians, they ignore the efforts and experiences of 
those who seek alternative means of achieving social and economic advancement by 
pursuing local livelihoods. Failing to tell their stories implicitly supports dominant 
Western-centric notions that African youths are excessively fixated with the idea that 
success and financial autonomy and socio-economic advancement can only be 
achieved through migration to the West. These notions are further reinforced by recent 




through either the Mediterranean or the Sahara by risking their lives. Hence, this study 
principally contributes to the growing body of anthropological literature on young 
people and the ways they internalise local opportunities to achieve social and economic 
advancement. It suggests ways in which we can conceive of and investigate livelihood 
strategies of young urban Africans that is not based on migration.  
In the chapters that follow, I shift attention to the experiences of Gambian hustlers I 
encountered during fieldwork, who rather than wait to migrate, take advantage of local 
opportunities to achieve social and economic advancement. By exploring their 
economic activities and aspirations, I intend to demonstrate the empirical grounds for 
my assertion that, in many cases, in the Gambia, some young people pursue local 
livelihoods to achieve their aspirations of social and economic advancement. In other 
words, finding themselves in a condition of ‘involuntary immobility’, they take 
advantage of locally available opportunities and resources to create a better life for 
themselves and their families. This study supplements the works of Africanist 
anthropologists who have recently made attempts to bring to the fore of social analysis 
the lives and experiences of young Africans who ‘stay behind’ (Gaibazzi, 2015). For 
example, in an attempt to present an alternative to the view that migration has become 
a default option for many young people in Africa to pursue their livelihoods and fulfil 
their aspirations, Gaibazzi explored the lives of young men who ‘stay behind’ in the 
Gambian village of Sabi whose ‘settled lives’, he argues, have been taken for granted. 
Although the hustlers in this study earn a living through their interactions with toubabs, 
the aim is not to establish a systematic comparison between beach hustlers and 
chanters. Rather, the aim is to map out the crosscutting trajectories of young people, 
the economic activities they engage in to achieve their aspirations and the factors that 
shape these aspirations. Life story interviews with, and the narrated experiences of, 
key beach hustlers and chanters provided the empirical foundations that helped the 
study to juxtapose and socially contextualise the aspirations of beach hustlers and 
chanters, and the strategies they employ to achieve their aspirations. The overarching 
concern of this study, then, is precisely to investigate young Gambians’ social and 
economic aspirations and the hustling strategies they employ to achieve their 
aspirations. The key questions that the study seeks to explore are: What are the social 




shaped and negotiated? What strategies do they employ to achieve their aspirations?  
Drawing on this, the study aims to address the broad themes of aspirations, aspirations 
formation and livelihood strategies.   
This ethnography provides an intricate account of how young Gambians in a state of 
‘involuntary immobility’ pursue local livelihoods by employing different strategies to 
achieve their social and economic aspirations. It further explores the social, cultural 
and religious factors that shape these aspirations. In order to locate the study within 
wider debates, the next section sets out in more detail and addresses the theoretical 
approaches to hustling strategies, aspirations and aspirations formation. 
1.4 Anthropological Approaches to Hustling and Aspirations  
The young people whose life stories constitute this ethnography associate the 
livelihood strategies they employ to achieve their aspirations with everyday ‘hustling’. 
Hustling among Gambians conjures up ideas of hard work, smartness and 
determination to obtain something and the ability to overcome obstacles and adapt to 
new opportunities and positions. It speaks of an ideal of self-reliance. Although many 
consider it as a precondition of success, it is by no means a guarantee.  
In the Gambia, hustling is both an activity and a social construct that emerged among 
unemployed youth in post-independent Gambia. Certainly, regardless of socio-
economic status, hustling has historically been a popular livelihood option for the 
majority of urban youth, particularly the poor. It was common practice, during the 
1980s through to the 1990s, for both the poor and elite families to respond to worsening 
economic situations and political uncertainty by sending their children to study, but 
most importantly to work/hustle abroad. This led to the term ‘hustle’ being used 
interchangeably with migration (Gaibazzi, 2015: 22) as people who travelled to the 
West are said to be going ‘to hustle’. Hustling in the West, the UK and US in particular, 
has been a key livelihood strategy for many young Gambians in their attempts to fulfil 
their aspirations of social and economic advancement.  
Despite this general conception of the term hustling within Gambian society, I have 
observed multiple patterns of hustling mobilised along generational and gender lines. 




societal perceptions. For instance, hustling before the 1990s was very much a male 
project in the Gambia. Although women too hustled as well, the idea of hustling 
outside one’s place of residence was usually associated with men only. Hence, it was 
uncommon for women to migrate for the purpose of hustling and hustling among 
women was confined to street vending near their homes. 
However, a declining economy resulting from the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s saw 
many male family heads failing in their obligations as sole subsistence providers. The 
diminishing ability of men to take care of the families as it used to be, has induced 
women to assume a more independent role in securing an income to support 
themselves and their children as demonstrated by the women fruit sellers of this study. 
Consequently, Gambian women’s lives take a different trajectory nowadays compared 
to the case some 20 to 30 years ago where women had to marry, sometimes very early, 
to get access to cash and other resources through men. Thus, marriage and having 
children was an important factor shaping a woman’s life, mainly because it determined 
access to resources. Although this still is the case to some extent, its significance has 
somewhat diminished. In particular, female hustlers’ income-generating activities has 
effected social norms leading to a more balancing of social relations. Hence, in the 
contemporary context, hustling in the Gambia provides women with a new role model 
that departs form established gender roles which confined women strictly to the 
domestic sphere. This new role model also applies to the men who are now more 
involved in domestic work resulting in new reconfigurations of gender roles and 
norms. 
The first subsection of this section explores the anthropological approaches to the 
hustling strategies of urban youths by setting out in more detail the hustling strategies 
of young urban men that frame and motivate this study. I then look at the relevant 
scholarship on young people and their aspirations, and further explore the socio-
economic factors that shape these aspirations. This not only helps us to understand, 
make sense of and situate the empirical discussions within wider scholarship on 
aspirations, it will also let theory inform the empirical data of the study. However, I 





1.4.1 Conceptualising ‘Youth’ 
The ways in which the young hustlers in this study express their aspirations and the 
attempts they make to fulfil these aspirations in the midst of limited opportunities runs 
counter to the views of many West African specialists who attribute the experiences 
and involvement of young people in urban areas to marginalisation, socio-economic 
failure, crime and violence, and armed conflicts (see for example Chauveau and 
Richards, 2008; Richards, 1996; Vigh, 2006). These attributes have led some scholars 
to pessimistically describe African youths as ‘hopeless’, or, borrowing O’Brien’s 
(1996) phrase, ‘a lost generation’. Taken together, such observations hide the more 
mundane dimensions of everyday life in many settings where physical violence is not 
the daily fare or where numerous young people continue everyday daily living in spite 
of violence. In the Gambia, if there is violence, it tends to be of a structural kind, 
inflicted on young people’s lives. These result from poverty, economic depression and 
societal pressures to conform to masculine expectations and obligations.  
I suggest that in such a situation, young people are not so much a "lost generation" as 
they are a segment of the population of whom many in fact might never become adult 
in a normative social and cultural sense. Thus, Temudo and Abrantes (2015) calls for 
a challenge of the current dominant narratives about the crisis of youths in 
contemporary Africa and highlights the need to study their aspirations and 
achievements from a holistic perspective. 
The concept of youth is a socio-cultural construction bearing both ‘biological attributes 
and time and culture bound characteristics’ (Durham, 2004). For instance, 
international organisations like the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and 
the Commonwealth apply an age bracket of 15-24 years old, 15-29 years old and 15-
35 years old respectively to define youth for operational purposes. Although these 
organisations classify those under 15 years of age as children, a 2007 World Bank 
report ‘Development and the Next Generation’ expanded the range to include all 
people between 12 and 24 years old (World Bank, 2007). The Government of the 
Gambia’s national youth policy uses a more flexible, but extensive range of 15 to 30 




Conversely, anthropologists and sociologists have drawn our attention to the fact that 
the concept of ‘youth’ as a social category is culturally and historically constructed 
(Thorsen, 2007; Christiansen, Utas and Vigh (2006: 10) and its meaning can differ in 
different times and contexts. For example, in one social context, a young man without 
the resources to marry and establish a household may remain a youth longer than his 
contemporaries who have achieved this status. In Kenya, for instance, the notion of 
youth has, across different cultural groups, traditionally been associated with a time of 
ambition. Similarly, Boehm (2006) observes a situation in Lesotho where youth is 
perceived as a transitional phase characterised by a certain degree of liminality. In 
order to be a complete socially and morally accepted adult, or what Vigh (2006) calls 
homo completto or complete man, access to symbolic and material resources and 
marriage are essential preconditions. 
In the Gambia, the social category of youth is constituted by a characteristic set of 
conditions that begin somewhere in adolescence and extend for many as far as their 
late twenties or even early thirties. These conditions include having not yet attained 
the widely standard markers of adulthood which can entail income, marriage and child-
rearing or a combination of them. Thus, young men in their late thirties or early forties 
who lack these markers are still considered youth. This illustrates that the age 
parameter alone is not adequate to conceptualise youth in certain contexts and that 
young people’s social categorisation are related to context-specific norms and 
customs, which include rites of passage, assignment of social responsibilities and 
social status (Waldie, 2006). 
The above situation has made the transition from youth-hood to adult-hood a challenge 
for young people in many African contexts. Economic crisis and its attendant 
deprivations has put many young people in a precarious situation, where they have to 
wait longer than normal to be accepted as adults. The attributes of adulthood are 
becoming increasingly unattainable by the majority of young people in Africa 
struggling with unemployment and sustainable livelihoods in the context of 
widespread social and economic crisis. An illustrative example can be found in urban 
Ghana where a recurrent theme amongst youths was the indefinite postponement of 
their ascent to adulthood due to lack of employment, marriage and the ownership of 




In discussing youth in Madagascar, Cole (2005) has suggested that youth no longer be 
conceptualized as a transitional phase leading up to adulthood. She argues that it now 
appears to be quite common to remain a youth indefinitely. In an environment of 
economic decline, individuals occupying this expanding category of youth experience 
a changed relationship to their future. Hence, Honwana (2012) and Sommers (2012) 
use the term ‘waithood’ and ‘being stuck’ respectively to describe the experiences of 
young people who find themselves in a ‘period of suspension between childhood and 
adulthood’. Specifically, ‘Waithood’ (a portmanteau term of “wait” and “-hood”, 
meaning ‘waiting for adulthood’) refers to the perceived period of suspension between 
youth and adulthood. Howana (2012) argues that ‘waithood’ accounts for a 
multiplicity of young people’s experiences, ranging from daily survival strategies to 
having to resort to improvised forms of livelihood in the informal economy to 
involvement in illegal and sometimes criminal endeavours. She points out that: 
Young people in waithood are pushed out of the system and 
forced to survive on the margins of society. Rejected by the 
state and the formal sector of the economy, they create new 
spaces and mechanisms for survival and operate in subcultures 
outside hegemonic structures (Howana, 2012:23). 
The majority of my interlocutors expressed their situation through these terms. How 
they respond to these processes depends greatly on their socioeconomic (such as 
gender and religion) and spatial location and the kinds of skills and resources they can 
draw from within the organization of everyday life in their own household contexts 
and in the wider setting. Although the barriers to international migration constitute an 
important challenge to many hustlers livelihoods, it seems that they are not completely 
unprepared to cope with such a situation. This study shows that these hustlers have 
crafted alternative ways of earning an income by tapping on local and available 
resources. I suggest that this adaptation to immobility is a genuine opportunity to make 
money at home. 
Immobility can be a dynamic condition (Jónsson, 2007) and studies have shown how 
young men adapt to immobility by resorting to particular socialising patterns and youth 
cultures (Christiansen et al, 2006). For instance, Abdullah (1999) observes that the 




to socially redefine themselves in terms that reflect their marginal situation. The 
symbolism of this redefinition is reflected in forms of socialisation and the 
construction of sub-cultures. Most  African urban youth are now attracted to embracing 
religion and joining religious movements such as the Tablighi as in the Gambia 
(Janson 2014) and Pentecostal churches as in Ghana (Burrell, 2012). In particular, 
Gaibazzi (2015: 130) found that Gambian youths see piety as directly related to 
‘disenfranchisement and the delusion of unrealised migration plans’. 
Other forms of socialisation among urban African youth is the creation of youth groups 
and gangs. Ya’u (2000) observes that such gatherings in Kano, Nigeria, provides male 
youth with an identity. In these spaces, the use of nicknames and the consumption of 
contemporary music like reggae and hip hop are an important part of identity re-
invention. Evident in this respect is the interplay between youth’s aspirations and the 
dynamics of cultural globalisation as youths tap into ‘global youth cultures’. As a 
result, popular and mass culture in the West has become, to a large extent, part of the 
repertoire of African youth culture. In Examining the ways in which urban youth in 
Arusha, Tanzania, ‘inhabit fantasy’, Brad Weiss (2002) helps us understand this 
‘glocal’8 phenomenon. He details a world of barbershops named after distant 
geographies, filled with the posters and paintings of black American celebrities, in 
which young men listen to and watch the music and visual entertainment of an ardently 
engaged ‘imagined’ global world.  
Although this study focuses on youths in a specific context and how they experience 
and react to conditions of ‘involuntary immobility’, the socio-cultural dynamics 
inherent therein evokes issues that have a wide resonance in Africa and in Africanist 
scholarship on youth. It is important to note that most African societies are 
gerontocratic, hence, youth is seen as a transitory phase to adulthood, and its 
elongation, in contrast to the Western view, is not perceived as a desirable outcome 
(Honwana and De Boeck, 2005; Alber, Van der Geest and Reynolds-Whyte, 2008). 
 
                                                 




1.4.2 Hustling Strategies 
Sociologists and anthropologists have used the term ‘hustling’ to describe a broad 
range of economic activities that the young people they studied engaged in as a 
livelihood strategy.  For example, Ned Polsky (1969), the first person to introduce the 
concept of hustling into the social science literature (Fields, 1985: 28), used the term 
to describe the activities of men who earn a living by betting on pool and billiard games 
in the US. In his ethnography, ‘Hustlers, Beats, and Others’, Polsky examines the 
occupation of a particular type of gamblers who make a living by betting in different 
types of pool or billiard games. Referred to as pool room hustlers, they engage in 
‘deviant occupation’ by breaking enforced gambling laws to supplement their income. 
Following Polsky’s work, anthropological scholarship on hustling as a livelihood 
strategy has undergone a gradual conceptual focus. Broadly speaking, the earlier use 
of the term from the 1970s to the 1990s focused on young men’s ‘deviant’ economic 
undertakings to fulfil their aspirations (Klein, 1989; Calhoun, 1992; McNamara, 
1995:25). The subjects of these studies were young men who engage in ‘survival sex’ 
by selling diverse sexual services to other men for payment and/or other personal and 
material advantages. For example, In ‘The Times Square Hustler: Male Prostitution in 
New York City’, McNamara (1995) provided an ethnographic account of the lives of 
male hustlers in New York’s Times Square who are involved in the trade to supplement 
their income. Times Square hustlers, according to McNamara, engage in diverse 
activities, which range from “voyeurism, posing nude, masturbating clients or 
sadomasochism and oral and anal sex” (McNamara, 1995: 28). Despite having sexual 
encounters with other men, male hustlers do not consider themselves to be gay and 
their greatest contradiction lies in juxtaposing their hustling activities and their 
heterosexual identity (see, Klein, 1989). Similarly, Klein’s (1989: 12) study of 
Southern California’s bodybuilders who were involved in the “widespread selling of 
sexual favours to gay men” has been identified as one aspect of the broader hustling 
strategies that young urban men employ to achieve their aspirations. Klein found this 
form of hustling to be an important economic strategy for his study participants in an 




Research on male street hustling has also established the principal methods through 
which the majority of male hustlers are introduced into hustling (Calhoun, 1992). 
Through ‘peer introduction’ male street hustlers learn about and are introduced to the 
trade through interactions and associations with friends, siblings and/or other relatives 
who are already participants. Also referred to as ‘significant others’, they do not only 
introduce the new recruits to hustling but also provide instructions, techniques and 
motives for carrying out the activity. Calhoun, also found that others are introduced to 
hustling through what he calls ‘situational discovery’ which involves a situation where 
a young person learns about male prostitution without much effort by stumbling into 
the activity.  
The period after the 1990s saw the emergence of the definitive works on hustling in a 
developing world context. This was mainly due to the emergence of sex tourism in the 
1990s in mostly the Caribbean and Africa. This phenomenon led to a slightly different 
use of the concept of hustling as the term was applied to describe the economic 
activities of young ‘local’ men who engage in intimate relationships with female 
tourists. Also known as beach hustling, it is defined as the activities of “young, 
unemployed black men who provide escort and sexual services to white female tourists 
of varying ages in exchange for economic goods and services which range from brand 
name clothes to airline tickets”(Kempadoo, 1999: 186; Phillips, 2008). The 
anthropological literature classifies beach hustlers into two categories depending on 
their economic activities and their money-making strategies. These are those who 
engage in transactional sex with tourists as a means of earning an income and those 
who offer diverse services such as guiding.  
For example, in Kenya, Meiu (2009) examines the activities of the young Samburu 
men who migrate seasonally to coastal tourist resorts seeking the niche of tourism for 
material gains by developing relationships with white female tourists. Calling them the 
“Mombasa morans (warriors)”, these young men engage in sexual relationships with 
“older and ugly white women for money" (Meiu, 2009: 126). Similarly, Phillips (2008) 
explored the interactions between white female tourists and local men in Barbados. 
The ‘gigolos’ as Phillips refers to the beach boys in Barbados, establish liaisons with 




continued period of time can escalate to emotional attachment and sometimes 
culminates in marriage.  
Other studies on beach hustling have focused on beach hustlers who make money by 
providing unconventional guiding services to tourist. For instance, De Francisco 
(2004) studied the economic adaptations utilised by young men, known as the papasi, 
in Zanzibar to subsist at the margins of the tourist economy. Acting as local tour 
guides, key to the papasi’s (a Swahili word for ‘tick’, the blood-sucking parasitical 
insect) daily survival is the “Mzungu (or white man) commission”. This commission, 
which normally amounts to about 5-10 percent of the value of the foreigner’s custom, 
are paid to the papasi by hotels, guesthouses, tourist attractions and taxi drivers when 
they bring them business.   
Correspondingly, the commission system is an important feature of the hustling 
strategies of beach boys in Malindi, Kenya, who also act as local tour guides for 
tourists (Eid Bergan, 2007) as they attempt to persuade tourists to book safaris or go 
for boat trips. Normally ten percent of the price paid, the beach boys in Malindi along 
with waiters or hotel employees, receive commission (from the place visited) for 
taking tourists almost anywhere; to a restaurant, to a bar or club, or to various tour-
operators. Most often the commission is paid without the tourist knowing about it. In 
Cuba, Vertovec (2012: 29) reports that the dollars tourists spend in the country have 
created new unofficial opportunities for Cubans to make money. Working as jineteros 
(the Cuban name for hustlers), “they panhandle from tourists, offer their services as 
guides, and sell stolen merchandise such as cigars at below-market prices”. 
In the literature on the Gambia, studies on hustlers and their livelihood strategies that 
have received the most attention have focused on the sexual aspects of hustling. These 
include studies by Nyanzi, Rosenberg-Jallow, Bah and Nyanzi (2005), Brown (1992) 
and Wagner & Yamba (1986). They studied the activities of young men, locally known 
as bumsters, who provide sex to Western tourist women looking for holiday romance 
in return for money, goods and an opportunity to travel. To secure economic 
advancement  through overseas migration or remittances and social respect at home,  
young Gambian men often cultivate relationships with older foreign  female (and 




and inter-generational sexual relationships are often perceived as highly desirable 
(Nyanzi et al., 2005). 
For instance, in ‘Bumsters, Big Black Organs and Old White Gold: Embodied Racial 
Myths in Sexual Relationships of Gambian Beach Boys’, Nyanzi et al (2005: 557) 
found that the key hustling strategies of bumsters consist of “indulging in a complex 
web of sexual activity ranging from commercial to non-commercial, voluntary to 
socially-imposed, individual to peer-driven, heterosexual to homosexual, casual to 
regular, particularly with foreign tourists”. As part of their hustling strategy, bumsters 
establish multiple partnerships either concurrently or in sequence and having regular 
sexual relationships with older White women, although some also engaged in sex with 
younger women (ibid). Similarly, in her study on the hustling strategies of bumsters in 
the Gambia, Brown (1992) found that bumsters target tourists to make money from 
them by employing deception and spinning false stories of personal plight. 
There seem to be some convergence in the hustling strategies of Gambian bumsters 
and the beach hustlers in the Caribbean, East Africa and other West African contexts. 
Firstly, as part of their hustling strategies, the findings reveal that beach hustlers use 
dress to construct a particular image as a means of conveying a certain message. 
Writing about Senegalese beach boys, locally known as the cotemen, Venables (2009) 
highlighted the importance of imagery as a key hustling strategy. Drawing on the 
works of anthropologists like Hendrickson (1996) and Newell (2005) who focus on 
the symbolism of clothing and body image, she argues that cotemen use dress and 
appearance to construct a particular image and convey a certain message to the tourists 
they interact with. Secondly, the ability of beach hustlers to speak several European 
languages in addition to their local languages has also been highlighted. For instance, 
Venables (2009) notes that cotemen often spoke French, Spanish or Italian in addition 
to their vernacular tongue and some also spoke English. Similarly, Pruitt and LaFont 
also assert that “learning to speak a little German occurred” among Jamaican beach 
hustlers (1995:431).  
The forms of hustling strategies discussed above fall under the typology of economic 
activities that are considered to be deviating from widely acceptable norms (Miller, 




have engendered stigma for the hustlers involved in their respective societies 
(Goffman, 1968; Klein, 1989; Calhoun, 1992). Early studies on hustling strategies that 
portray the deviant nature of the economic activities of hustlers has given way to 
attempts by later scholars on the hustling strategies of urban youths to draw on the 
entrepreneurial nature of hustlers (Munive, 2010; Candace, 2011; Di Nunzio, 2012; 
Thieme, 2013; 2014). In particular, Thieme (2014: 230) described the activities of 
Kenyan youths, whose work within the informal waste economy are “continuously 
entangled in references to hustling” as a form of entrepreneurship. In her work, 
‘Turning Hustlers into Entrepreneurs, and Social needs into Market Demands: 
Corporate–Community Encounters in Nairobi, Kenya’, she described as 
entrepreneurial the hustling strategies of urban youths living in the slums who use the 
resources of waste in their neighbourhoods to generate income. 
The beginning of the new century saw the emergence of novel forms of hustling 
strategies that make use of new information and communication technologies (ICT). 
In particular, a growing body of empirical work, particularly within social 
anthropology, has demonstrated the ways in which the internet has been or is being 
used to support the hustling strategies of young people in urban settings. Similar to the 
ways the chanters in this study appropriate the internet to support their hustling 
strategies, the studies focus on the economic activities of young people in urban 
settings, mostly found in cybercafés, who resort to various strategies to make money 
from the people they interact with online. 
Since the mid-2000s, there has been a marked increase in ethnographic studies that 
have contributed to these theoretical insights. In Nigeria and Ghana respectively, Ndjio 
(2008) and Whitty (2013) reported on the internet hustling strategies of the so-called 
Nigerian 4199 email scammers and the Ghanaian sakawas10. In both instances, the 
scammers randomly send emails to people claiming to be a wealthy former member of 
the corrupt government network with access to millions of dollars and requesting help 
to quickly transfer the money out of the country. Email recipients are asked to provide 
                                                 
9 Name derives from the Nigerian Criminal Code (419) that deals with offences of obtaining property 
by false pretences. 
10 A widespread practice in Ghana which combines modern Internet-based fraud practices with 




financial assistance to make the transfer of this money possible and is promised a 
substantial percentage of the money as a reward. A potential victim who believes the 
story and sends money will later realise that they have been defrauded as both money 
and scammer disappears. Internet scams can take many forms including claims about 
lottery winnings, church projects, or business deals (Burrell, 2008).  
Forms of scams such as the 419 are not new. Ampratwum (2009: 68) reports that as 
far back as the 17th century, early versions of this type of scam were in use in Europe. 
Known as the ‘Spanish Prisoner fraud’, the scam in that case consisted of a 
correspondence in which the ‘criminal’ would claim to be a prisoner who knows where 
some buried treasure is located. The ‘prisoner’ would ask for money to bribe the prison 
guards so that he could escape and get to the treasure. In return for such money, the 
‘prisoner’ would promise to share the treasure with the target of the scam. 
Similarly, anthropologist have also reported on the emergence of new forms of online 
fraud known as ‘romance fraud’. These are mostly popular in Ghana (Whitty, 2013) 
and Ivory Coast (Ford, 2014). For instance, Ford’s work on the hustling activities of 
the "brouteurs" in the Ivory Coast capital of Abidjan shows how cheap and fast access 
to the Internet has attracted young Ivoirians into the cybercafés, where they make easy 
money by initiating online love affairs with Westerners. Like their Ghanaian 
counterparts, the "brouteurs” create multiple online profiles and initiate contact with 
potential victims through chat rooms or dating web sites with the aim of luring them 
into a romantic relationship. By employing various tricks, the prospective foreign 
“partner” is seduced into to sending money for travel or medical expenses. As Abugri 
(2011) observes,  
In these romance scams, the criminals prey on single people 
and lonely hearts who are looking forward to having some fun 
or marrying their internet dates. In the course of the Internet 
dating they manage to convince their victims to send them 
money or obtain their victims’ bank accounts and empty them.  
With respect to new forms of hustling strategies where the internet is used as a 
principal tool, two things needs to be highlighted. Firstly, it is important to note that 
not all internet related hustling strategies are fraudulent in nature. For instance, a study 




Kenya, found that Facebook has been used among youths to support income generation 
by searching for “employment opportunities, marketing themselves, and seeking 
remittances from friends and family abroad” (Wyche et al., 2013). The study reveals 
that constraints such as unemployment among slum dwellers created an informal 
economy where hustling was used as a key strategy to generate income livelihoods. 
Consequently, Facebook was used as a hustling platform to support some slum 
dwellers’ livelihood strategies by connecting them to formal employment, support 
entrepreneurial efforts and seek remittances, or small sums of cash, from friends and 
family members abroad. This type of “consolidated” use of ICTs provides income 
generating opportunities for peripheral users (Ibid). 
Secondly, the study of the internet in hustling is not new as studies have shown how it 
has affected the dynamics of male street hustling or male prostitution.  In ‘In the 
Company of Men: The Inside Lives of Male Prostitutes’, Smith and Grove (2011) 
indicate that the internet provided an outlet for male prostitutes and customers to 
effectively locate each other while remaining anonymous behind a computer. 
Experienced and novice hustlers were able to advertise their sex work by accessing 
computers in coffee shops for little or no cost.  
In addition to the works that have provided a framework for our understanding of the 
hustling activities of urban youths, a few studies have emerged among Africanist 
anthropologists, in particular, that has approached the hustling strategies by focussing 
on the activities of young people who find themselves in a condition of ‘involuntary 
immobility’ (Gaibazzi, 2015;  Jonsson, 2012; Carling, 2002). In many developing 
countries, ‘involuntary immobility’ has become a central concern for people who have 
lost a strategy for creating a better life for themselves and their families. For instance, 
in her study on the ‘experiences of immobility’ among young Soninke men in the 
village of Kounda, Mali, Jonsson (2012) showed how young Soninke men, whose 
aspirations to migrate relate to ‘structural and cultural features of Soninke society’, 
pursued alternative forms of livelihoods not based on migration as a strategy to achieve 
their aspiration of ‘social becoming’. In their study on Balanta young men in Guinea 
Bissau, Temudo and Abrantes (2015) document the agency of many rural Balanta 
young men in using agriculture as a means to fund their education, to feed their 




Mali and Guinea Bissau, young urban Gambians adapt to immobility by resorting to 
hustling activities and in some cases adopting particular socialising patterns and youth 
cultures. 
Not all young people who find themselves in a state of ‘involuntary immobility’ are 
gainfully occupied. In Sabi, the Gambia, for instance, Gaibazzi (2015) found ‘sitting’ 
around with friends in ghettoes and drinking attaya characterises the experiences of 
some young Soninke men who find themselves in a condition of ‘involuntary 
immobility’. Referring to them as the ‘stayers’, the youths in Sabi resort to ‘sitting’ as 
a temporal strategy to ‘deal with their spatial problems’ (Ibid: 116). Unlike some of 
their counterparts in Sabi who engage in either agriculture or hustle, ‘just sitting’ does 
not accrue any value to the ‘sitters’.  
1.4.3 Aspirations and Aspirations Formation  
Broadly speaking, aspirations are born out of the desire and ambition to achieve 
something. Usually, it is used to refer to the career and educational ambitions of young 
people, but it can also be used to refer to more general life ambitions, such as wanting 
to start a family or live in a particular area (Gutman and Akerman, 2008). Although 
aspirations embody a sense of the future, they also influence and represent people’s 
orientations, values, and actions in the present (Allport 1955; Zimbardo and Boyd 
2008). In other words, aspirations are not only the outcome of conditions; they ‘do’ 
something and play an important function in people’s everyday lives. While the study 
of aspirations is marginal within mainstream research on the urban livelihoods of 
young people, perhaps because it is unclear how aspirations relate to actual outcomes 
(Crivello, 2015), an attempt will be made here to explore existing literature on the 
aspirations of young people and how they are shaped and negotiated. 
The social science literature presents two primary ways of conceptualising aspirations. 
The first is of aspirations as expressing some component of reality – that is, what 
people expect to achieve (see MacBrayne, 1987). Second are aspirations as ‘hopes and 
dreams’ which are not necessarily rooted in reality (Gutman and Akerman, 2008; 
Leavy and Smith, 2010). Venables’s (2009) work on the migratory aspirations of the 
young people she studied in Southern Senegal, ‘who aspire to migrate but whose 




The literature tends to provide a somewhat narrow conceptualisation of the aspirations 
of young people. For instance, the majority of earlier studies on aspirations were 
carried out in a Western context and focussed on the career aspirations (educational 
attainment and future occupations) of young people (see for example MacBrayne’s 
1987; Leavy & Smith 2010 for reviews). However, the last decade saw an emergence 
in a body of work that focusses on the aspirations of young people in Africa. A recent 
study in South Africa by Mosavel, Ahmed, Ports and Simon (2015) explored the 
aspirations and dreams of youth living in a low-income, urbanised, South African 
community. The findings suggest that the youths viewed education as their primary 
aspiration and the key to future success because it enabled upward social and economic 
mobility. A few other studies focussed on the aspirations of rural youths, particularly 
within the agricultural and cocoa farming sectors (see for example Anyidoho, Leavy 
and Asenso-Okyere, 2012; Leavy & Smith 2010) or the vocational aspirations of 
African students (Nwagwu, 1976).  
The aspirations of many of my interlocutors diverge from those discussed above. For 
these youths, their aspirations for success is motivated by achieving a better life.  In 
the case of the hustlers in this study, all acts of consumption are considered to be part 
of strategies for advancing personal success. Although Rowlands (1999:147) contends 
that the desire for success as an index of social mobility is hard to define and evaluate, 
the stories of the hustlers in this study suggest certain common themes in the evaluation 
of success. Whereas success in the 1960s and 1970s was evaluated by educational 
qualification and gaining access to state positions, the agenda for success and self-
affirmation in neo-liberal Gambia is recognised through a preference for conspicuous 
consumption in the form of driving new cars, driving fancy clothes, building houses 
and distributing cash to family members and other people in the community.   
Other scholars have focussed on the migratory aspirations of urban youths (Del Franco 
2006; Thorsen, 2007; Whitehead et al, 2007; Venables, 2009). In Southern Senegal, 
Venables (2009) reveals that the activities of the côtémen within the tourism sector 
formed part of their migration strategies. The dreams of young Senegalese men are 
adrift on the Atlantic as they attempt to reach the Canary Islands in order to create 
employment opportunities that will generate income to send back to their extended 




striving for opportunities in what they imagine to be the economic paradise of Europe. 
Other scholars who did research on beach hustlers in other contexts also emphasise 
their ultimate wish to migrate from their country to either Europe or the USA through 
their relationships with foreign women (Ebron, 2002; Cabezas, 2004). 
The existing studies on the aspirations of young Gambians mainly focus on their 
migratory aspirations (see for example Nyanzi et al., 2005; Brown, 1992; Wagner and 
Yamba, 1986). For instance, in their encounters with Gambian beach boys or bumsters, 
Nyanzi et al. (2005) observe how they openly fantasise and discuss their aspirations to 
travel to Europe or North America through their relationships with ‘older white 
women’ in order to escape the misery of the Gambian existence. The aspiration to 
migrate to the West to achieve social and economic advancement among the bumsters 
is often referred to as the Babylon syndrome. Babylon11 is the emic name for the West, 
‘a dream destination flowing with wealth which forms the core of the bumsters 
fantasies and aspirations to travel abroad and escape poverty’ (ibid: 567). Just like the 
Gambian bumsters, young people in Cape Verde also aspired to migrate to the West 
to achieve their aspirations of social and economic advancement (Carling, 2002). 
These ‘life-making projects’ are usually seen as a quest for material stability and 
relative comfort in an owner-occupied house with a stable family.   
In addition to conceptualising the aspirations of young people, anthropological studies 
have also examined the ‘determinants and correlates’ of aspirations (Leavy & Smith, 
2010). These focus on how aspirations are formed and how they develop in response 
and in relation to different environments, contexts and circumstances (Ibid). They 
highlight the tendency for aspirations to be formed early in childhood but shaped and 
modified over time by environment and experience. In other words, aspirations cannot 
be viewed as personal attributes entirely under an individual’s control. Rather, they are 
situated within and affected by particular opportunities, constraints and circumstances. 
Appadurai (2004: 67) views aspirations as part of wider “ethical and metaphysical 
ideas derived from cultural norms, that are either complementary or may substitute 
each other, and are never simply individual as they are formed in interaction and in the 
thick of social life”.  
                                                 




Other research presents aspiration formation as a dynamic process, developing within 
and influenced by the context in which a person lives (Anyidoho et al., 2012).  This 
context encompasses personal beliefs, societal expectations, and structural 
opportunities and constraints. Young people’s economic activities are shaped by an 
interplay of socio-economic dynamics and the quest for their transition to adulthood. 
The by-product of this interplay shapes the aspirations of many young people in Africa 
(Kabiru et al., 2013).  
For example, in his work in rural Bangladesh, Del Franco (2006) explores this 
dynamic, looking at how the emphasis placed by young people on commitments to 
family and also their own personal complex networks of social relationships influence 
aspirations. Similarly, drawing on empirical work by the DFID-funded Migration 
Development Research Centre to analyse inter-generational relations and independent 
child migration, Whitehead et al. (2007:18) use a specific interpretation of the concept 
of ‘inter-generational contract’ which stresses that intra-household relations “may be 
simultaneously relations of dependence, interdependence and autonomy on different 
terrains”. As inter-family interactions involve constant negotiations around the long 
term balance of support and reciprocity, the aspirations of young people are thus  
framed within implicit and explicit expectations placed upon them by family and 
kinship networks, which in turn are influenced by gender-specific societal customs and 
norms (ibid:15). This corresponds with aspiration formation in the Gambia, where I 
have observed that youths are influenced by a strong sense of community, social 
support and social influences in general. Both the environment close to the individual 
and the broader societal context and cultural norms therefore influence aspiration 
formation.  
It should by now be obvious that this study seeks to develop an understanding of the 
hustling strategies that young people employ to fulfil their aspirations. Hence, the first 
part of this review paid close attention to anthropological perspectives and 
understandings of hustling strategies. The review of previous works on the hustling 
strategies of young people in urban settings provides a useful theoretical lens through 
which to approach the hustling activities of the beach hustlers and chanters of this 




strategies.  The second part of the review explored the literature on aspirations and 
aspirations formation, and those which motivate and frame this study.       
1.5 Thesis Structure/Outline 
This introductory chapter (One) provides a general introduction to my research in the 
Gambia. I started the introduction with a vignette partly to give the reader a foretaste 
of the lives and activities of Gambian hustlers who constituted the majority of my 
interlocutors. I provide an insight into the focus and theoretical relevance of the study 
by situating the study within wider scholarly debates on urban youth livelihoods and 
aspirations. I also set out in more detail the theoretical considerations that frame this 
study. I address the main theoretical approaches to aspirations, aspiration formations 
and livelihood strategies in order to situate the three ethnographic chapters within 
wider anthropological debates.  
Chapter Two provides a methodological discussion which centres on how the research 
was conducted as well as the challenges of doing fieldwork at home and the hazards 
of ethnographic field work in general. In Chapter three, I introduce the Gambia as the 
setting of my study and briefly describe the social context of and family dynamics in 
the Gambia. I situate my research within the context of the contemporary political 
economy of the country.  I evaluate the perspectives on the impact of the political and 
economic developments of the past 20-30 years on the ability of young Gambians to 
fulfil their social and economic aspirations. I then provide a brief background and 
context of the tourism sector, and access and use of ICTs in the Gambia.  
Chapters Four, Five and Six constitute the empirical core of this study. The chapters 
document the hustling strategies of beach hustlers and chanters. The chapters further 
explored the aspirations that the hustlers aim to achieve by engaging in hustling 
activities. The factors that shape these aspirations were also discussed.  
In Chapters Four and Five, for example, I show the strategies that beach hustlers and 
chanters employ to achieve their aspirations in a state of ‘involuntary immobility’. I 
begin by introducing the hustlers by describing the places that I met them and the 
settings in which I observed their operations. In particular, Chapter Four looks at beach 




the tourism industry. The chapter pays particular attention and gives an account of 
their different income earning strategies. Chapter Five is concerned with a different 
category of hustlers, locally known as chanters and examines their ‘itineraries of 
accumulation’ by establishing relationships with toubabs and resorting to various 
tactics to make money from them. I focus specifically on two very common ways in 
which my interlocutors earned money, which I refer to as ‘the love method’ and the 
‘deception method’. I explore how these methods are carried out and the tensions 
inherent in them.  
Following on from this, Chapter Six relates hustlers to their societies by demonstrating 
how hustlers’ activities and aspirations are shaped by both family and societal 
expectations and the quest for social and economic advancement. I discuss the 
opportunities that hustling provides for the participants of this study to achieve their 
aspirations of social and economic advancement. I examine the complex interplay 
between fulfilling socio-cultural obligations that hinge on reciprocity and inter-
generational contracts and having access to and displaying modern consumer goods 
and the accomplishment of upward social mobility. I further suggest that the desire to 
fulfil socio-cultural obligations among my interlocutors can be understood through the 
notion of acquiring barako (blessing). The conclusions of the study are developed in 
Chapter Seven, where key ethnographic findings are summarised and weaved together 
in order to relate Gambian youths’ hustling activities to ideas about aspirations of 
social and economic advancement, fulfilling socio-cultural obligations and achieving 












The accounts and stories of the hustlers in this ethnography culminated from eight 
months of fieldwork in the Gambia. The fieldwork was carried out in two phases 
between 2013 and 2014. The first phase was carried out from September to December 
2013. This was followed by a second phase from March 2014 to July 2014. To 
understand the aspirations of hustlers and how they are shaped and the strategies they 
employ to achieve them, I followed the lives of prominent beach hustlers and chanters. 
Their accounts and personal stories reflect the lives of many hustlers who find 
themselves in a condition of ‘involuntary immobility’. Using three ethnographic 
chapters, I connect their trajectories and tell their stories in a way that evokes some 
sense of their situations and economic activities. 
To achieve this, I interacted with hustlers in their natural settings. This is the context 
in which the activities of interest to the researcher occur (Blaikie, 2010: 114). For 
instance, to understand the lives, aspirations and hustling strategies of chanters, I spent 
time observing and talking to them in cybercafés in Brikama, where the activity is 
prevalent among the town’s youths. I also spoke to Internet café operators and owners, 
people in the neighbourhood and the families and friends of hustlers. Although I 
conducted observations and interviews in all the cybercafés in Brikama, the AON and 
GAMTEL and their surroundings served as my main research setting.  
My encounters with beach hustlers mostly took place in Kololi, the Gambia’s tourism 
industry’s largest and most populated beach section. Considered the hotspot of 
Gambian tourism, it boasts many hotels and restaurants. In addition, I also spoke to 
beach hustlers who operated in Bakau, Bijilo and Senegambia. In these spaces, I 
approached participants in their occupations as taxi drivers, bird watchers, fishermen, 
local tour guides, fruit sellers, juice pressers and souvenir vendors. In particular, I 
followed the hustlers whose stories make up this ethnography, observing their work 
on the beaches, in taxi stands and the airport, amongst other places. This chapter 




encounters with the hustlers in these environments. Specifically, the chapter explores 
how access to hustlers and their milieu was negotiated, how the research was 
conducted, the problems encountered in the field and how they were tackled. 
Despite observing and talking to many beach hustlers and chanters, this ethnography 
is drawn from the life stories of ten hustlers. They provide an expanded representation 
of participation which includes everyday engagements with toubabs.12 The ten hustlers 
were selected from people I directly approached in the field and others recommended 
by research assistants and gatekeepers. Although I used the term ‘hustling’ for 
soliciting participants, I specified that I was mainly interested in their aspirations and 
the strategies they employ to fulfil these aspirations. A significant feature of my 
fieldwork experience was the way I had to deal with the dilemma of my dual identity 
as both an insider and an outsider. This conflict began to surface when my recognised 
identity as a semester who had gone to Europe to ‘hustle’ overshadowed my new 
identity as a researcher. This dual identity, the “hustler-cum-ethnographer” played a 
fundamental role during the research process, affecting the way people perceived, 
approached and interacted with me. 
This chapter therefore describes my attempts to reconcile these dual identities and the 
corresponding methodological consequences. Before doing that, I first introduce the 
field sites and discuss how access was negotiated, gained and sustained. I further locate 
the study within the qualitative tradition and explain why I chose the ethnographic 
methodology and its principal methods of data collection. To produce the life stories 
of hustlers in their own words, I discuss how in-depth semi-structured life story 
interviews were used to supplement the findings generated from observations. I 
conclude with a discussion of the hazards I was exposed to during my fieldwork and 
how general ethical issues around informed consent, privacy and harm were dealt with.  
 
                                                 
12 Attempts to talk to the toubabs they deal with proved unsuccessful. The ones I approached on the 
beaches and online by creating online profiles on social networking sites were suspicious of my 
motives and were consequently reluctant to talk to me. Their lack of voice does not affect the quality 
of this study as the principal focus is the alternative economic activities of hustlers and their 




2.2 Gaining Access to Hustlers and their Settings 
All ethnographic research involves the need for the researcher to “gain and maintain 
access to the research setting or social group in order to successfully carry out social 
research” (Coffey, 2006). The issue of access is therefore a key concern that the 
ethnographer must grapple with both before and during field work. Bryman (2008) 
observes that one of the key and yet most difficult steps in ethnographic research is 
negotiating and gaining access to the setting relevant to the research and the 
informants. Hence, it is crucial for researchers to not only successfully negotiate access 
to the research setting, but also to maintain on-going access. The inability to achieve 
this might cause problems for any researcher. The methodology literature (Ibid; 
Fielding, 1993) makes a distinction between physical and social access. This means 
that in situations where access is granted to the physical setting by virtue of it being an 
open/public setting, access to prospective research participants still has to be skilfully 
negotiated. Achieving this delicate balance can be a difficult task as it “requires the 
researcher to draw on his or her interpersonal resources and strategies” (Atkinson, 
Delamont & Lofland, 2007). 
This section reflects on the strategies I used to negotiate and maintain access to both 
the research settings and the participants. Due to the nature of this study, access was 
negotiated in two different settings, the beach and the cybercafé, by utilising multiple 
entry points. 
2.2.1 Doing Research on the Beach 
The beach hustlers I followed carry out their activities on the beach and its surrounding 
areas and at the airport. Although across the world such spaces are often open to the 
public, this is not the case in the Gambia. Beach hustlers and other locals who lack 
acceptable reasons for going to these spaces are prevented by security from entering 
or hanging around in them. Only registered beach hustlers are allowed controlled 
access, meaning they can only operate where their GTB cards permit them to. 
Fortunately, I did not have any problems gaining access to and hanging around along 




the case, David, my research assistant, told me that this was to do with my appearance 
as a semester. In fact, David was only allowed access when he was with me. 
Accessing the spaces where beach hustlers operate was not enough to study beach 
hustlers and their activities. To do this, I needed to have access to the beach hustlers 
themselves. I needed to observe and talk to hustlers who would be willing to share 
their knowledge of beach hustling and their aspirations with me. At first, I did not 
know where to start. Before I considered hiring the services of David, the few attempts 
I made to talk to people I perceived to be beach hustlers were unsuccessful. The few 
juice sellers and fruit sellers who mistook me for a tourist interested in buying their 
produce initially accommodated me by exchanging a few pleasantries with me. They 
suddenly changed their attitude towards me once I introduce myself as a researcher, 
perhaps due to the sensitive political context.  
In addition, my unfamiliarity with the geography of the industry prevented me from 
navigating through its complex terrain. I did not know the right spots where I could 
find beach hustlers. I needed a social navigator. I needed someone who understood 
both the social and physical terrain of the tourism industry to help me navigate its 
complexities. Someone with an extensive social network within the industry to provide 
access to not only beach hustlers, but also people with knowledge of beach hustling. 
After a few days of contemplation, I decided that only a beach hustler could possess 
these qualities. It was then that David came into my mind.   
I first met David during my first field visit in the Gambia. I was introduced to him by 
BJ, a youth leader in Brikama. BJ was aware of my research due to an interview I had 
carried out with him on chanting in Brikama. My initial encounter with David himself 
was to discuss chanting as he sometimes carries out the activity. With extensive 
knowledge of hustling and the aspirations of hustlers, I spent the next few days with 
David, discussing hustling while drinking attaya in my living room. It was during these 
interviews that David revealed to me that his main occupation was beach hustling and 
that he works as a local tour guide in Kololi. He has also plied his trade in Senegambia 
and Bakau. Having run into trouble with the security forces where he was beaten on 
many occasions, locked in a cell for a few weeks and taken to provide free labour at 




In his eight years as a beach hustler, David would normally relocate to Cap Skirring, 
in Southern Senegal, during the off season to hustle. However, a minor illness 
prevented him from embarking on this journey in 2013, when I was doing my 
fieldwork. He instead stayed in Brikama where he spent most of his time in the 
cybercafés chanting to survive and staying in contact with the toubabs he established 
relationships with on the beach. At 26 years old, David is not married. Born and bred 
in Brikama, he became a school dropout due to difficulties in finding someone to pay 
for his education. When he was 8 years old, his father abandoned him and his mother 
and moved to France where he never got in touch, until very recently. With his mum 
struggling to raise David and her other children, he was adopted by his uncle who 
initially paid for his education but later stopped due to financial difficulties. His uncle 
worked as a labourer on a building construction site and David joined him after quitting 
school. As he narrated his ordeal then: “these were days of hardship and labour. No 
dad, no mum and with an uncle who was struggling to feed me, I had to do something”.  
While working with his uncle, David would follow his friends to the Brikama tourist 
market on Thursdays when tourists would visit the craft market, which is also known 
as the tourist market. The tourists would throw biscuits, books, coins and other items 
to the many kids who hung around. David and his friends would use the opportunity 
to make friends with the tourists by exchanging addresses. When David met a Dutch 
couple who invited him to go to see them at the hotel, he unlocked the secret world of 
pleasure, leisure and opportunities in the tourism industry. From then on, David would 
hitch-hike to the beach every day. At 16, he left the labourer job and became a beach 
hustler. 
When the idea of hiring a research assistant came up, David’s name crossed my mind. 
Without hesitation, I called his cell phone as I had his number from our previous 
meeting. Luckily, he was around Kololi and I was close by so we arranged to meet at 
‘The Village’, a popular meeting point in Kololi. After a brief discussion, David 
accepted the offer of being my research assistant and we decided to start the next day. 
As with all other beach hustlers, David refused to set a fixed price for his services, 
instead telling me to give him whatever I thought was appropriate. As we shall see 




bargained for. David saw this as an opportunity not only for economic gain but also 
for material and other types of gain. After every session, I would give him some cash. 
The following day, during our first session in the field, I quickly began to appreciate 
his many qualities. I soon came to realise his mastery of both the social and physical 
terrain of the industry, his attention to detail and his proficiency of the English 
language. He took me to the fishermen, the bird watchers, the juice pressers, the fruit 
sellers and all those who operate within the industry. He introduced me to unregistered 
local tour guides who move about touting for customers and evading security. The 
nature of their work makes it difficult to get access to them. David provided this access 
as he is considered to be one of them and also through his outstanding social skills. 
These are skills he did not learn through formal education, but through his long career 
as a beach hustler. These skills helped to ensure that participants had confidence in me 
and my research. His charisma also created a personal chemistry with participants who 
not only offered to talk to us but also allowed us to sit in their spaces and observe them 
whilst they served us attaya.   
David’s extensive social network in the industry and his familiarity with its social and 
physical terrain significantly helped to ease access to both beach hustlers and the areas 
where they operated. He introduced me to almost all the participants that took part in 
this study. He introduced me to Andy who agreed to be interviewed and who shared 
his life, aspirations and experiences as a beach hustler that helped greatly with this 
ethnography. His presence gave confidence to Buju and other fishermen to open up 
and discuss their lives and activities with me. Wherever we went, I would be reminded 
by beach hustlers that they were talking to me because of David, who they consider as 
one of them. 
The vital role played by research assistants in the research process is highlighted by 
Deane and Stevano (2015). Drawing on a political economy approach, they argue that 
research assistants often act as more than translators or interpreters. Based on the 
authors’ experiences of fieldwork in Tanzania and Mozambique, they emphasise the 
crucial role that relations with research assistants play in mediating relations between 





Despite his presence being valuable for my research, David’s constant complaints 
about his difficult life situation, his intermittent requests for financial help and his 
strong desire to travel to Europe at all costs almost jeopardised our working 
relationship. For example, while his father was on holiday in the Gambia, he tried to 
convince me to speak to his father about taking him to France. I was initially reluctant 
to do this as I felt it was none of my business. When David realised that I was not 
willing to help him with this, he changed his attitude and would miss our appointments. 
To appease him I went to see his father on the condition that we spoke in private, 
without David. When I finally met him, I just told him about how David admires him 
and that he should do something to help his son. His father’s reaction was great and he 
appreciated my intervention, confiding that this was something he had long been 
contemplating. In the end, David was happy and things went back to normal.  
If getting involved with private family issues was a problem, constant requests for 
financial help both in the field and after returning to Edinburgh was agony. David 
would miss appointments, citing financial problems that I was forced to bail him out 
with. I did what I could do just to keep his services. However, while back in Edinburgh, 
David would still bombard me with messages requesting financial help. The message 
below is just one of the many messages from David requesting help: 
Hi. Benn (sic) a while. Hope u ok. Not ben (sic) easy my boss. 
Well am just managing especially during this month Ramadan. 
Well today I was at your home in brikama I was talking to your 
mum for hours and she was very happy. Well my boss I was 
thinking if things are fine with you over there I would be very 
happy if you can kindly help me with 20 pounds so that I can 
fix one nice haftaan13 for the koriteh14 feast please my boss. 
(Extract from SMS sent by David). 
In ‘The Friendly Financier: Talking Money with the Silenced Assistant’, Molony and 
Hammett (2007) draw on their fieldwork experiences in Tanzania and South Africa 
respectively, to highlight the ways in which the relationship between the researcher 
and research assistant can be affected by wealth asymmetry. Although their paper 
                                                 
13 Full-dress, ankle-length, long-sleeved traditional clothing men wear for big occasions like Koriteh 
and on Fridays. 




focuses on the dynamics of an ‘outsider researcher working in a southern context’, 
my experiences show that the dynamics of perceived financial asymmetries also 
affect researchers going back home to do field work.   
 
Figure 5: David talking to some fruit sellers in their stalls in Bakau beach 
2.2.2 Doing Research in the Cybercafés 
Cybercafés are public places where anyone can go to buy time online and to browse. 
Therefore, accessing these spaces did not pose any challenge. However, to understand 
the lives, aspirations hustling activities of chanters, having access to the spaces where 
they operate is not enough. To provide a comprehensive description of their activities, 
I needed to fully interact with them. I wanted to tell their stories using their own words. 
Gaining access to chanters who were willing to open up about their activities proved 
to be difficult in the beginning. This is due to the sensitive nature of their activities. 
According to Li (2008: 102), sensitive research “refers to the study of secretive, 





Chanting, just as gambling is a sensitive research topic, and as we shall see later in the 
ethnographic chapters, is characterized by a mixture of deviance, secrecy, and stigma 
in this context. Although not illicit, some of the strategies used by chanters to make 
money from the toubabs they meet online can be considered by mainstream society as 
immoral. As such, they keep their activities secret, making it difficult for an outsider 
to access their lives and activities. The difficulty of gaining access to people who 
engage in deviant behaviour that generates stigma was discussed by Klein (1989:169) 
in his study on body builders in California who sell sexual services to gay men. He 
observed that “the stigma attached to hustling is so great that only six hustlers granted 
me an interview on the subject”. Entering the subculture of people who engage in 
deviant behaviours poses a serious challenge for researchers as they are mistrustful 
and suspicious of outsiders, especially those seeking information about their activities 
and their involvement in it.  
This challenge has led researchers interested in such activities to use covert methods 
by feigning their identity in order to access research participants and to avoid suspicion 
(see for example Erickson and Tewksbury, 2000). I decided from the outset that I 
would take the role of an overt observer. This means that I would reveal my identity 
as a researcher. Carrying out covert research would have raised ethical issues with 
which I was not comfortable so I chose to remain open and honest about my work, 
even if this did affect the number of hustlers who were willing to talk to me. Being 
overt also provided me with the opportunity to provide appropriate assurances to my 
research participants which subsequently eased the social access problem.  
Having access to the physical spaces of the cafés guaranteed, my task was to negotiate 
social access, meaning access to participants who would be willing to share their 
stories with me. This access comes in two levels. The first entails establishing a 
relationship with hustlers, and the second entails sustaining this relationship over a 
longer period. Initially, my instinct was to go into the cybercafés and start talking to 
people randomly. However, I heeded advice on the use of gatekeepers (Bryman, 2008; 
Coffey, 2006; Fielding, 1993) to carry out such research. A gatekeeper is someone 
who has control over the researcher’s access. Establishing a rapport with a gatekeeper 




gatekeepers to ease access to key interlocutors through enhanced credibility as a result 
of their mutually trusting relationship. An incidental benefit of the gatekeeper is that 
they may in the long- term become key interlocutors themselves (Bryman, 2008). 
To access participants, I used the services of a few gatekeepers I was in contact with 
through local networks. One of my gatekeepers was Alkali, the proprietor of the AON 
cybercafé. I have known Alkali for many years as he and his family live on the same 
street as mine. However, our acquaintance deepened during my previous research 
visits when I frequented his café. Alkali did not only allow me access to his cybercafé, 
he also introduced me to many hustlers who showed their willingness to be 
interviewed. These hustlers also introduced me to their friends in their network. This 
snowball approach proved to be extremely pragmatic in generating a reservoir of 
interlocutors. With extensive knowledge of chanting, Alkali also became a principal 
informer. I interviewed him on many occasions as he provided valuable insights into 
chanting. In addition to Alkali, other cybercafé owners and managers also became 
useful gatekeepers, facilitating both physical and social access.  
Having established access to participants through gatekeepers, my next challenge was 
to maintain this access throughout the research period. As Bryman notes, “access does 
not finish when you have made contact and gained access to the group” (Bryman, 
2008: 299). Therefore, securing access is a constant activity. I maintained on-going 
access by developing long-term relationships with participants, based on reciprocity, 
trust and honesty. My cultural and social identity, which I share with them, was a great 
asset. It also took patience and time to gain the hustlers’ trust and to clear any cloud of 
doubt that they might have had surrounding my intentions. I noticed that the ways in 
which the interlocutors answered my interview questions and the things they confided 
was due to the trust established. The role of a research assistant with an insider 
perspective also helped enormously.  
I used the services of Sait, a former chanter and a university student, to act as my 
research assistant. I chose Sait due to his networks with a lot of chanters and also 
because he eased my access. He is also an experienced researcher as he works as a 
consultant for many organisations wanting to do research in the Gambia. His 




contributed extensive insights into the activities of chanters. However, a few months 
ago, Sait was arrested with two Ghanaians for doing research in the Gambia. They 
were arrested by the National Intelligence Agency (NIA)15 for distributing 
questionnaires asking ‘political questions’ such as people’s perception of the Gambian 
president. This demonstrates the problem of doing research in autocratic political 
dispensations.   
2.3 Ethnography: Telling the Tales of Hustlers 
Research strategies provide researchers with a set of procedures to answer research 
questions. Blaikie (2010: 18) contends that “the choice of research strategy constitutes 
the second most important research design decision” that a researcher should make 
and Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009) find research strategies to consist of the 
general plan to answering the research questions. Although a plethora of research 
strategies with distinctive characteristics have been identified, albeit with certain 
overlaps, this study finds the ethnographic research strategy to be the most appropriate 
for this study.  
By and large, ethnography falls under the umbrella of qualitative research, where the 
intent is to provide a detailed, in-depth description of everyday life and practice or 
what Geertz (1973) referred to as "thick description". Qualitative research provides a 
rich and solid description of social phenomena (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003) and puts 
emphasis on the ways in which individuals interpret their social world and events that 
allow the researcher to view the people under study through their own eyes and in their 
natural setting (Bryman, 2008). The use of the term "qualitative" is meant to 
distinguish this kind of social science inquiry from more "quantitative" or statistically 
oriented research. The quantitative and qualitative approaches have different aims, 
although they can complement each other. 
Ethnography is both a qualitative research process (one conducts ethnography) and a 
product (the outcome of this process is ethnography). The aim of ethnography is to 
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interpret culture. As a strategy of social inquiry, it has been developed within social 
anthropology to study and describe cultural systems, contexts, processes and meanings 
(Punch, 2005). As such, cultural interpretations have been considered to be the 
ethnographer’s main contribution to knowledge. The strategy involves the study of 
behaviour in a natural setting which is based on the idea that adequate knowledge of 
social behaviour cannot be fully grasped until the researcher has understood the 
meaning people apply to their own experiences (Fielding, 1993). 
Similarly, Hammersley and Atkinson (2007:3) view ethnography as a research strategy 
that involves a process where the ethnographer participates “overtly or covertly in 
people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening 
to what is said, asking questions and collecting relevant data” with the aim of 
describing what is happening in a particular setting and how the people involved see 
and interpret their own actions. The beauty of ethnography is immersion in another 
society and culture that offers insights and perspectives that would otherwise not be 
available through other methods of social science. Immersing myself in the daily lives 
of hustlers generated insights into their social world, their aspirations and their 
economic activities.   
In line with ethnographic principles, I combined the use of several methods, participant 
observations and in-depth unstructured interviews in particular, to collect appropriate 
data to produce ethnographic monographs. Data was corroborated by supplementing 
interviews and observations with other methods such as informal conversations, 
writing field notes following observation sessions as ethically and logistically as 
possible, using photographs taken by me to elicit narratives and comparing information 
across a variety of interlocutors and settings. I also made sure that I elicited honest 
accounts from interlocutors by making sure I interviewed only those who wished to be 
interviewed. The combination of these methods will to a great extent ensure the 






2.3.1 In the Company of Hustlers: Participant Observation 
In ethnographic research, a wide range of qualitative methods are available for 
researchers to use for collecting data. Blaikie (2010: 163) asserts that “data can be 
collected from individuals, small groups and many kinds of larger groups” from four 
different types of setting. These are “the natural settings, the semi-natural settings, the 
artificial settings and social artefacts” (Ibid). In carrying out this research, I studied 
hustlers in their natural settings. This means that I spent a significant amount of time 
in the company of hustlers as they went about their activities in cybercafés, on the 
beach and its surroundings and at the airport, amongst other places. The data generated 
provided a rich description of the activities of hustlers and the settings under which 
they operate.  
I used the process of participant observation to embed myself into the world of 
hustlers. The deep interactions with the hustlers enabled me to make sense of complex 
and hidden phenomena. In ‘Hustling and Other Hard Work: Life Styles in the Ghetto’, 
Valentine (1978) illustrates this point when she reflects on the participant observation 
she conducted on the lives and economic strategies of Afro-Americans in Blackstone. 
In relation to this study, I carried out participant observation in multiple settings. 
Observation was also extended to the wider society to understand the aspirations of 
hustlers and how these are shaped. The limits of using participant observation to study 
hustlers was the tension that arose between participating and observing (Rabinow, 
1985:79). This is because the activities of hustlers in terms of the strategies they 
employ are not conducive to the ‘participatory’ element of participant-observation. 
Even though I was accepted by hustlers by spending more time in their company, I 
was unable to participate fully in their world for ethical reasons. 
2.3.1.1 Observing Beach Hustlers 
Based on an initial tour of the tourism industry and guidance from David, I carried out 
observations in four key settings to study the activities of beach hustlers. These 
included along the beaches, where juice pressers, fruit sellers, fishermen and horse 
riders operate; the ‘strip’ in Kololi and its restaurants where local tour guides operate; 




were selected based on a variety of factors, many of which included accessibility, 
unobtrusiveness and both physical and social familiarity.  
Observation was used in these settings to obtain insight into the daily activities of 
beach hustlers in terms of how they make contacts and interacted with the toubabs, 
how they make money from them and how they interacted among themselves. Whether 
hanging out with taxi drivers in their taxi stands, drinking attaya with bird watchers, 
taking a break from the sun under the big baobab tress with horse riders, following the 
trails of local tour guides, or as a guest at a restaurant, my primary role as observer-
participant transformed the dynamics of the events I observed into an activity. To do 
this, I was always very attentive to detail to avoid overlooking crucial information 
(Wolcott, 1994). 
My observations also involved regular visits to the airport, restaurants within the 
industry, tourist attractions and street corners where unregistered local tour guides tout 
for customers. The observations I carried out were focused and engaging in a way that 
provided an account of the daily activities of beach hustlers including descriptive and 
sensory details such as hustlers’ conversations and imagery, the nature of their 
environments, the names of horse riders’ horses and juice pressers’ kiosks. These 
sensory descriptions were recorded at the end of each day of observation. At the end 
of every week of observation, these notes were consulted again together with David to 
ensure the accuracy of the recordings. 
Consent for observations in public settings could not always be ensured. Although, 
consent was always sought from beach hustlers like taxi drivers and juice pressers prior 
to observations inside their taxi stands and kiosks, this however did not apply to all 
those other hustlers who move around along the beaches, at the airports or on street 
corners as it was difficult to seek consent from them. 
2.3.1.2 Observing Chanters  
Most of the observations of the activities of chanters took place at the AON and 
GAMTEL cybercafés. Issues of access and the representative nature of these cafés 
determined this decision. The observations were carried out both inside the café and 




used other institutions near GAMTEL such as the post office and the Western Union 
outlet and also their interactions with the wider society. These provided insights into 
the hustlers’ aspirations and how these are shaped. This offers an understanding of 
their lifestyle and the role that hustling plays in their relationship with the wider 
society. This was achieved by socialising and hanging out with hustlers in their grand 
palaces, on football fields watching nawettan16 and at other social events.  
Inside the cybercafés, I spent hours observing how hustlers use the Internet to make 
money. My observations were mainly focussed on the websites they used, how they 
communicate with toubabs, how they interacted among themselves and with the café 
managers and the tactics they employed to make money. Although I endeavoured to 
stick to a pre-planned observation schedule, impromptu visits to the cybercafé proved 
to be useful. Observations were carried out daily using different shifts. For instance, I 
divided my shifts into morning and evening as hustlers work in a shift pattern due to 
their various social and professional engagements.  
My observations in the cybercafés were overt in the sense that the café managers knew 
I was doing research. Through rumours, hustlers also came to know I was doing 
research. However, in some smaller cafes, I carried out covert research as I would buy 
Internet browsing time and observe as a mere customer. As is the case on the beach, 
the nature of cybercafé Internet use and the number of visitors makes it impractical to 
gain consent from individual cybercafé customers. So I decided to only inform the café 
managers about my presence and purpose and to do observations. 
2.3.2 Unstructured Interviews and Informal Conversations 
In addition to participant observations, I conducted in-depth semi-structured 
interviews and informal conversations. Interview questions were open-ended rather 
than closed (Venables, 2009). This provided the basis for in-depth discussions and 
allowed interlocutors to give their own accounts of the issues that were important to 
them and their activities. It gave them the opportunity to talk about their experiences 
and perspectives on hustling. Interviews were started by asking questions which 
revolved around hustlers’ biographies such as place of birth, educational and family 
                                                 




background, their career paths to hustling, why they choose to hustle, their aspirations, 
the strategies they employ to make money from hustling, the opportunities of hustling 
and how these fulfil their aspirations, their interactions and relationships with toubabs 
and their engagements with and how they are perceived by with the wider society. 
Interviews were carried out with both hustlers and those close to hustlers and potential 
hustlers. 
This type of interviewing proved to be a useful way of understanding hustlers’ 
individual stories and was particularly beneficial in helping to create the stories of the 
few hustlers whose life stories made up the ethnographic chapters. In addition to 
generating new insights, the interviews backed up and emphasised the findings which 
had emerged from the participant observations. To create a more relaxing environment 
for the interviews, I started the interviews by first introducing myself, particularly to 
those hustlers who did not already know me, and my research. I informed them that I 
am a student interested in researching and writing about their lives, aspirations and the 
economic activities they engage in to fulfil their aspirations. A few hustlers questioned 
my interest and what the research would be used for. However, I allayed these concerns 
by explaining my background as a PhD student working on my thesis. In some 
instances, I would mention my affiliation with the University of the Gambia (UTG)17 
as this made many people willing to talk to me.       
Informal conversations were also carried out to complement the interviews. The 
insights generated from these natural and impromptu conversations proved to be 
valuable as they added to my understanding of the lives of hustlers, particularly their 
aspirations. Informal conversations also facilitated a degree of openness that allowed 
space and time for hustlers to talk comfortably about their activities. Due to the 
irregular and busy schedule of hustlers, these impromptu conversations proved to be a 
valuable way of obtaining further clarity and elaboration without being interrogative.  
Two methods were used during the interviews to save the data. Audio tape recording 
of interviews was complemented by taking notes. Taking into account the advice of 
Leslie and Storey (2003: 93) about the need to ascertain cultural ramifications before 
                                                 




using tape and video recorders, I first sought the permission of my interlocutors before 
the interviews. Despite a few expressing their apprehension about this, the majority 
gave their consent. Aware of the sensitive nature of the issues discussed in the 
interviews, I made sure that the recordings were saved in files and stored securely. 
Except for a few interviews and conversations, the majority of the interviews were 
either done in Wolof or Mandinka as expressed by the preferences of interlocutors.  
Ethical issues became central to the interviews. Most interlocutors expressed concerns 
about not getting into trouble by talking to me. I reassured them that I was only 
interested in information and that I was not an NIA spying on them. I, however, made 
it clear that the information they provided may be published or presented at 
conferences and could become accessible in the public domain. This meant that their 
hustling activities and tactics could be made public. I nonetheless expressed my 
commitment to anonymise and protect their identity using pseudonyms. This approach 
was to some extent successful, leading to lengthy and richly detailed interviews with 
those willing to get involved in the study. However, the demeanour of most 
interlocutors was understandably cautious, but open. All interviewees were advised 
about confidentiality and anonymity before the interviews commenced. 
Unlike the challenges faced concerning informed consent while making observations, 
this has not been the case with interviews. According to Bryman (2008), the principle 
of informed consent means that research participants are provided with enough 
information to make an informed decision about whether they wish to partake in the 
study. The interlocutors who were interviewed were asked to give their consent. I took 
my time to explain to them about my research and the implications for them taking 
part in the study. This was mostly done orally. 
Although it was easier to inform interview interlocutors about their consent to 
participate in the study, I had to grapple with a few minor challenges. The culture of 
informality is so embedded into Gambian society that some interlocutors became 
suspicious when I attempted to discuss issues such as ‘informed consent’, 
‘confidentiality’, ‘privacy’ and ‘anonymity’. Most found these words to be too formal 
and this frightened some interlocutors judging by their hesitations after these 




standard procedure and it has nothing to do with the government. On a few occasions, 
I lost valuable information as some people were reluctant to open up after initially 
indicating their enthusiasm to be interviewed. For example, a café manager at the 
Montego Bay cybercafé initially agreed to be interviewed and was in a cheerful mood 
until I read him the informed consent. He then found some excuse to make the 
interview as short as possible.  
2.3.2.1 Interviewing Beach Hustlers 
To understand the activities of beach hustlers, I conducted 43 interviews including life 
history interviews with 4 beach hustlers. I am not claiming to make over-arching 
generalisations about beach hustling in general. My intention is to give an account of 
the economic activities of a particular group of people who find themselves in a 
condition of ‘involuntary immobility’, operating on the margins of the tourism 
industry in an attempt to fulfil their aspirations. Although the hustlers I interviewed 
cover a broad spectrum of informal service providers from juice sellers to bird 
watchers, excluded from this sample were those hustlers whose main preoccupation is 
to sell sex to female tourists for material and financial gain. Their stories have been 
reported elsewhere (see for example Nyanzi et al, 2005; Brown, 1992; Wagner & 
Yamba, 1986). The officials of institutions with a stake in the industry such as the 
GTB, TSU the head of the Gambia Hotel Association were also interviewed to acquire 
broader knowledge of the industry and the roles they play.   
Interviews with beach hustlers were mostly conducted within the TDA. This was done 
not only because it was convenient for the hustlers, but also because I wanted to 
interview them at their place of work. My key interlocutors allowed me to visit them 
in their homes and some interviews also took place there. Regardless of the place, my 
interlocutors made the decision about where the interviews should be carried out. For 
unregistered beach hustlers or the so-called local tour guides who lack a fixed place, 
we mostly met at one of the restaurants within the TDA.  
The drawback of interviews within the TDA was that interviews were sometimes 
disrupted by others who intervene to ask questions and the sound from the sea also 




in their shops. For example, in the taxi stands, at least ten or fifteen people will be 
there. They would all be interrupting the interviews with their own views while I am 
interviewing one of them, who they identified as their leader. In some occasions, while 
having informal conversations with tourist taxi drivers, others who overheard us 
talking came to join our conversation. Even though I had told them I was a researcher, 
they still thought I was in a position to help them with solutions to the problems they 
face in the industry. They told me to tell the authorities about their plight and they 
were so excited to have someone from outside come to talk to them that they were all 
talking at the same time, telling me about what to tell the authorities. I had to be patient 
and listen attentively to their complaints.  
I also experienced situations when a few beach hustlers refused to be interviewed 
perhaps due to the sensitive political climate in the Gambia which creates agitation 
among hustlers. Furthermore, most hustlers were difficult to interview due to their 
busy schedule. This was particularly the case during the tourist season, between 
October and April. Being interviewed for hours was something they could not 
accommodate. This was made worse by the unpredictable nature of the industry in 
terms of varying arrival times and the randomness of when tourists ask for services. 
Research with beach hustlers was also an expensive affair. Although I did not offer 
payment to interviewees for them to be interviewed, for ethical reasons, I was obliged 
to pay for restaurant bills if the interviews took place there, to buy juice and fruit and 
other products from them after every interview and I had to offer to buy lunch and 
attaya for the taxi drivers and bird watchers. Although other researchers have offered 
payment in exchange for the time the interviewee is giving, I did not consider it 
appropriate to do so in this instance (see Shaver, 2005, for example). 
2.3.2.2 Interviewing Chanters 
To study the economic activities of chanters, I conducted 35 interviews with young 
people who engage in this type of hustling. Fifteen of these were extensive in-depth 
life history interviews with six chanters. Interviews were also done with people who 
frequented cybercafés. These generally fell into one of three main categories: the 
cybercafé owners, the operators they employ and the cybercafé users. The latter, 




people in society who either benefit from chanting or who are close to the people who 
are involved in the activity.  
One of the many problems I faced was finding a suitable place to conduct the 
interviews. This was particularly apparent when interviews were to be conducted with 
chanters and café owners/operators who always insisted on carrying out the interviews 
in their place of work or “natural setting” as Blaikie (2008) would call it. Most chanters 
spend a significant amount of their time in cybercafés which made it impossible to 
conduct interviews in their homes or somewhere else. Moreover, some never wanted 
me to meet them in their homes to discuss what they do in the cybercafés.   
The majority of the interviews with chanters took place outside the cybercafés, in 
surrounding spaces such as café verandas or under any tree where we could find 
enough shade to shield us from the scorching African sun. As these were situated on 
highways, there was lots of noise from passing cars and trucks and the occasional 
greetings of passers-by who either recognised me or the interviewee. Most chanters 
did not wish to be interviewed inside the café for fear of others hearing what they were 
saying or being seen talking to me during the interview. On a few occasions, I 
interviewed chanters inside GAMTEL and these interviews were conducted inside a 
small room used as a mosque. Although some interviews were held in my own home, 
I tried to avoid this due to interruptions during the interviews from family members 
who would occasionally come to pay me a visit. As Gambian culture dictates that one 
must show hospitality to visitors, I always had to interrupt my interviews to attend to 
my guests. For example, one morning whilst having an interesting interview with 
Buba, I was interrupted when an uncle came to see me for financial help.  
In addition, the chanters were not always good at honouring appointments. The 
majority would come late at best or would never show up at all. A few initially agreed 
to be interviewed by arranging a time and place to meet just to never show up and they 
refused to pick up my calls. A casual conversation with some of my trusted 
interlocutors informed me that some hustlers suspected me of being an agent of the 
notorious and most feared NIA. Although I could not ascertain the rationale for this 




intentions. It is likely that those who refused to be interviewed were engaged in 
activities they did not feel comfortable discussing with an outsider. 
Interviews with café owners took place inside the café as they would be working. 
These interviews posed some challenges as we were almost always interrupted by 
customers who had questions or who wanted to buy more browsing time, but I had no 
choice as the cafe owners expressed their preference to be interviewed at their place 
of work. These interventions disrupted the natural flow of the interviews. Sanders 
(2005) describes how interviewing participants at their work place can be disruptive, 
as was the case with her research which was conducted at a female massage parlour.  
Secondly, interviewing café owners at their place of work in the presence of customers 
prevents them from providing an honest account on their perspectives of chanting as 
this might seem to undermine the privacy of their customers. This was the case with 
my interview with Bas, the owner and manager of Bass Internet Café. We conducted 
the interview behind his counter inside the café and he started providing insightful 
information on chanting until his Dutch wife, who works with him in the café, came 
to sit close by to serve customers. Some, however, have provided honest and detailed 
accounts during interviews when the café is empty during electricity blackouts or, as 
in the case of Alkali, when he came to see me at home. 
Another challenge was the constant demands for financial or other material help by 
some interlocutors after the interviews. They requested things ranging from money to 
watches and mobile phones. I knew I had to be smart not to outright reject these request 
as this could alter the nature of my relationship with them, but at the same time I had 
to avoid making promises I could not fulfil. Although this left me with a dilemma, my 
familiarity with the cultural context gave me an advantage in dealing with such 
situations. I treated each case individually and did what I could or sometimes give less 
than requested. For example, Dem, the chanter I introduced in the introductory 
vignette, called me a few days before I left the field requesting help to pay his fees. 
Below is an excerpt of the correspondence: 
Dem: Hello IS, I still did not get any response from you...Please i am in need with this 




Dem: Hello Iss, I still did not get any response from you.. Please...i am begging you I 
need this help. Please (sic). 
Me: Hi, Just got ur emails. I had to spend more time in Brussels than expected. I just 
arrived home. I understand ur situation but you need to give me some time to see what I 
can do. I am not promising anything right now as I just arrived and need to sort some 
things out. I am not sure how soon you need this but I will see what I can do (sic). 
Dem: Hello Iss I am so much happy to read back from you.. as you can see at the moment 
I am not even going to school...do you expect me to lie to you... I will never ever lie to 
you about my schooling..I am not pressuring you or forcing Just see yourself what you 
can do......I i can't pay this.. means i will repeat my grade 9. just see yourself ok (sic). 
2.4 ‘Semester, spy, hacker’: Challenges Encountered in the Field 
Ethnographic research arouses debates about ethical conduct (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007: 215), particularly with regards to the use of participant observation. 
Ethnography itself is fraught with methodological and ethical challenges (Lauder, 
2003: 185). This section reflects upon and discusses the dilemmas I faced when 
conducting fieldwork in my own country and in the town where I was born and raised. 
This is a town where I had extensive social networks, ranging from school mates, 
family and friends. As such, my connection and history in this town had a bearing on 
the research process, considering that the study is concerned with the lives of people 
engaged in sensitive and stigma related activities. 
2.4.1 ‘We know you as a semester’: The Dilemmas of Conducting 
Research at Home 
One of the most important contributions of this study to the methodology literature is 
doing research in your own home country. In relation to this study, doing fieldwork in 
my own home town came with a lot of problems and prospects that have in one way 
or another had a methodological impact on this study. Principally, the methodological 
concern for me in doing qualitative research in my own environment derives from my 
perception of myself as an “insider” researcher (Rabe, 2003), and my reflection on 
how my positionality within a shared space with my research participants would 




process. As an ethnographer doing research in my country, I also have to write and 
publish my findings at the end of the fieldwork period. With the prevailing political 
climate, what I chose to write and publish will to some extent affect the research 
process. 
Depending on the degree of familiarity with participants prior to beginning the 
fieldwork, the researcher can be classified along the continuum from ‘outsider’ to 
‘insider’. These are consequential for the research process, the findings and its 
implications. Insider perspectives are those taken by a researcher who is a member of 
the community being studied and outsider perspectives are those taken by a researcher 
who is an outsider to the community being studied. As the nature of ethnographic work 
involves the interpretation of cultures (Geertz, 1973), there is a responsibility on the 
part of the researcher to the culture being studied because the perspective the 
researcher takes impacts the knowledge produced about that cultural group.  
Although discussion of issues related to research limitations and the prospects and 
problems of the insider versus outsider status of the researcher have been both popular 
and contentious in ethnographic studies, Mullings (1999: 340) contends that the 
insider-outsider dichotomy is “less than real as it freezes personalities in place and 
assumes that being an ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ is a fixed attribute”. Moreover, Twyman, 
Morrison and Sporton (1999: 319) also argue that “the insider/outsider binary is not 
clear cut as such positions allow a ‘betweenness’ that implies that no one is an ‘insider’ 
or ‘outsider’ in any absolute sense”. Breen (2007:163) outlined three key advantages 
of being an insider to the research domain: “a superior understanding of the group’s 
culture; the ability to interact naturally with the group and its members; and a 
previously established, and therefore greater, relational intimacy with the group”. 
In relation to this study, my position as both an insider in the society and an outsider 
to the group studied created dilemmas which needed to be carefully balanced. Being 
an insider familiar with the languages, culture and political context of the Gambia 
helped me to know and understand the unstated messages in the hustlers’ narratives. It 
also provided me instant physical and social access, which would have taken a long 
time for an outsider to gain. I know some of the research interlocutors personally which 




use their knowledge of the group or area to gain more intimate insights into their 
opinions. I also had easy access to government officials who accepted requests for 
interviews. Although I was an insider in the society, I was an outsider within the sub-
group of chanters. And due to the nature of some of their activities, access to the group 
had to be carefully negotiated.   
The challenges I encountered as an insider were numerous. Firstly, people recognised 
me wherever I went, and whilst busy making observations in cafes, they would distract 
my attention with protracted pleasantries and conversations. Secondly, it was also 
frustrating as I struggled to balance work and other social commitments. My past 
interactions with the community as a semester also played to my disadvantage. I had 
always visited the country as a holidaymaker not as a researcher. I would also suggest 
that local perceptions of semesters to be rich and generous holiday makers contributed 
to the endless financial and material demands from interlocutors. My background as a 
semester also fuelled suspicions about my true motives amongst interlocutors as most 
of them struggled to comprehend why a semester would come and spend all his time 
in the cybercafés asking questions about their activities. BJ, a youth leader told me 
this, when I recounted my problems to him: 
Some of these boys will find it hard to trust you. They always 
knew you as a semester and now you come asking them 
questions about their activities. They have been doing this for 
years and they wonder why you are now interested in their 
activities. Why did you choose to write about this and why 
now? Why has no one done it before? These boys will ask 
these questions. They are also scared that the government 
wants to put a stop to this so they have sent you to conduct 
investigations. And their livelihoods depend on this. 
The above instances challenged my ethical positionality to some extent. The manner 
in which I was perceived and approached inevitably influenced my fieldwork. 
Researching issues within a home context is an increasingly prominent aspect of 
contemporary fieldwork and the complexity of “(post)modern identities complicate 
traditional binaries of insider/ outsider” (Breen, 2007). Whilst in the field, I avoided 
rigidly considering myself as an insider or outsider. Instead, I was as reflexive as 




situation. Managing these ‘multiple selves’ became a daily struggle (Reinharz 1997: 
3).  
2.4.2 “They think you are a hacker or a spy”: Some Hazards of 
Conducting Ethnography 
A further challenge I encountered in the field was the apprehensive nature of hustlers 
about my motives. Some were of the view that I was either spying on them on behalf 
of the government, or that the toubabs had sent me to find out about their activities. 
Some went to the extent of thinking that I used my cell phone, which was big enough 
to look like a tablet, as a device to hack into their accounts and steal their ‘toubab 
contacts’ and that I would get in touch with them on my return to Europe. Some said 
that I have been to Europe and made money and that I do not want them to make 
money. Perceiving a threat to their livelihoods by my presence, a few hustlers decided 
to take action.  
A few weeks before my planned exit from the field, rumours that I was either a 
government agent sent to spy on their activities, or a hacker trying to steal their 
contacts began to spread among the chanters in Brikama. These rumours had their 
epicentre in GAMTEL but later spread to smaller cafes as some chanters hang out in 
both of these spaces. My attention was brought to this state of affairs by Dem. He 
called me on my cell phone one evening, warning me that I should not go to GAMTEL 
as some boys were planning to attack and beat me up in the dark whilst on my way 
home from GAMTEL. 
Being a small town, word about this had circulated around town and I later understood 
that there was a great debate on this issue with some saying I was a spy while others 
saying I was not. Despite Dem’s advice, I went to GAMTEL to monitor the situation 
myself. Upon entering, I observed how everyone turned to stare at me. I could hear 
whispers of “he is here” from some chanters sitting close to where I was standing. 
Immediately, Rahman, the café operator on duty, also one of my interlocutors asked 
to see me outside. He then told me that some guys came to see him this morning saying 
that they think I am a spy and that I came to steal their ‘contacts’ by using my device 




said he tried to convince them that I was only a researcher but they were still distrustful. 
I thanked him for this information and told him I would take care of the situation. 
I went back inside the café and sat down in my usual place. A moment later, one 
chanter came towards me, called me by my name and said he wanted to see me. I went 
outside and it turned out to be a guy who knew me very well. He told me the same 
thing as Rahman. He added that “these guys receive hundreds of thousands of dalasis 
here from gay men and they are scared of losing all this”. He then told me not to mind 
them but to be careful. I thanked him and hung around a bit, but as the atmosphere 
became tense I decided to leave. On my way home, another guy caught up with me 
and said “Ceesay, I am different from them”, and then vanished. 
Although I had prepared myself for how to deal with potential harm to myself and my 
interlocutors before going to the field, I had underestimated the extent to which this 
could occur. This was partly due to my conviction that my home is the safest place for 
me to do my research and that I would always find ways to deal with these situations 
if and when they arise. Having read about some of the risks and hazards that 
ethnographic researchers are exposed to while in the field, I started thinking about the 
worst case scenarios. The case of Ken Pryce, the author of a celebrated ethnography 
of West Indian life in Bristol (Pryce, 1979) who disappeared while researching 
criminality in Jamaica and his body was later found washed up on a Caribbean beach 
or Myrna Mack, the American anthropologist murdered by Guatemalan paramilitaries 
came to mind (Bloor, Fincham and Sampsom, 2010). The fate of Owens (2003), who 
was accused of being a spy and expelled from Zanzibar whilst doing fieldwork came 
to mind. Although in the case of Owens it was the government rather than the group 
he was studying that accused him of being a spy.  
I was then reminded by Lee’s (1995) monograph on ‘Dangerous Fieldwork’, which 
drew a distinction between ‘ambient’ and ‘situational’ dangers. The former concerns 
dangers in the field for researchers and the researched alike, as in the case of tropical 
diseases, while the latter concerns dangers ignited by the presence of the researcher in 
the field such as threats of violence towards researchers of drug use or prostitution, 
where researchers “run the risk of misidentification as a spy for the police and the 




Loftsdottir, 2002) on how researchers can protect themselves against physical harm by 
skilful fieldwork relations, which I read prior to going to the field proved to be useful.  
One of the consequences of the rumours was that owners of smaller cybercafés 
changed the way they accommodated me as they did not want to be seen as 
accomplices and lose customers. Some avoided me in the initial days when the 
rumours were rife. Others gave me their full support, saying that they knew these were 
mere fabrications. With this support, I spoke to some influential chanters and explained 
in all sincerity that I am neither a spy nor a hacker and I am only interested in learning 
and writing about their hustling activities. Although it took a lot of convincing, it 
worked to some extent as some trust from others was restored while some still had 
their doubts. However, the insights and data from those willing to talk were quite 
valuable. 
In hindsight I could have avoided this precarious situation had I done things 
differently. Firstly, I had underestimated the extent to which certain parents are 
complicit with chanters. My discussion with the local chief about his views on chanting 
brought me trouble. Before embarking on a visit to the chief, I did not know that his 
nephew was a chanter and that he shares some of his earnings with the chief. I later 
learned that immediately after my visit to the chief, he alerted his nephew, telling him 
that someone is in town to enquire about their activities and that he does not trust that 
person. His nephew broke the news in GAMTEL in the spirit of alerting his colleagues. 
Secondly, I could have avoided attracting unnecessary attention from chanters had I 
not always carried with me a big phone that looked like a hacking device.  
2.5 Hustlers: Disguised Names and Protected Identities 
Gambian society is characterised by entrenched social norms that tend to stigmatise 
those who deviate from these norms. As such, the majority of hustlers, chanters in 
particular, are very discreet about their online activities. The issue of hustlers who 
make money from their online interactions with gays can cause emotional and 
psychological harm to participants and stigma if people outside of their professional 
circle are aware of it (Goffman, 1968). As such, to ensure confidentiality, I never 




anyone else in society. This was to ensure that I did not cause any psychological harm 
to my interlocutors as exposing certain activities could cause problems for participants 
in a number of ways, jeopardising their relationships with friends and family and them 
becoming victims of stigma in society. 
Aware of these social dynamics, I have made every effort while writing this study to 
protect the identity of the hustlers who shared their lives, experiences and activities 
with me. In doing this, I used the strategies employed by Chernoff (2003) and Venables 
(2009) in their ethnographic research on bar girls in Ghana and clandestine migrations 
in southern Senegal respectively. It should be noted that the dynamics of 
anthropological fieldwork can sometimes make it difficult to conceal the identities of 
people and places (Crandon-Malamud, 1991). Consequently, my key challenge was to 
protect the names and identities of hustlers and, to a lesser extent, the spaces they 
operate. The names used in the ethnographic chapters are pseudonyms (that are 
representative of the Gambian context) invented to disguise the names and to protect 
the identities of the participants. I have also avoided giving any of my interlocutors the 
names of other hustlers that I met during my fieldwork in 2013. For beach hustlers, I 
have used the names they use in the industry as they did not object to this. 
Finally, there is the issue of location and there is a risk of identification through 
association with a particular location within the TDA and cybercafé in particular. In 
2013, Brikama had almost 30 cybercafés. Some of the names of the cybercafés 
mentioned in this study could not be disguised so I have used the real names of places 
as they existed during my fieldwork. For instance, I could not disguise the name 
GAMTEL as this would alter the comparison I will be making between it and the other 
smaller cafes. Nonetheless, GAMTEL is visited by many people and new people 
always come and go. It would therefore be hard to connect the names of my key 
interlocutors with any particular person. Furthermore, to ensure the anonymity and 
confidentiality of my interlocutors, I used systematic data protection techniques as 
advised by Bryman (2008). While in the field, I made sure the data collected were 
constantly encrypted on a daily basis and securely stored on password protected pen 






In this chapter, I have attempted to provide a comprehensive methodological 
discussion of this study by identifying numerous influences in the field, from research 
assistants to researcher perceptions and threats of harm. It is important to understand 
these influences as they shaped the trajectory of the research process and led to 
particular types of outcomes. I discussed the strategies I employed to gain and maintain 
access to both the physical and social setting. By doing this, I highlighted the 
importance of the services of research assistants and discussed how some can be a 
burden within various social contexts. The rationale for selecting the ethnographic 
research strategy as opposed to other available strategies was also discussed. These are 
consistent not only with the purposes of the research but also with the key 
philosophical underpinnings of the researcher. 
The numerous methods used to collect the data, and their complementary nature, was 
also discussed. For instance, participant observations helped to describe the events, 
behaviours and activities of hustlers in their social setting. Semi-structured in-depth 
interviews and informal conversations explored the aspirations of hustlers and how 
they are shaped. Furthermore, this chapter has also drawn particular attention to my 
positionality and how my insider role has enabled me to gain access to understand the 
participants and the environment in which they work, and more generally to aid the 
generation of meaningful data. Despite obvious advantages, there were inevitably 
problems with being an insider and these were discussed.  
In terms of methodology, this chapter makes a contribution to urban and/or beach 
ethnography, an emerging sub-field of ethnography that focus on local residents living 
and working in the periphery of spaces designated for tourists and operating on the 
margins of the law. Although the methods I have used in this study have been 
previously applied in similar studies, but in different contexts (MacGaffey & 
Bazenguissa-Ganga, 2000; Nisbett, 2006; Burrell, 2012; Chernoff, 2003; De Fransico, 
2004; Ndjio, 2006; Weiss, 2009 and Janson, 2014), this study’s key methodological 
approach is distinctive in that the research strategy used sought investigate urban 
hustling across multiple settings. Recent developments in anthropology has seen a shift 
























The ‘Hustling’ Nation 
3.1 Introduction 
The Gambia is one of the places that are difficult to classify within standard ways of 
thinking about the world (Lewis and Wigen, 1997) due to its unique cultural and 
religious attributes. It is thus useful to carry out a brief presentation of a few central 
aspects of Gambian society so as to provide a foundation for the analysis of aspirations, 
aspiration formations and hustling in contemporary Gambia. I have chosen the Gambia 
as the setting and case in the analysis of how young Africans experience ‘involuntary 
immobility’. The country is a suitable case because its experience of ‘involuntary 
immobility’ is at the same time typical and extreme. It is typical in the sense that the 
constellation of a history of emigration, pervasive aspirations to emigrate, but few 
opportunities to do so, resembles the situation in many developing countries.  
The Gambia’s situation is extreme in the sense that emigration has been more 
extensive than in most other countries in the West African sub-region relative to 
population size, and affects virtually every family in the country. A study by Kebbeh 
(2013) indicated a dramatic increase of the number of Gambians that had emigrated 
from approximately 35,000 in 2000 to approximately 90,000 in 2010. Although small 
when compared to migrant stocks from other Sub-Saharan African countries, the 
Gambia’s net migration rate in 2013 (-2.34 migrants/1,000 population) is the tenth 
highest in Africa (ibid). As a result, phenomena that could also have been studied 
elsewhere stand out particularly evident in the Gambia. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section introduces the Gambia as 
the setting for my research. Its aim is to provide the reader with the social, economic 
and political context within which urban youth hustling takes place. I start by giving a 
brief background of the Gambia in terms of geography, demography and society. I 
proceed with a detailed description of the economic and political conditions that 
influence the ability of young Gambians to fulfil their social and economic aspirations. 
In particular, I examine the political and economic developments from the early years 




economic crisis and the ensuing political uncertainty from the 1990s onwards when a 
group of junior military officers took over power.  
In the second section, I contextualise my research interest and setting by providing 
background information on both the tourism sector and the status, access and use of 
ICT in the Gambia, the Internet in particular. I illustrate the importance of these 
resources to the hustling patterns of my study participants. I show how a group of 
people, in the midst of limited economic opportunities, make use of the resources 
available to them in an attempt to fulfil their aspirations. I argue that the expansion of 
the tourism sector and the availability of public access to ICT has provided 
opportunities for many young Gambians, particularly those who find themselves in a 
state of ‘involuntary immobility’, to generate the income they need to achieve both 
social and economic advancement.     
 
Section 1 
The Smiling Coast 
3.2. Geography, Demography and Society: A Brief Background 
The Republic of the Gambia is situated along the banks of the River Gambia in the 
West African Sahel zone. Nestled inside Senegal like a “hotdog in a roll” (Sallah, 
1990), the Gambia is Africa’s smallest country. With a land area that spans only 4,36I 
square miles (11,295 sq. km), the country represents the classic case of a micro state. 
The country’s current population is estimated at 1.9 million (GBOS, 2014), a six fold 
increase since independence in 1965, when the population was just over 300,000 (Rice, 
1968). According to the most recent demographic report, more than half (about 
63.55%) of the country’s population are young people, below 25 years of age. In terms 
of gender distribution, the female population is marginally greater, representing 
50.53% of the total population (GBOS, 2014). 
The Gambia is divided into seven administrative regions: Banjul City Council, 
Kanifing Municipal Council, West Coast Region, North Bank Region, Lower River 




of the Gambia as well as the administrative centre of the country and the seat of the 
government. Other towns of significance are the bustling town of Serekunda, which 
has the country’s largest market and the serene coastal town of Bakau, famous for its 
many tourist attraction sites. The peri urban town of Brikama is the Gambia’s largest 
town and is located in the Kombo Central District. It is the regional capital of the West 
Coast Region and it is the most populated Local Government Area in the country, with 
an estimated population of 700,000 people (GBOS, 2014). Located inland, in the South 
Bank, the main urban settlement is about 35km southwest of the capital Banjul. The 
town is a popular tourist destination owing to its status as the home of the biggest craft 
market in the country.  
The Gambia is ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse. This is demonstrated 
in the way several ethnic groups live together in harmony. The Mandinkas make up 42 
percent of the population, the Fulas (18 percent), the Wolofs (16 percent), the Jolas 
(10 percent), the Serahules (9 percent) and the rest (4 percent) (GBOS, 2014). 
Intermarriage among the different ethnic groups is very common, making the Gambia 
a melting pot of different ethnic and cultural groups. The great majority of Gambians 
are Muslim, with over 90 percent following the Sunni branch of Islam. Christians, 
most of whom are Roman Catholic, make up 9 percent of the population and the 
remaining 1 percent do not adhere to any particular religion (ibid). 
3.3 Socio-Cultural and Family Dynamics in the Gambia 
As a focal socialising agency (Macleod, 1987), the family plays a crucial role in 
shaping the aspirations of many of the hustlers in this study. Hence, this section 
provides a brief discussion of family dynamics in the Gambia. It further explores the 
importance of intergenerational relations and reciprocal social exchange and how they 
determine family relations, roles and interactions in the Gambia. This is relevant in so 
far as it avails us the opportunity to understand the societal context in which hustling 








Family in the Gambia, as in many other contexts (Bongaarts, 2001), plays an important 
social function. This not only includes social reproduction, care and support (Alber, 
van der Geest and Whyte, 2008) for dependents, but is also an agent for transferring 
resources across generations. The typical Gambian family unit is intrinsically complex 
in both size and composition due to the extended family system. Generally, it 
constitutes both core and extended members living together in one compound. Core 
family members include a husband (normally head of the house), a wife (or wives) and 
children. Extended family members include multiple generations and other relatives 
such as grandparents, grandchildren, paternal and maternal uncles and aunts and 
cousins.  
The close-knit extended family system is the most common type of family unit 
structure in the Gambia. The traditional family is usually large, sometimes with three 
generations living together in one household. The average household size is 8.5 
members per household (GBOS, 2014) and is estimated at 6 people in urban areas and 
15 people in rural areas. The social fabric of the Gambia is based on family networks 
often stretching into neighbouring countries like Senegal and Guinea Bissau. These 
networks provide support systems that mitigate critical poverty in the absence of 
institutional social welfare schemes. This provides support for many families during 
key lifecycle events and helps vulnerable families deal with economic shocks and 
stresses (UNICEF n.d). 
Consequently, most Gambian families rely on support systems based on family and 
kinship ties, or what Ben-Porath (1980) refers to as the ‘F-Connection’. This support 
system acts as a safety net that helps to mitigate critical poverty, which has increased 
to substantial proportions in the past two decades. More recently, with many Gambians 
living and working in the diaspora, remittance transfers represent an increasing and 
important avenue of kin-based welfare support that has prevented many families from 
falling into poverty. The extended family system involves a socio-cultural obligation 





Remittances play an important role in facilitating these forms of economic assistance. 
For example, Gambians living in the diaspora send money back home in the form of 
remittances to support the livelihoods of the families they have left behind. It is 
estimated that over 70 percent of Gambian families depend on this form of money 
transfer for survival (IFAD, 2007). During the past few years, incoming remittances 
as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) in the Gambia have been among the highest 
in Africa (World Bank, 2014) and the country ranks number nine of the top 10 
countries that receive remittances from abroad and remittance inflows to the country 
account for 19.8 percent of GDP (Ibid). These figures do not include the very large 
amounts of money transferred through unofficial channels.   
Gambians living abroad do not only support their families back home through 
remittances. They also create small businesses for them that can ensure a constant 
income for daily subsistence. These businesses include opening cybercafés, shipping 
used cars and vans to be used in transportation businesses and sending second hand 
clothing, computers, mobile phones, refrigerators, furniture, spare parts and other 
materials that are sold in the second hand market. Today, the Gambia’s transport sector 
is controlled by these types of activity as the public transport system has collapsed 
since the early 1990s. In addition, the Serekunda highway has become the home of 
many second hand shops where one can seemingly find anything.  
Touray (2006) described the Gambia’s social system as ‘patriarchal and gerontocratic’. 
Hence, gender dynamics have always played a crucial role in how power and wealth 
is distributed within the typical Gambian family as distinct roles exist for males and 
females, particularly between the husband and wife. Men maintain the authority in the 
house, and they are responsible for providing financial, material and moral support for 
their families. In return, the women take care of the daily chores and duties of the 
household. However, these types of gender roles are in flux. Although the notional 
norm of ‘male provider’ (Ibid), in line with Islamic values, weighs heavily in Gambian 
society, financial difficulties such as unemployment and high living costs has in the 
past 20 to 30 years put increasing economic pressure on male family heads. Hence, 




During my fieldwork in the Gambia in 2013, I observed that the male family heads are 
no longer the main providers for children’s education and other needs and daily 
household living costs. Some women, mostly wives, and young adults who earn money 
through various means tend to use it to provide for their own needs and to support 
other family members. For instance, whereas before the male family head was 
expected to provide deppaas or the daily food expenditure for the family meals, it is 
now often the case in some families that other family members help out with this 
provision and the payment of other bills like water and electricity. In some cases, the 
responsibility of providing financial and material support for family members is now 
mostly carried out by anyone with the economic capacity to do so, including wives, 
sons or daughters.  
The majority of the family heads I interviewed maintained that they rely on the support 
of their adult children for their subsistence. Some of these children live and work in 
the West and provide this support by sending monthly remittances. For instance, Aunty 
Khaddy is a 65 year old retired teacher whose six children live and work in both the 
UK and the USA. She told me that each of her children send her ‘monthly allowances’ 
to enable her to pay for her food, medical bills, electricity and water bills and to cover 
other social costs. The children of parents who are working in the Gambia, either in 
the public sector or private sector, such as banks apportion a certain percentage of their 
salaries to support their parents and other family members. The young Gambians, who 
have neither the means to travel nor the education or skills to get a proper paying job, 
such as my study participants, resort to diverse informal economic activities or hustle 
to provide this support.  
Not all parents or family members in the Gambia have the privilege of such forms of 
support. A few of my interlocutors, who happen to be parents, have complained to me 
that they do not get any support because they either lack a child who is old enough to 
get a job or to travel or that the adult child they depend on has become a failure by 
doing nothing useful to earn the income needed to support them. Basiru is a 50 year 
old civil service driver whose situation exemplifies the former case. Unlike his 
contemporaries, Basiru got married quite late and so has no adult children who are 




as he has to provide for his young family without getting any help. Although he gets 
occasional help from his younger sister’s children who work in the Gambia, this help 
is not normally enough and only happens once, maybe twice every year. In one of our 
interviews, he aptly described his situation:  
I am suffering today because I have no child big enough who 
can help me. I am on a grade one salary which cannot even buy 
a bag of rice. I have six children. When two of them get sick 
together, I am faced with a dilemma of who to cure. More so, 
who is going to pay for my medication when I fall sick?  
 
Generational Relations and Reciprocity 
The expectation from young Gambian adults to provide livelihood support for their 
parents, other family members and others within the community is underpinned by 
social obligations born out of generational relations and reciprocal social exchange. 
Intergenerational relations take the form of what Bourdieu (1990: 167) refers to as the 
“economy of material and symbolic exchanges”. In the Gambia, and elsewhere (Alber 
et al., 2008), they form the implicit expectation that parents care for their children until 
they can care for themselves, and that children support their parents when they can no 
longer support themselves. Reciprocity, or reciprocal social exchange, constitutes the 
most important quality of intergenerational relations (Ibid). This means the sense of 
‘mutual dependence expressed in give and take over time’ (Alber et al., 2008: 6). The 
concept captures the performance of sharing and the transmission of material resources 
and also mutual expressions of care within families and communities.  
In his theoretical formulation, Finch (1989) used the concept of ‘normative obligation’ 
to explain obligations of kinship in contemporary Britain about the ‘proper thing to 
do’ for relatives in terms of support for personal care, financial support and 
accommodation. These normative obligations vary greatly according to time and 
place. Yet, the notions of duty and responsibility form the core of intergenerational 
relations and reciprocal social exchange within families in the Gambia. Duties and 
responsibilities within the family in the Gambia are sanctioned by inter-generational 




and young people (sons and daughters). They are based on transmissions that stem 
from a logic of social indebtedness where it becomes the obligation of parents to be 
responsible for providing care, food and shelter as well as moral guidance through 
education (both secular and Islamic) for their children. In return, children are expected 
to repay these efforts through financial support and care once they grow old enough to 
earn an income.  
This is not always the case as research has indicated. For instance, in her study on the 
city of Bobo-Dioulasso in Burkina Faso, Claudia Roth (2014) described a situation 
where children fail to find gainful occupations and establish themselves independently 
and continue to depend on their parents at a stage in their lives when they should be 
developing the resources with which to support their parents in their old age.  
Similarly, in Dogondoutchi, Niger, Masquelier (2005: 59) found disillusioned Mawri 
parents perceived their children, mostly young men, as ‘good-for-nothing, ungrateful 
sons, eager to make claims upon their fathers’ land, yet reluctant to fulfil social 
obligations’. Although cases of such forms of ‘inversion of intergenerational relations’ 
(Alber et al., 2008) can be found in the Gambia, it was not a pattern I found among my 
key interlocutors.   
Moreover, reciprocal social exchanges in the Gambia are not confined to biological or 
physical bonds. They are also constituted in much broader terms, including neighbours 
and friends. In some cases, neighbours and other extended relatives do help to support 
a child when the parents are unable to. In most cases, orphans benefit from these types 
of support. It therefore sometimes happens that young people turn to distant relatives 
or neighbours and friends to solicit assistance to pay for education, to buy uniforms or 
other school materials. The provider of such support usually has the implicit 
expectation that the child will reciprocate the support once he or she is old enough and 
financially strong enough to do so.  
For instance, David feels indebted to his uncle who took care of him when his mother 
left.  Although his uncle did not do much in terms of paying for his education, David 
still feels that the little his uncle did for him in terms of feeding and sheltering him 
must be reciprocated. David finds this to be problematic for many young people, 




The difficulty here is that when you have money, not only do 
you have to help family members, but also your friends and 
neighbours who were there for you when times were hard. So 
when you start making money, you realise that you are socially 
indebted to so many people and not paying it back incurs 
accusations of ungratefulness. 
Other hustlers have also told me that not only do their families have a pervasive 
influence on their aspirations, but also so does the wider community. Indeed, I noticed 
during my fieldwork that financial help in the form of remittances and local 
contributions usually goes to members of the extended family and others in the 
community.   
Intergenerational relations and reciprocal social exchanges within the family and the 
community in the Gambia, as elsewhere in Africa (Mazzucato, 2008), are not free of 
friction or conflicts. Although the majority of Gambian parents and other members of 
the extended family and community welcome the contributions made and the support 
they receive from their children and other young adults, this puts the young adults in a 
stronger negotiating position as they have become independent from the authority of 
their elders. A few elders I spoke to expressed their concern and frustration about the 
declining authority of many family heads and the ways ‘today’s younger generation 
abuse their independence’. 
Alhaji Dambele is almost 80 years old and is a known conservative among his 
neighbours in Brikama. Despite all his children living in the UK, he still tries to 
maintain strict moral codes in his compound. I was told by one of my interlocutors that 
when his sons come home for holidays, they prefer to stay at one of the hotels to escape 
his control over their activities. Alhaji complained about what he perceives to be the 
lack of morality among today’s younger generation in the Gambia. He attributed this 
to their ability to earn their own money. He went even further to make a contrast 
between his generation and today’s young people: 
During our time, whether we travelled or farmed, we were 
under the authority of our elders. We give everything we earn 
to our elders without asking them how they spend it or question 
their authority. But today’s young people, they will start to 




Just like Alhaji, other elders I spoke to in Brikama expressed their misgivings about 
the comportment of the younger generation, the chanters in particular. These elders 
often complained to me about the ‘immoral ‘behaviour of the young generation of 
Gambians. Such pronouncements moral degeneration are more than nostalgic 
reminiscences about an ever more distant past when youth respected gerontocracy and 
behaved according to prescribed social norms. The elders’ concerns about these 
troubling social transformations in generational dynamics can be connected with a 
much more general trend involving unemployed youths throughout Africa. For 
instance, in Niger (de Latour, 1992:73) reports that Mawri elders complained that 
‘before youths obeyed their fathers, they were afraid of them. Today, they have 
become women’. 
3.4 Political Economy of the Gambia 
Politics 
The Republic of the Gambia is a former British colony and protectorate that gained 
independence from the United Kingdom in February 1965 and became a constitutional 
monarchy within the Commonwealth. However, after a subsequent referendum, the 
country became a republic within the commonwealth in April 1970. Prime Minister 
Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara later became President, combining the offices of Head of 
State and Head of Government (Hughes & Perfect, 2006). 
Except for a brief period in July 1981 when a group of leftist rebels made a failed 
attempt to overthrow the government of President Dawda Jawara and replace it with 
what they proclaimed to be a "dictatorship of the proletariat" under the leadership of a 
12-man National Revolutionary Council (Wiseman, 1981: 373), the Gambia has 
enjoyed relative peace and stability since its independence. In addition, the country 
was distinguished as one of Sub-Saharan Africa’s longest standing multi-party 
democracies, along with Mauritius and Botswana, at a time when authoritarianism and 
military regimes held sway in the continent (Edie, 2000). 
Moreover, since independence up until 1994 when Jawara’s government was 
overthrown, the Gambia had maintained what seemed on the surface to be a 




contested by a range of political parties (Saine, 2009). However, close scrutiny of this 
system reveals that Jawara actually presided over a de facto single party system under 
the guise of a multi-party democracy by holding elections every five years. Winning 
these elections with his People’s Progressive Party (PPP), Jawara continuously 
dominated the political landscape (Edie, 2000; Hughes, 1992; Perfect, 2008). The term 
“sembocracy” (sembo being a Mandika word meaning power or force) was coined to 
describe the Gambia’s political experience under Jawara (Saine, 2009). The term has 
been used to describe the otherwise covert authoritarian practices of Jawara’s 
government under the guise of democracy. Jawara resorted to a variety of tactics to 
consolidate his rule. Prominent among these were his strategic use of state patronage 
and building tactical alliances (Hughes, 1992).  
A second successful, albeit peaceful, military coup in July 1994 toppled the 
government of Jawara and his PPP’s 30 year rule. This event halted the country’s long 
façade of a multi-party and democratic regime. The putschists were four young junior 
officers of the Gambia National Army (GNA) who established the Armed Forces 
Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC). Led by a 27 year old lieutenant, Yaya Jammeh, 
the officers justified their actions by claiming grievances over the late payment of 
salaries and poor living conditions in the barracks. In their first speech after taking 
over, the coup leaders expressed their displeasure over rampant corruption, denounced 
the tyranny of the PPP and their failure to develop the country over the thirty years it 
had been in power (Perfect, 2008: 431). 
The new military government announced a four-year transitional timetable to return 
the country to civilian rule. However, a combination of international economic 
sanctions and domestic pressures forced the AFPRC military government to revise its 
four-year timetable to two years. Resigning from the army and transforming the 
AFPRC into a populist political party to become the Alliance for Patriotic 
Reorientation and Construction (APRC), Jammeh contested the 1996 elections and 
won with an outright majority. There were widespread claims from both international 
observers and opposition party leaders that the presidential elections were neither free 
nor fair because the electoral process was engineered from the outset to enable Jammeh 
to stay in power (Saine, 2009). Becoming a “soldier turned civilian president” (Saine, 




successive elections in 2001, 2006 and 2011. Despite allegations of electoral fraud and 
political intimidation from local critics and international observers (Ibid), Jammeh’s 
electoral successes were more to do with the disorganised and fragmented nature of 
the opposition parties. 
To maintain his grip on power, Jammeh established a special security and intelligence 
apparatus known as the National Intelligence Agency (NIA). Established in 1995, it 
reports directly to the president (Amnesty International, 2008). The NIA has since 
metamorphosed into a complex intelligence network that includes anybody who can 
provide information about real and perceived critics of the state. Today, the name 
instils fear and suspicion among Gambians as everybody suspects everybody of being 
an NIA and nobody wants to discuss anything related to government issues in the 
Gambia for fear that they might be talking to an agent of the NIA. President Jammeh 
recently declared that nobody can remove him from power and that he intends to rule 
for “a billion years” (Coughlin, 2013). However, a failed coup attempt in December 
2014 led by some Gambian dissidents living in the US sent a clear message that 
potential adversaries are willing to test his resolve and grip on power.  
Economy 
Throughout the colonial period, the Gambia’s economy, like other West African 
colonies, depended on the proceeds of international trade (Hughes and Perfect, 2006: 
31). Until the Second World War, a significant part of government revenue was 
provided by customs receipts, generated by duties imposed on manufactured goods 
and other food and clothing products imported from Europe by trading companies 
(ibid). Other sources of government revenue were provided by duties on the sale of 
groundnuts, the principal export crop, and fines and licences. The period following the 
Second World War, the Gambia’s development expenditure was largely financed by 
grants or loans from the British government. At independence, a significant amount 
(60-70 percent) of domestic revenue was derived from taxes on international trade 
(ibid: 32).  
Post-colonial Gambia’s national economy is based on agriculture, the tourist industry 
(mainly along the Atlantic Coast) and the re-export trade (Sallah, 1990; IMF, 2015). 




agriculture suffering from climate and market constraints over the past decades, the 
country continues with peanuts and peanut products, fish, cotton lint and palm kernels 
as its main export products (Wane, 2009). The country’s relatively low trade taxes has 
promoted its role as an ‘entrepot’ in the sub-region (Golub and Mbaye, 2008). This 
entrepot role has contributed substantially to government revenues, as imported goods 
destined for re-export generally pay full duties when entering the country (Ibid).  
Saine (2009) notes that post-independent Gambia’s economic trajectory can be divided 
into four key periods. These include: the period just after independence and its 
concomitant economic challenges, the economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s (partly 
triggered by the oil crisis) and the implementation of structural adjustment policies, 
and the period covering 1995-2008 that ushered in military rule and its APRC 
government offshoot. I extend this economic trajectory to reflect the passage of time 
since his book was published in 2009 and include the period covering the last 7-8 years 
during which the Gambia’s economy entered a period of worsening economic 
performance, and reached crisis proportions in 2015. 
Upon gaining independence, the Gambia inherited one of the poorest and least 
diversified economies in the global economy (Rice, 1967; Beddies, 1999). Successive 
governments (two in total since independence) have, therefore, relied on bilateral and 
multilateral donor aid from mostly EU, the US, China and then Taiwan, and budgetary 
support from international financial institutions (Saine, 2009). This support propped 
up the economy, which did relatively well in maintaining favourable growth rates and 
an overall narrow budget deficit (Sallah, 1990; Hughes and Cooke, 1997; Saine, 2009). 
However, external shocks such as the oil crisis of the 1970s (which led to an increase 
in import prices for petrol in particular), a long drought in the Sahel, a drop in world 
market prices for groundnuts and decreasing donor aid saw a sharp decline in 
economic performance (Beddies, 1999; Saine, 2009). The situation was also 
compounded by a decline in tourist numbers in the immediate aftermath of the 1981 
aborted coup, and inappropriate fiscal and monetary policies by the Jawara 
government.  
To reverse the protracted economic deterioration and lay the foundations for sustained 




Economic Recovery Program (ERP) with assistance from the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other international donors (Sallah, 1990). The 
official view provided by the IMF/World Bank and the Government of the Gambia 
suggested that by eliminating government subsidies, disposing of state-owned 
enterprises, and increasing tax revenues, the ERP helped the Gambian government’s 
finances, having a positive effect on the Gambian economy. This view was supported 
by Saine (2009) who claimed that from the period when the ERP was implemented in 
the mid-1980s to 1994, when the military took over power, the Gambia made 
significant progress in reducing financial imbalances and strengthened the basis for 
sustainable economic growth.  
However, the above views were incongruent with that held by some observers. For 
instance, according to Foroyaa, the opposition newspaper published by the People's 
Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism (P.D.O.I.S.), the E.R.P. was 
a political ploy designed to enhance the survival of the ruling People's Progressive 
Party (PPP) (Sallah, 1992). Foroyaa emphasised the continuing defects of the political 
economy, and claims that as far as the majority of Gambians are concerned, 'the ERP 
of the international money lenders' has not yet been successful as it resulted in social 
costs such as job losses and the removal of seed and fertilizer subsidies for farmers. 
Be that as it may, Hughes and Cooke (1997) assert that the Gambian government’s 
reserves in 1994 were healthy enough to support imports for about six months. 
However, this trend of strong economic performance was once again to be reversed 
when the military took power in July 1994.The aftermath of the 1994 military coup 
(1994-1996, to be precise) saw the Gambian economy suffering from a series of 
external shocks. These include poor rains which had a setback for agricultural output, 
economic sanctions imposed by major donor partners and a decline in private 
investment due to the loss of investor confidence (Beddies, 1999). As a result, the 
currency weakened, productivity declined and government revenues plummeted 
(Ibid). Despite these economic realities, the new military government embarked on 
ambitious and expensive infrastructural development programmes, building a new 




expensive ‘Arch 22’18 monument. Although these projects, sponsored through 
excessive domestic and external borrowing, were politically appealing, they made very 
little economic sense as they further plunged the economy into a downward spiral 
(Saine, 2009). 
The return to civilian rule in 1997, however, and the subsequent resumption of 
economic and budgetary assistance from major donor partners such as the European 
Union led to improved macro-economic conditions and strong growth. This period 
coincided with a boom in construction (Gambians living in the diaspora were building 
homes), tourism and telecom sectors facilitated by steady inflows of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and remittances (Ibid). In spite of these macro-economic 
achievements, poverty increased from the period 1994 to 2008 as many Gambians fell 
below the poverty line (Heintz, Oya and Zepeda, 2008).  
After a brief honeymoon of relatively strong economic performance, the period 
spanning 2009 to 2015 witnessed worsening economic conditions to crisis proportions. 
This state of economic affairs is caused by a combination of factors. Firstly, the 
country is witnessing a decline of its agricultural base due to unfavourable weather 
patterns in the Sahel. In particular, delayed rains in 2014 caused distress to the 
economy, leading to a significant decline in crop production (IMF, 2015). This is 
aggravated by the poor performance of tourism, which accounts for about 20 per cent 
of the country’s GDP. Although the country has been spared from the latest Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa, the crisis negatively affected the Gambian economy by 
discouraging tourists from visiting the country. It is reported that the tourism sector 
has experienced a 60 percent decline in tourist visitors, leading to a 12 percent 
depreciation of the dalasi, the country’s local currency (IMF, 2015). Hotels have had 
to close and staff have been laid off as a result of tourists’ cancellations and tour 
operators reducing scheduled flights.  
This state of economic affairs, in combination with the government’s fiscal 
indiscipline has seen the value of the dalasi plummet against both the CFA (used by 
most of its neighbours including Senegal) and major international currencies such as 
                                                 





the dollar and the euro. In an attempt to reverse this trend and to stabilise the 
depreciating dalasi, the Government of the Gambia decided to depreciate and peg the 
value of the dalasi, in 2014, to the major currencies. The loss incurred from this 
financial interference mostly affects the majority of the population who for their 
livelihood, depend on remittances sent from abroad. Shortly afterwards, the Resident 
Representative of the IMF in the country went public, saying that this policy move will 
make matters worse for the economy. 
The decision to tamper with and manage the foreign currency exchange has caused a 
dramatic increase in food prices and other consumer goods, while salaries remain 
stagnant. This has had a negative effect on the standard of living of the majority of 
Gambians by weakening purchasing power. Making matters worse is the very high 
rate of unemployment and underemployment, particularly among youths, for which 
there are no reliable estimates. Nyanzi summed this situation up when she claimed 
that: “In the Gambia, successful livelihoods among youths are challenged by 
unemployment, underemployment, low employability due to limited skills and early 
school dropout” (Nyanzi, 2010:207). The country’s education system is partly to 
blame for the situation as it fails to provide the types of skills training that can assure 
employability. A study in 2014 conducted by the Educational Research Network for 
West and Central Africa (ERNWACA) to examine the extent to which the Gambian 
Curriculum for Upper Basic School Leavers is relevant to social demand for their 
employability concludes that many educational institutions in the country are 
becoming more of a liability than an asset. It is estimated that over 60 percent of 
graduates could not find employment, and the few who do make up the 40 percent of 
employees living on less than 1.25 dollar a day (Ibid).  
With these developments, the economy is plummeting into a recession and the budget 
deficit is widening. The country has registered a record rate of inflation in the first 
quarter of 2015 (IMF, 2015). For example, recently released official figures for May 
2015 show that the fiscal period running from March 2014 to March 2015, the 
country’s National Consumer Price Index (NCPI) increased from 5.6 percent to 6.5 
percent, while food inflation skyrocketed to 8.4 percent from 6.4 percent (Ibid). The 




that the country experienced a decline in GDP and an increase in the level of public 
debt in 2014. 
The Gambia’s economic downturn cannot be wholly blamed on external factors such 
as the Ebola outbreak and poor rains. In addition to the government’s interference in 
the exchange rate, some of President Jammeh’s actions and polices have also 
contributed significantly to the current economic situation. For instance, worsening 
human and civil rights conditions under the APRC regime and attacks on freedom of 
expression and perceived members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and 
intersex (LGBTI)19 community (Amnesty International, 2015) has forced the 
European Union to block some €13 million euros in aid to the Gambia last year. Also, 
citing general concerns over continued human rights abuses, the United States has 
slashed aid to the country in the last year (Reuters, 2015). Bearing in mind that the 
Gambian economy to a large extent depends on foreign aid, the move by the EU has 
meant further significant strain on the already collapsed economy, having serious 
implications for the livelihoods of Gambians. 
Jammeh’s hard stance against gays has not only made the Gambia one of the world’s 
most hostile gay destinations (Spartacus International Gay Guide, 2015)20, but has also 
had serious implications for the Gambian economy and by extension for the 
livelihoods of many Gambians. Being a country whose economy depends heavily on 
tourism, Jammeh’s gay policy can have the effect of tarnishing the friendly image of 
the country, thereby affecting the growth of tourism in the Gambia. The withdrawal of 
the Gambia from the Commonwealth in 2013 (Perfect, 2014) by the government is 
also predicted to have implications for people who depend on tourism for their 
livelihoods as the decision may result in fewer British tourists visiting the country 
(ibid). Moreover, President Jammeh’s declaration at a political rally, in December 
2015, that the Gambia will henceforth be transformed into an Islamic Republic has the 
potential of scaring Western tourists away. This can negatively affect the economy and 
the lives of those whose livelihoods depend on tourism and tourism related activities. 
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The above exogenous and endogenous factors have seen the country performing badly 
in recent macroeconomic indicators. For instance, the country ranks 172nd out of 187 
countries in the United Nations Human Development Index according to the 2014 
Human Development Report (UNDP, 2014) which is in the low human development 
category. This position has declined, taking into account that in the 2011 HDR, 
Gambia was ranked 168 out of 187 countries (Ibid). The Multidimensional Poverty 
Index (MPI) indicates that 60.8 percent of the population are poor (Ibid), faring just 
better than the Central African Republic in this index. Not likely to meet the 
Millennium Development Goal of halving income poverty by 2015,21 the country’s 
population is experiencing low national economic growth and urban livelihoods are 
becoming increasingly precarious and many young Gambians facing the prospect of 
not being able to fulfil their social and economic aspirations.  
Moreover, hustling in the Gambia must be understood by looking at the interplay 
between the above factors and global political and economic forces. For instance, 
structural adjustment programs (SAP) of the 1980s and neoliberal market policies, (the 
ERP in particular) have reduced the proportion of Gambia’s wage employed 
population. The ERP imposed on the Gambian economy in 1985 as conditions for 
loans saw the emergence of two ‘Gambias’ (Moseley, Carney and Becker, 2010). One 
exists along the urban seaboard, where the majority of citizens engage in informal 
economic activities as a livelihood strategy. The other Gambia is found in the country’s 
interior, where subsistence agriculture remains significant yet fails to meet the 
subsistence needs of those who engage in it. These have to depend on remittances 
either from the urban areas or abroad. This situation enticed young men from farming 
households in rural Gambia to migrate to coastal towns in search of improved 
economic circumstances. Most ended up on the beaches working as tourist guides or 
engaging in other petty jobs on the fringes of the tourism industry.  
The failed socio-economic policies of the Gambian government compounded by neo 
liberal policies have affected the availability of economic opportunities. A school-
leaving certificate is of little use unless you know someone influential as the 
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government is unable to provide enough jobs. In highlighting the temporal dimensions 
of neoliberalism for young people in other African contexts, scholars have rightly 
emphasized the role of neoliberal economic policies, particularly structural 
adjustment, in creating a gap between the aspirations of youth and economic realities 
(Cole 2004; Hansen 2005; Howanda and De Boeck 2005; Jua 2003; Masquelier 2005; 
Silberschmidt 2004;Weiss 2004). James Ferguson (2006) has explained that economic 
shifts associated with neoliberal capitalism have derailed Africa from what he calls a 
“temporal developmental trajectory” (2006:190). Ferguson and other anthropologists 
have argued that, although theories of neoliberal capitalism are useful for 
understanding economic decline and unemployment, they must also take into account 
local cultural and economic dynamics (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000;Weiss 2004). 
For the Gambia, failed economic policies by the two governments, spiralling insecurity 
heralded by neoliberal policies and the country’s marginalization in the world market, 
have profoundly shaped young urban livelihoods. One might summarise by saying that 
the Gambia’s economy, in both its historical and contemporary form, classically 
represents what Bayart calls the ‘economy of extraversion’22 (2000:227). This took the 
form of the export of crops (groundnuts in particular), the re-export trade, tourism, 
remittances sent by migrants and direct bilateral and multilateral financial aid. I 
suggest that, by pursuing local livelihoods through their interactions with toubabs, 






                                                 
22 Extraversion, according to Bayart (2000: 218), entails the ‘gratification from what is outside of the 
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3.5 The Tourism Sector: An Overview 
The first part of this section aims to provide a brief overview of the Gambia’s 
tourism sector. I demonstrate how the introduction of tourism in the Gambia has 
provided opportunities for some young Gambians who find themselves in a condition 
of ‘involuntary immobility’ to generate the income they need to fulfil their 
aspirations of social and economic advancement. I begin by exploring relevant 
studies on tourism in general and tourism in the Gambia in particular. 
3.5.1 Tourism: A Brief Definition. 
As a complex activity, attempts to establish a universal and interdisciplinary definition 
of tourism have proved to be quite problematic (van Hassel, 1994; Burns, 2004). 
However, central to understanding tourism is the idea that it “involves travelling to 
and staying in places outside ones usual environment or home on a temporary and 
voluntary basis, either for leisure or business” (Franklin, 2003: 25). The growth of 
tourism in developing countries has attracted a lot of research aimed at understanding 
its economic impacts on host countries (for example Mathieson and Wall, 1982; 
Rahman, 2010; Mathieson and Wall, 2006:70; Risso and Brida, 2008). The majority 
of these studies focus on the economic impacts of tourism in terms of its financial 
(both macro and micro) and employment benefits to the destination country. For 
instance, Mathieson & Wall, (2006:70) bring into attention the wider economic 
impacts of tourism in terms of linkages and leakages within the local economy of many 
developing countries. Others (Risso and Brida, 2008; Smith and Warburton, 2012) 
have found tourism to strengthen the host nation’s foreign exchange earnings, directly 
and indirectly contributing to government revenues (Hsu & Gartner, 2012) through 
taxes and levies thereby promoting overall economic growth. Tourism also has 
provided opportunities of both formal and informal employment opportunities for host 
populations. It is argued that the rapid expansion of international tourism has led to 




For instance, the Gambia’s tourism industry is a crucial component of the country’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (second only to Agriculture) and a major source of 
foreign exchange. Estimates show that it contributes to somewhere between 19-20 
percent of the country’s GDP and provides employment for more than 100,000 people 
both directly and indirectly and accounts for 20% of formal employment (Mitchell & 
Faal, 2007). To these estimates should be added people engaged in the informal 
tourism sector. This includes all those individuals and micro enterprises which engage 
with tourists and the tourism industry. It is estimated that as many as 3-4,000 people 
are engaged – some on a seasonal basis – either full-time or part-time in the tourism-
related informal sector, giving a total of around 10,000 people that directly depend on 
tourism for their livelihood and that of their dependants (Ibid). 
While the overall contribution of tourism to the Gambian economy is undisputed, the 
tourism industry's real contribution to poverty alleviation is less obvious. In a study to 
examine the share of tourism expenditure reaching the local economy, Mitchell and 
Faal (2007) indicate that mainstream holiday package tourism in the Gambia has 
important ‘pro-poor’23 benefit flows and that in total, about 14 percent of the Gambian 
part of the tourism value chain flows to poor people through retail markets, the 
agricultural supply chain, non-managerial hotel workers, guides and taxi drivers, 
amongst others. 
Although tourism in developing countries has been considered to provide job 
opportunities for the local people and increases their income, a few tourism scholars 
(for example Nimmonratana, 2000; Goodwin, 2002) have identified the economic 
dependence of the local community on tourism as a negative economic effect. They 
argue that the dependence on one sector for economic survival can put major stress on 
the industry as well as the people who operate within it. For instance, Harrell-Bond 
(1979:88) argues that the development of tourism in the Gambia increased “the 
Gambia's dependency on and its sensitivity to economic fluctuations in the tourist-
generating markets outside the country”. This became apparent last year when the 
Ebola outbreak in West Africa had serious economic implications for the Gambia’s 
economy.  
                                                 




3.5.2 The Evolution of Tourism in the Gambia 
The Gambia is renowned as an attractive tourist destination due to its fine beaches and 
pleasant temperatures. The country has a hot subtropical climate and experiences a 
humid rainy season from June to November and a cooler and more pleasant dry season 
from November to May (average temperatures range from 23 degrees Celsius in the 
winter to 42 degrees in the summer). The first tourists arrived in the Gambia in the 
1930s by steam cruiser. With the onset of the Second World War the cruise liners 
ceased operation and it was not until the birth of charter tourism in the Gambia that 
tourists visited the country in great numbers (Brown, 1992: 362). Charter tourism 
started in earnest in the Gambia around 1965 when a party of about 300 Swedish 
tourists arrived in the country (Harrell-Bond, 1979).  
The advent of charter tourism coincided with the government’s bid to diversify the 
Gambian economy and offset its continuing dependence on a single cash crop of 
peanuts, which made it very vulnerable to the risks of bad weather, pests and price 
fluctuations (Sallah, 1990). Tourism was considered to be the cornerstone of this 
policy of diversification, and the former president, Jawara, worked with international 
development agencies, like the World Bank to promote this agenda (Nyang, 1974). 
Charter companies, mostly from Scandinavia, began marketing the Gambia as an ideal 
winter holiday destinations for Europeans (Janson, 2014). This led to a steady influx 
of tourists, particularly from Scandinavia (Rice, 1968), putting pressure on the Atlantic 
Hotel (then the country’s only hotel), situated in the capital, Banjul, as it struggled to 
meet the upsurge in demand for rooms (Harrel-Bond, 1979). Subsequently, five star 
international hotels were built along the coast in Bakau and Fajara in the late 1960s. 
As tourism developed throughout the 1970s and more tourists started arriving, more 
hotels were built.  
In the mid-1970s, the creation and development of the Tourism Development Area 
(TDA) further along the Atlantic Coast led to the construction of more hotels to meet 
the rising demands of tourists (ibid). The new hub of this development was along the 
Senegambia area in Kololi. The TDA was later extended to include satellite villages 




(the Coral Beach Hotel & Spa24 and Coco Ocean Resort and Spa) in Brufut and Bijilo 
villages respectively.   
Today the TDA is geographically concentrated along a 10 km strip on the Atlantic 
Coast, encompassing an area that is 800 metres from the coastline. The TDA is further 
divided into sections. These include Bakau, Palma Rima, Bungalow Beach (BB), 
Senegambia, Bijilo and Brufut. Palma Rima, BB and Senegambia are all located within 
the village of Kololi. All these sections are linked by a main road (the Bertil Harding 
Highway, also known as the “The Strip”) where most of the tourism activities take 
place. “The Strip” is populated by hotels, restaurants and supermarkets and prices are 
more expensive within this area and the TDA in general. This is not surprising as 
studies (Wamwara-Mbugua and Cornwell, 2008) have found that tourism leads to 
increase in prices for basic services and goods in destination countries.  
At the moment, the TDA consists of 40 hotels, 127 guest houses, 132 bars and 
restaurants and 21 beach bars (Gambia Tourism Board, 2014). The hotel stock is of 
variable and quite modest quality, with the majority being three or four stars, although 
Coral Beach Hotel and Cocoa Ocean Resort and Spa are five star rated. The TDA has, 
in the past ten years, seen a sharp increase in the establishment of relatively low quality 
accommodation in the form of guest houses or motels that cater for a broader market. 
The majority of these businesses are owned by foreigners, particularly the Lebanese 
and some Europeans, although a few are Gambian owned. A plethora of nightclubs 
and two casinos can also be found within the TDA. In addition, a number of craft 
markets have been created in the TDA close to the hotels where tourists may purchase 
batiks, wood carvings and other traditional crafts. 
The aims and objectives of tourism for the Gambia are encapsulated in the Gambia’s 
Vision 2020 for the tourism sector. This vision pledges to: 
Make the Gambia a tourist paradise and a major tourist 
destination through product innovation, quality improvement, 
improvement of investment returns and diversification of The 
Gambia's tourism product. And a distinctive tourism 
destination that offers a high quality experience for our visitors 
                                                 




that is sustainable and where strong economic and social 
benefits are provided for Gambians (Vision 2020).  
The Government of the Gambia (GoG) illustrated its commitment to the sector in 
achieving this vision by establishing The Gambia Tourism Board (GTB), formerly the 
Gambia Tourism Authority (GTA).  
Through an act of parliament in July 2001, the Gambia Tourism Authority became a 
public enterprise with the task of developing and regulating the tourism industry in the 
Gambia. It became operational in November 2001, to be replaced in 2011 with a new 
entity called the Gambia Tourism Board (GTB). The main reason for this change, 
according to GTB officials, was to put more focus on marketing rather than regulation. 
Although this change did not lead to any significant budgetary changes (in terms of 
government subsidies), some restructuring and personnel redundancies were carried 
out to reflect the roles and mandate of the GTB. The GTB was given a slightly 
enhanced role and in addition to those it inherited from the GTA, its principal functions 
are to vigorously promote ‘destination Gambia’ as an attractive tourist destination, 
ensure tourist facilities meet high international standards, establish and maintain the 
quality standards of the industry, develop the human resource base of the industry’s 
products and services and collect and conduct surveys on tourism activities in the 
industry, amongst other things (GTB Act, 2011).   
3.5.3 Informal Service Providers 
The increase in informal economic activities, such as guiding, and the escalation of 
tourist harassment and hassling, led to in 2003, a Government policy to regulate the 
hitherto unregulated activities of informal economic operators within the tourism 
industry. The strategy was to make informal service providers and vendors, also known 
as beach hustlers, useful partners within the tourism industry. In 2004 the strategy led 
to the registration of a class of informal service providers within the margins of the 
tourism industry. These include, but are not limited to, bird watchers, juice pressers, 
fruit sellers, fishermen, craft sellers, taxi drivers and horse riders. Each of these 
operators was helped by GTA to create their own associations which serve as a link 




Beach hustlers who wish to be registered have to fill in an application form and pay an 
annual licence fee of 525 Dalasis (approx. 8 GBP). GTB then carries out a screening 
check to see whether applicants have any previous criminal convictions. Those selling 
food items like fruit sellers and juice pressers are required to do a food hygiene course 
at Gambia National Tourism Training Institute before they are licensed. Also, bird 
watchers must have certification from the Bird Watchers Association. Apart from the 
registration costs, registered beach hustlers do not pay any other taxes, hence their 
classification as operators within the informal economy. 
Successful applicants are then issued with a registration card bearing their name, serial 
number, type of business and specific area of operation. The card became the only 
form of identification within the TDA and must be renewed every year by paying the 
licence fee. According to GTB, the card will help security officers to identify the beach 
hustlers who are allowed to operate within the TDA. It will also make it easier for 
tourists to know who they are dealing with. Beach hustlers who failed to abide by these 
regulations were not allowed to operate within the TDA. 
Registered beach hustlers were urged to adhere to a sense of decorum. They were 
required to be ‘correctly dressed’, must always be ‘sober’ and must not ‘hassle or 
behave inappropriately’ towards tourists. They are also not allowed to operate outside 
of the designated area stated on their cards. For example, if you are a bird watcher 
designated to Bungalow Beach (BB), you are only allowed within the premises of the 
bird watchers in BB. You are not allowed to tout for customers on the beach or other 
areas within the TDA. Transgressors are arrested and severely dealt with by the 
Tourism Security Unit (TSU). The TSU consist of personnel from the Gambian 
National Army and are stationed at various security checkpoints along the TDA.   
Although the primary goal of registration is regulation, it does come with other benefits 
for Gambian beach hustlers as well. Training and workshops are occasionally 
organised for them and guidelines are issued to meet the basic standards as service 
providers within the industry. For example, annual health checks are carried out on 
juice pressers and fruit sellers to make sure hygiene rules are adhered to. GTB also 




for registered fruit sellers to use. On the benefits of registration and regulation, 
Mamadou Bah, Quality Control Officer for GTB told me: 
The license is not just paying your money and having a card. 
It has benefits, particularly by encouraging and helping them 
to form associations which we have been given bargain powers 
to speak on their behalf. Our department helps them improve 
their services to acceptable standards. We bring in partners to 
train them. One association that benefited from this was the 
horse riders. The horse riders were helped to train in horse 
maintenance in terms of health and weight. They have a health 
passport and we provide someone to come and check the 
horses physically and medically and those that need treatment 
are treated free of charge. 
Despite this, some beach hustlers refuse to register and prefer to operate at the fringes 
of the industry as unofficial local guides, offering services to tourists ranging from 
guiding, interpreting and negotiating during their visit in the Gambia. Consequently, 
the authorities drew a line between beach hustlers considered as ‘legal operators 
providing genuine services’ and beach hustlers considered to be ‘illegal intruders’ 






Figure 6: A photo of the TDA ID card issued by the GTB to registered beach 
hustlers. 
3.5.4 Tourists and Tourism Activities 
Tourism in the Gambia is distinguished by its seasonality. As a winter sun destination, 
the peak season for tourist activities is from November to April, and this period is 
locally known as the ‘season’. With humid and almost unpleasant temperatures during 
the summer when the rains fall, tourism activity almost comes to a standstill between 
the months of May and October. With very few tourists, most hotels and tourist related 
businesses are closed. Seasonality also affects those whose livelihoods depend on 
tourism. For example, only half of the total labour force is retained during the low 
season and most hotel staff such as recreation and restaurant workers are laid off. 
Tourism in the Gambia is also based predominantly on charter tourism. Also known 
as ‘all-inclusive tourism’ or ‘package tourism’, it involves tourists purchasing 
everything in advance including plane tickets, airport taxes, fuel surcharges, insurance, 




Gambia Experience brochure, 2013). To cater for this, hotel complexes are equipped 
with bars, restaurants, shops, hair salons and any other services that the tourists might 
need. This encourages tourists to spend the majority of their time and money within 
the hotel complex, hence the establishment of an enclave resort within the tourism 
sector in the Gambia (Carlisle & Jones, 2012).  
The creation of ‘enclave tourism’ through all-inclusive tourist packages is considered 
to have a negative effect on the earning capacities of informal economic operators such 
as service providers and vendors within the tourism industry. This negatively affects 
the local people’s ability to profit from tourism (Freitag, 1994; Pattullo, 1996). It has 
been estimated that all-inclusive hotels generate the largest amount of revenue but their 
impact on the economy is smaller as compared to other holiday types (Ibid). In the 
Gambia in particular, ‘all-inclusive tourism’ is found to have a negative effect on ‘pro-
poor tourism’. The all-inclusive policy restricts the income earning opportunities for 
those at the lower end of the tourism value chain, beach hustlers in particular and others 
benefiting from tourism. Broham’s (1996: 56) assertion that there is minimal “potential 
benefits of tourism to ‘leak’ out into the local economy because large foreign tourist 
companies control the sector and are offered incentives by governments to the 
detriment of their tax base and the welfare of tourism workers” aptly captures the 
situation.   
In 1999, the government banned ‘all-inclusive’ holidays, citing limited positive impact 
upon the local economy and lack of support for local businesses.25 As the Ministry of 
Tourism stated then, “we want visitors to interact with our people and culture…if the 
tourists are restricted to one place because they have paid in advance for drinks and 
meals there is no benefit to our country. The local restaurants, bars, taxis and arts and 
crafts sellers all suffer” (Carlisle & Jones, 2012: 12). However, the government's 
policy position changed due to pressure from European International Tourism 
Organisations (ITOs) and the significant loss in tourist arrivals as a result of the ban, 
and ‘all-inclusive’ package tourism was re-instated. 
                                                 
25 A study by Freitag (1994) and Pattullo (1996) demonstrated similar concerns about the negative 




With the exception of the 2014-2015 tourist season, when the number of tourist arrivals 
plummeted to very low figures due to the Ebola crisis elsewhere in West Africa, the 
Gambia has enjoyed a steady increase in tourist arrivals in the last decade. This was 
partly due to terrorism concerns, mostly from tourists, in Egypt, Kenya and Tanzania, 
the Gambia’s traditional competitors. In fact, tourist numbers almost doubled from 
roughly 90,000 in 2004 to 172,000 in 2013 (GTB, 2014). Tourists that visit the Gambia 
are classified into “traditional” and “non-traditional” market labels by GTB (Ibid). 
Traditional markets are those countries from where the Gambia has long attracted its 
tourists and these include Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland and Norway. ‘Non-Traditional’ markets are those countries where 
interest in the destination is gradually on the increase. These countries include France, 
the USA, Italy, Australia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Ireland and Nigeria. In 
particular, the last few years has seen a significant increase in Polish tourists, with a 
growth rate of 627 per cent in 2013 compared to 2012 (Ibid).  
The last five years has seen a drop in tourist arrivals from traditional markets with a 
corresponding increase in arrivals from non-traditional markets. Beach hustlers are not 
happy with this development as they claim they make less money from non-traditional 
partners who spend less in comparison with tourists from Scandinavia. For example, 
my interlocutors told me that tourists from Poland are “stingy and would even share a 
drink among themselves”. In addition to earning less money from non-traditional 
partners, beach hustlers also find “repeat visitors” spend less compared to “first time 
visitors”. These classifications have implications for the activities the tourists engage 
in and how much they are willing to spend. In a study on the Gambia’s tourism sector, 
Bah and Goodwin (2003: 20) gathered that repeat visitors were less likely to engage 
in activities for which they would pay and that there exists “a strong negative 
relationship between frequency of visit to the Gambia and the number of activities 
undertaken away from the hotel and beach”. Essentially, those visitors who were on 
repeat visits to the Gambia did fewer activities. The study further found that first time 
visitors engaged in more paid activities. This is partly because repeat visitors tend to 
do less sightseeing and when they do they tend to be more independent, but it also 




failure of the informal sector to diversify and enrich their day excursion and activity 
offers. 
As a destination for mass tourism, the Gambia has numerous attractions and offers 
quite a few activities. Although it lacks the big game parks that are found in East Africa 
and the beauty of the Nile Valley and the Pyramids found in Egypt, the Gambia makes 
up for this through its reputation as one of the best bird watching destinations in the 
world. The country has 500 recorded bird species, both migrant and resident (The bird 
watchers association). As such, many tourists visit the country for bird watching, 
spending their time within the tropical gardens of the major hotels, in wildlife and bird 
reserves such as Tanji and Abuko Nature Reserves. In addition, the Atlantic Ocean 
and the River Gambia provide the country with the perfect resources for game or 
recreational fishing, which attracts a lot of tourists. Furthermore, Alex Haley’s novel, 
Roots, traced the story of Kunta Kinteh (a Gambian captured during the slave trade 
and taken to America) to the River Gambia and the town of Jufureh. This has attracted 
many African-American tourists going on the “Roots Heritage Trail” and the incipient 
celebration of the International Roots festival organised every year by the Ministry of 
Tourism & Culture.  
In addition to these products, tourists visiting the Gambia visit many local attractions. 
These include the Katchikally crocodile pool in Bakau where they get the chance to 
see and touch a white crocodile believed to be sacred by the town people, Serrekunda 
town with its dazzling and hectic market, the Albert market in Banjul, Sunday wresting 
in Bufazone, the tie-and-dye factory in Latrikunda, Bijilo Forest Park famous for its 
different species of monkeys, birds and other flora, Abuko Nature Reserve, a popular 
tourist attraction for seeing wildlife and the Tanbi Wetland Complex, located just on 
the mouth of the River Gambia which is famous for oysters and mangroves. Going 
further inland, tourists visit Brikama and its craft market and the Makasutu Culture 
Forest which lies next to the River Gambia. With respect to the above, a 2013 survey 
by GTB showed that “climate, sun, beach, people and culture, eco-tourism, nature and 






3.6 ICT access and use in the Gambia 
This section aims to provide a brief overview to the access and use of ICTs in the 
Gambia. Access to and use of the internet in cybercafés have provided opportunities 
for the protagonists of this study to generate the income they need to achieve their 
aspirations of social and economic advancement. The literature on ICT use in 
developing countries distinguishes two primary research foci (Brown & Grant, 2010; 
Avgerou, 2010). These include studies that focus on understanding technology “for 
development,” and those that focus on understanding technology “in developing” 
countries (Qureshi, 2010; Donner, 2008). While the former explores the generally 
assumed causal relationship between technology and socio-economic development 
arising from the consensus that ICTs can have a prescriptive effect on development 
(Walsham & Sahay, 2006; Walsham, Robey, & Sahay, 2007), the latter is concerned 
with the ways in which individuals and their societies adapt western-inscribed 
technologies to fit with their cultural, political and social environments. This 
discussion will adopt the latter approach due to the nature of this study. 
 
3.6.1 General Background to ICT in the Gambia 
Together with other developing countries, new Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) is considered to be a key driving force for the socio-economic 
development of the Gambia. The underlying logic in support of this position converges 
on the notion that access to and strategic use of information and communication 
technology (ICT) has the potential to transform developing countries into knowledge 
information and network societies (Castells, 1996). It is in this spirit that the Gambian 
government has made efforts to develop its ICT sector through policy instruments, 
ICT projects and investing in infrastructure. However, the great majority of the 
country’s population still lacks private access to computers and the Internet due to a 
plethora of factors such as resource constraints, illiteracy and poor infrastructure.  
The Internet was first launched in the Gambia in 1998 and the country was the first to 
participate in the UNDP's Internet Initiative for Africa programme to help establish a 
low-cost Internet backbone running at 512Kbps via Teleglobe in Canada, with local 




2003). The first Internet Service Provider (ISP) was the Gambia Telecommunications 
Company (GAMTEL), which is also the regulator and sole fixed-line provider. 
Although it had a relatively well-developed national fibre backbone network, fixed-
line penetration has remained low, which has also hindered Internet usage (Ibid). The 
deregulation of the telecommunications sector in 1996 led to the establishment of 
private mobile networks such as Africell and Comium, both with Lebanese backing, 
and the Gambian owned QCell. These compete with GAMTEL through its mobile 
subsidiary, GAMCEL. This significantly increased mobile subscriptions from 221,319 
in 2005 to 1,986,490 in 2014, making mobile market penetration above the African 
average (PURA, 2014). 
Although the number of mobile subscriptions exceeds the population (estimated at 1.7 
million in 2013), the discrepancy is due to the fact that the great majority of Gambians 
possess two, three and sometimes four mobile phones. Each mobile is registered to a 
particular network as cross network calls can be expensive. For instance, a person with 
two phones will subscribe to either GAMCEL or QCell and would use GAMCEL to 
call only GAMCEL lines and QCell to call QCell lines. Secondly, cheap Chinese-made 
mobile phones and flourishing second hand outlets and free SIM cards have 
contributed to the discrepancy. In the Gambia a higher proportion of households own 
mobile telephones (65.1%) than fixed telephones (20.6%). In urban areas, 76.5% of 
households own a mobile against 54.8% of households that own a mobile in rural areas 
(PURA, 2014). 
The country holds the headquarters of the Africa Coast to Europe (ACE) submarine 
cable which is one of the most ambitious telecommunication projects in the sub-region 
(Touray, et al., 2015). The submarine cable connects the country to the 14,000 
kilometre fibre-optic cable and is controlled by GAMTEL. The project was launched 
in December 2012 and the total design capacity of the submarine cable is 5.12 
terabytes. The 17,000 kilometres submarine cable will provide direct cable 
connectivity to Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Guinea, Sao Tome & Principe, 
Sierra Leone and the Gambia (ibid). 
The installation of ACE saw an increase in Internet bandwidth in the Gambia. The 




rates, but as of mid-2014, such improvements had yet to be realized (Freedom House, 
2014). Yet, connection speeds are still slow, averaging 1.2 Mbps (compared to a global 
average of 3.9 Mbps), according to May 2014 data from Akamai’s “State of the 
Internet” report (Belson, 2014). Mobile Internet is becoming increasingly available, 
especially among urban elites. Gambians who can afford smart phones or whose 
relatives send them smart phones from the diaspora and can afford to buy expensive 
data from any of the mobile service providers normally access the Internet through 
their phones. With the exception of those who can afford to access data through their 
mobile phones, the number of people with private access to the Internet in the Gambia 
is very minimal and is exclusively an urban phenomenon. Internet access in the 
Gambia is costly and quite a luxury.  
The country currently has six Internet Service Providers (ISPs). These include 
GAMTEL, LANIX, Unique Solutions, Netpage, QCell and Connexion Solutions. 
Private mobile companies also provide Internet service for their customers. The 
number of private Internet subscribers using either one of the above increased from 36 
in 2004 to 3,112 in 2013 (PURA, 2014) and the type of Internet access ranges from 
ADSL, leased line, Wireless CDMA, 3G and Broadband. In total, the number of 
Internet users in the Gambia has increased from 195,433 in 2011 to 373,865 in 2014, 
roughly 19 per cent of the population (ibid). These include those who access the 
Internet through their phones, those with private Internet access and those who access 
the Internet through public access points such as cybercafés. In particular, the 
widespread use of the Internet in public access venues explains the rapid growth of 
Internet users compared to subscribers. 
These developments are more the result of private sector investments than government 
commitment. Despite launching an elaborate ICT policy within the framework of the 
National Information and Communication Infrastructure (NICI) in 2004, the volatile 
political situation is inhibiting its realisation. The objective of the NICI is to lay plans 
for the technological framework necessary to enable the Gambia: 
To leapfrog several stages of development by establishing a 
participatory approach in building human resources and a 
conducive environment that utilises ICT as a platform to 




and as a tool to implement applications and provide services in 
order to achieve higher growth rates in all spheres of socio-
economic activities (NICI Policy, 2004). 
Remarkably, the NICI, as with most developing country ICT policies, is informed by 
and driven within the framework of the donor aid complex. Hence, the policies bear 
all the hallmarks of a top-down approach to ICT initiatives that fail to consider local 
realities and the context of implementation. Encapsulated in the ICT policy is a broad 
vision of a modern Gambia based on harnessing ICTs and emphasising the invaluable 
role of ICTs in enabling Gambians to achieve “high quality livelihoods with peace, 
stability and unity; good governance; a well-educated and learning society and a strong 
competitive economy capable of producing sustainable growth and shared benefits” 
(Ibid). 
Despite these policy dreams, the number of people with access to the Internet is still 
very minimal. General IT knowledge in the Gambia is quite poor as this has not been 
integrated into the primary and secondary education system. The computer to student 
ratio in middle/upper basic school is 1:110, 1:29 in senior secondary schools and 1:10 
in tertiary and higher education. The percentage of ICT qualified teachers is 2.4 
percent in lower basic schools, 4.2 percent in middle/upper basic schools, 15.8 percent 
in senior secondary schools, 38.5 percent in vocational/technical institutions and 13.9 
percent in tertiary education. There are also a few ICT training institutions offering 
short-term courses in basic ICT proficiency (DOSCIIT, 2003). Very few people own 
PCs and IT artefacts are regarded as luxury tools.  
Enhanced telecommunications infrastructure and increased bandwidth has not 
translated into price reductions in voice and data or improved quality of and access to 
ICT services for Gambian consumers. Today, access to the Internet is mostly provided 
by public access points which have become popular, especially among youths who can 
neither afford personal computers nor the expensive mobile Internet charges. At a cost 
of about £20 per month, fixed-line subscriptions are expensive for individual users in 
the Gambia, where average monthly household incomes are less than £30. 
Consequently, most Internet access in the Gambia is via public cybercafés, which 





3.6.2 Access to the Internet and the Role of Cybercafés in the Gambia 
Generally, access to the Internet in the Gambia, as in many other developing countries, 
is facilitated by arrangements for public use (Mwesige, 2004, Gomez, 2012). This is 
specifically the situation in the Gambia where the majority of Internet users gain access 
through public access venues. The cybercafés in particular provide opportunities for 
ordinary Gambians in economically deprived conditions to access the Internet at 
various rates and connection speeds. Although other public access venue such as 
public libraries and telecentres do not exist, alternative models of public access to 
internet, though of restricted nature, can be found. These are the café-restaurant and 
bars that provide internet facilities to their mostly affluent customers through WiFi 
networks. In addition, mobile phones also have increasingly become key providers of 
public access to the internet. 
Cybercafés, also known as internet cafes, are mostly found in urban and peri-urban 
areas (Gomez, 2012) and are increasingly becoming important spaces of 
communication and interaction for many people in developing countries. They are for-
profit venues that are open to the public and offer computer access and related services 
by generally charging a fee. Haseloff (2005: 4) defines cybercafés as “for-profit 
facilities, open to the general public to access the Internet, other network facilities 
and/or a variety of information technology tools on a temporary contract basis (pay 
per use) without the necessity for the users to own hardware or software themselves." 
Burrell (2012) and Smith (2008) argue that the term ‘café’ is a misnomer as few of 
these facilities served food or drinks of any kind. Be that as it may, countries such as 
the Gambia, where few people can afford private access to the internet, cybercafés 
“readily become high-tech access nodes” (Haseloff, 2005: 16). They have become 
useful spaces that people frequent to get access to the internet for communications and 
to get access to other ICT products such as printing and scanning.  
In addition to providing ordinary Gambians with their online communication needs, 
cybercafés also offer spaces for sociability and socializing with other café users as is 




Thus, Musatov (2001) considers the cybercafé to satisfy a combination of 
physiological and information needs of the individuals and Laegren and Stewart 
(2003:370) argue that “the technical, social and spatial spaces are deeply intertwined 
in cybercafés”. Relatedly, Nisbett (2006) and Venables (2009) bring our attention to 
the dual nature that exist in cybercafés in terms of space; the social space of the 
cybercafé itself and the online social spaces provided by the internet. This resonates 
with Liff & Steward’s (2003) contention that the cybercafé implies a “heterotopian 
juxtaposition” of the virtual world of ‘cyber’ space and the real place of the ‘café’. 
Nonetheless, there exists a discrepancy in the literature over the role played by 
cybercafés and other spaces of media consumption for sociability. Whereas studies 
highlight the cybercafés and other spaces of media consumption as nodes of sociability 
(e.g., Miller and Slater 2000; Laegren and Stewart, 2003; Weis, 2002), Burrell (2012) 
found very limited amount of sociability occurring in Accra’s cybercafés, noting that 
cybercafés in Accra are spaces where networks of youths “travel through”. The cafés 
she observed in Accra serve as places of escape, transporting customers to distinct 
places outside of Ghana. This displacement fed into the fascination with abroad and as 
she put it: “walking into the cybercafé, customers were suddenly transported from a 
hot, tropical climate to the air-conditioned environment required by these machines 
from the cool North” (Burrell, 2012: 92). This fascination with abroad was indicative 
through the names of Accra’s cybercafés (normally adopting non-local names such as 
‘Sky Harbour’). 
The physical spaces of the cybercafés in the Gambia are distinguished by their basic 
furnishing. This is the case in many developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. For example, studies of cybercafés in Accra (Burrell 2012), Bamako (Steiner, 
2011) and Umuahia (Smith, 2007) found that the interiors of many cybercafés they 
visited had a homogeneous quality. In order words, they all look similar to one another. 
Burrell describes cybercafés in Accra as ‘strikingly place-less’ as they were typically 
located in bland, often windowless rooms and sparsely decorated. She observes that 
the arrangement of the computers were done in a way that fails to promote interaction 
between customers. The arrangement of equipment and furniture, however, was 





The Gambia has experienced an exponential growth of cybercafés in urban settings in 
the past 10 to 15 years. The great majority of cybercafés are established as family 
businesses, mostly by Gambians living in the diaspora who ship second hand PCs from 
Europe and the US to equip cybercafés which are run to provide subsistence for their 
families back home. Some are investments by civil servants or other public sector 
workers as a side business to supplement their low incomes. There are no statistics on 
the number of cybercafés in operation in the country. This statistical void is partly due 
to a lack of research and regulations for registration on the one hand and limited 
institutional oversight mechanisms on the other hand. However, a survey I carried out 
on the number of cybercafés in Brikama while conducting my fieldwork showed that 
the town has approximately 30 cybercafés concentrated in densely populated 
neighbourhoods.  
Although a few scholars have begun to question the future relevance of cybercafés in 
the age of the mobile internet (Ajao, 2012; Samii, 2009), others are of the view that 
these assertions are largely “untested and worthy of further scrutiny” (Walton & 
Donner, 2012). In their article ‘Your phone has internet - why are you at a library PC? 
Re-imagining public access in the mobile internet era’, Walton and Donner (2012: 1) 
argue that while the mobile internet is opening up opportunities for young people, “its 
current form still conflicts with the easy (global) rhetoric of a closing digital divide 
and the end of public access venues”. The authors conclude that no evidence exists 
that the demand for public access venues among resource-constrained, mobile 
Internet-using communities will decline in the near term as the desire for big screens, 
faster and cheaper bandwidth will remain. In the Gambian context, mobile internet 
complements rather than competes with cybercafés. Most young internet users who 
can afford to possess smart phones are faced with the challenge of affording the high 
fee of mobile data provided by one of the six mobile ISPs in the country. Cybercafés 







3.6.3 Cybercafés in the Gambia: Users and Patterns of Use 
Cybercafés in the Gambia in terms of users and patterns of use are somewhat similar 
(except for the gender dimensions) to those found elsewhere in developing countries. 
Studies have used demographic variables such as age, gender, education, occupational 
status, income differences and ICT access (Gomez and Camacho, 2009; Sciadas et al., 
2012) to characterise cybercafé users in developing countries. For example, in their 
study to profile public access to internet users in 25 developing countries, Gomez and 
Camacho (2009) observed that the typical profile of Internet users in cybercafés, are 
likely to be young (15-35 years), male, low to middle income, high school or college 
educated in an urban location. These findings are consistent with the findings of similar 
studies in Nigeria (Abdulkareem, 2010), Botswana (Sairosse & Mutula, 2004), 
Uganda (Mwesige, 2004), Indonesia (Wahid et al (2004) and Manila (Bringula et al., 
2012). Internet use in cybercafés in the Gambia is not characterised by significant 
gender gaps when compared to other contexts where cultural barriers inhibit women 
from using public access to ICTs (see for example Gomez and Camacho, 2009 ;Terry 
and Gomez, 2012; Nisbett, 2006;  Huyer, 2005; Burrell 2012). Although internet users 
in cybercafés in the Gambia are predominantly male, gender biases and cultural norms 
do not restrict women from using cybercafés as both men and women find the 
cybercafés to be conducive spaces of social interaction.  
In the introduction to the study, I have argued that the majority of young Gambians I 
encountered during fieldwork in the Gambia appropriate the Internet in ways that 
support their livelihoods. However, it must be noted that this is not the only pattern of 
use among cybercafé internet users in the Gambia.  As in other developing countries 
where the majority of the population rely on public access points like cybercafés to 
have access to the internet, ‘consolidated use’ (Wyche et al., 2013) of the Internet in 
cybercafés can be found among Gambians. This involves instrumental use (job 
searching, business and bureaucratic activities, general educational activities and 
seeking information), recreational use (chatting and playing online games) and social 
use (interacting with friends and family online) (Hong and Huang, 2005; Wahid et al, 





3.6.4 Regulation of Cybercafés in the Gambia 
Although the establishment and operation of cybercafés in the Gambia should be 
regulated by the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) in accordance with 
section 14 (1) (g) of the PURA Act 2001, the body has had a lax approach towards 
cybercafés due to lack of enforcing capability. As such, cybercafés were (and some 
still are) established and operated without being registered or following procedures. 
However, cybercafé registration and regulations were tightened in September 2013, 
which required operators to provide thorough details for a license, as well as mandating 
the physical layout of cafes and the signs that must be displayed. Many interpreted this 
as part of the government’s efforts to control the flow of information, particularly to 
government dissidents living in the diaspora who use online radios to criticise the 
government.    
In April 2013, PURA further issued a press release banning cybercafés from offering 
Voice over IP (VoIP) calling services such as Skype, citing the need to protect the 
country’s “national interest” (PURA, 2013). Cybercafés were also banned from 
offering Internet dating services, with the government providing no justification. In 
response to a public outcry over the ban, the Ministry of Information and 
Communication Infrastructure issued another press release two days later clarifying 
that the use of VoIP services was not in fact prohibited. Rather, the government 
restricted Internet cafes from commercialising VoIP services, or charging additional 
rates for VoIP calls on top of the standard Internet access rates (Daily Observer Online, 
April 23, 2013). 
These developments led to arduous regulatory requirements for the operation of 
cybercafés. For instance, cybercafé owners are now required to register with PURA 
for an operating license (in addition to a requisite business license) through an 
application that requires details of existing bandwidth, the ISP, the number of 
computers installed, and services provided and a fee of 100 dalasis (about £1.50) 
(PURA, 2013). Existing cybercafés were given a deadline in May 2013 to submit their 
applications and registration fees to PURA or face closure. In September 2013, PURA 
issued further guidelines that dictated specific requirements for the physical layout of 




“cafes must not have fully enclosed cubicles which will isolate a computer user from 
other computer users; that café operators display a signboard communicating that 
"Cyber Crimes and Pornography are prohibited" and the service provider shall also not 
publicly advertise or provide dating services or solicit or host dating services” (Ibid).  
Despite these regulations, many cybercafés are still unregistered and are still 
maintaining the status quo in terms of operations. Although a few cybercafé owners 
rushed to register in the aftermath of the announcements, this however subsided with 
time, as is the case with the public’s reaction to the government’s many declarations. 
As a result, PURA lacks definite figures as to the number of cybercafés that are in 
operation today in the country. What is evident is that they are mushrooming on street 
corners, on main roads and in many other spaces, providing livelihoods and 
opportunities for the fulfilling of aspirations for many of the country’s youths and their 
families. 
3.7 Summary 
I started this chapter by providing the reader with a brief background of the setting for 
this research. I have shown how Gambian society is based on family and kinship 
support systems. This system to a great extent shapes young Gambians aspirations for 
social and economic advancement. Despite this, young Gambians are finding it 
increasingly difficult to fulfil their aspirations due to the current political and economic 
situation. I argued that previous generations of young Gambians responded to this 
situation by migration to either Europe or the USA. However, the current political 
situation and strict immigration measures have made migration almost impossible for 
the majority of young Gambians. Finding themselves in a state of ‘involuntary 
immobility’ they pursue local livelihoods by making use of the resources available to 
them. 
In particular, I argue that the introduction of tourism in the Gambia and the role it is 
playing in creating informal employment and unofficial ways of making money for 
many of the country’s youths within the industry by benefiting from the presence of 
tourists. I discuss the Gambia’s tourism sector in terms of its evolution, activities, 
attractive sites and the relevant government policies. These have bearing on the 




adoption and appropriation of the internet in cybercafés to support the livelihood 
strategies of young Gambians. Hence, I provide a detailed overview of the tourism and 
the status, access and use of ICT in the Gambia, the Internet in particular, in order to 
contextualise my research interest and setting. I show that the patterns of Internet use 
in cybercafés by young urban Gambians are not specific to the country. This, in some 
way, suggests that this study provides new ways of approaching and understanding 
novel forms of Internet use in cybercafés. 
In addition, this chapter provides the context that will help the reader to understand the 
nuances of the chapters that follow.  More specifically, the social, economic and 
political context provided above should help the reader to put the methodological and 
ethnographical discussions of the study into its proper perspective. The detailed 
descriptions of the everyday lives and activities of hustlers are presented in the 
ethnographic chapters that follow. They are presented as a set of stories in an attempt 















‘We align and rhythm the toubabs’: The Strategies of Beach 
Hustlers 
From October to May, when the summer rains along the West African coast take a 
hiatus, evening temperatures are cool and pleasant. A walk along the coast of the 
Gambia offers a picturesque view of the beautiful tropical sunset over the Atlantic 
Ocean. This is the period that many Gambians wait for in anticipation. It is the time 
when tourists visit the country, bringing with them the wealth of the West. It is called 
the “season”.26 
4.1 Introduction 
The Gambia is experiencing a boom in its tourism industry with an exponential 
increase in the amount of Western tourists that visit the country each year. Cheap 
chartered flights and pleasant tropical weather compounded by the growth of terrorism 
activities in countries such as Tanzania, Kenya and Egypt have made the country an 
ideal destination for tourists wishing to enjoy some sunshine in the winter. This has 
created both formal and informal employment opportunities for many of the country’s 
youths, particularly the beach hustlers whose life stories constitute this ethnography. 
Finding themselves in a state of ‘involuntary immobility’, they take advantage of the 
opportunities provided by the tourism sector to generate the income they need to fulfil 
their aspirations of social and economic advancement.  
My encounters with beach hustlers took place on the beaches, the main junctions 
around the Tourism Development Area (TDA), beach bars, taxi stands, craft markets 
and the airport. These encounters revealed to me the hustling strategies they employ 
to generate the income they need to fulfil their aspirations. Consisting of small 
entrepreneurs, principally peddlers, vendors and others who provide informal services, 
they make a livelihood through their interactions with toubab tourists. 
                                                 
26 This is not only used by Gambians to refer to the period between October and May when tourists 




This chapter will start by describing the physical and social setting of the environment 
within which beach hustlers operate. Following this, I will show that by adopting a 
particular appearance and lifestyle, beach hustlers construct an image of themselves 
that is advantageous for their work. I then go on to explain the various tactics and 
strategies that beach hustlers employ to make money from tourists. The final section 
discusses some of the challenges they face within the industry.   
4.2 Beach hustlers, Chanters and Bumsters. 
Beach hustlers in the Gambia are both male and female. Usually between the ages of 
18 and 40 from low socio-economic backgrounds, the majority of them are not 
educated beyond secondary level and have few qualifications or skills that can get 
them formal jobs. Engaging in the informal sector is their only means of earning a 
living. These observations are consistent with the demographic profiles of beach 
hustlers in Kenya, Zanzibar and Senegal (see Eid Bergan, 2011; De Fransisco, 2004 
and Venables, 2009). As reflected in title of this section, beach hustlers a range of 
identity positions. 
Generally, beach hustlers in the Gambia are referred to as bumsters by the wider 
society. The term is, however, contentious and considered derogatory. The 
Government of the Gambia describes them as ‘aimless youths who loiter around 
toubabs hassling and hustling them for money and other material benefits’ (Gambia 
Information Site). The introduction of sex tourism in the Gambia saw the term being 
used narrowly to refer to young males who sell sexual services to toubabs. For 
instance, Ebron (2002) describes bumsters as young Gambian men who seek out 
romantic affairs with Northern European female tourists who could potentially help 
them to travel abroad. A broader definition that encompasses the complex activities of 
bumsters and which fits into the category of beach hustlers whose accounts are 
narrated in this study is provided by Nyanzi et al (2005). They describe bumsters as: 
Young men involved in diverse activities that include the 
process of misrepresentation of facts, usually a concoction of 
plight stories and ineffective struggles to meet the needs of 
large extended families, which are convincingly fed to 
sympathetic wealthy-looking foreigners with the motive of 




Existing anthropological definitions of bumsters, like the ones provided above tend to 
be androcentric, discounting the activities of females who engage in similar activities. 
Nonetheless, the majority of beach hustlers I encountered in the Gambia avoid using 
the bumster label self-referentially when talking to toubabs or other outsiders and can 
feel offended when referred to as bumsters by those outside their professional circles. 
Instead, they refer to themselves as local tour guides, informal service providers or 
petty traders. For instance, Andy, one of my principal interlocutors told me that “I am 
not proud to call myself a bumster but a local tour guide who shows Gambia to 
tourists”. Similar observations were recorded among the papasi in Zanzibar 
(DeFrancisco, 2004) and the coteman in Southern Senegal (Venables, 2009). To avoid 
disregarding the gendered and sometimes stigmatised nature of beach hustling, as 
previous studies have done, I will use the generic term ‘beach hustlers’ to refer to the 
hustlers in this study. The term bumster may appear in some direct quotations as used 
by beach hustlers themselves. 
Attempts by the government, in 2003, to regulate the activities of Gambian beach 
hustlers further problematized the bumster label. Beach hustlers were encouraged to 
register their informal economic activities with the Gambia Tourism Board (GTB) so 
they can become recognised economic operators and service providers within the 
tourism industry. This subsequently categorised beach hustlers into two main groups; 
registered and unregistered beach hustlers as not all beach hustlers were willing to 
register with the GTB. The beach hustlers that registered with the GTB argued that 
they no longer deserve the bumster label as they are legitimate economic operators 
within the industry. Although they admit that they sometimes use their legitimate 
status to ‘bums’, in a ‘civilised way’.  
Registered beach hustlers who engage in this form of ‘civilised bumsing’ call 
themselves ‘chanters’. Buju, a key interlocutor, told me: “bumsters have a bad 
reputation, so we call ourselves chanters. We have a job here but we chant. A chanter 
is someone who has something to do in the industry but has the chance to bums”. The 
unregistered beach hustlers I spoke to did not share Buju’s view. They consider 
anybody operating within the industry and making a living from tourists as a bumster. 




industry is a bumster, including the minister”, referring to the tourism minister. It 
should be noted that the registered-unregistered beach hustler dichotomy is not rigid 
as we shall see later, as some beach hustlers’ circumstances change from the former to 
the latter. 
Despite this, registered and unregistered beach hustlers can be antagonistic to each 
other’s interests, sometimes leading to acrimonious competition between them. This 
is due to the fact that, as hinted above, registered hustlers consider the unregistered 
hustlers to be ‘illegal intruders’ that come to spoil business for them. The actions of 
unregistered hustlers irritate the registered hustlers in their attempts to lure tourists 
away from the industry to the local markets where they can buy goods and 
commodities and pay for services like transport at a comparatively cheaper rate. As 
such, registered hustlers accuse their unregistered colleagues of taking away their 
customers. For example Mariama, a middle-aged widow who sells fruits at a stall in 
Palma Rima told me that “unregistered beach hustlers take the toubabs to Serekunda 
market to buy fruit as it is cheaper there”. This, she said, is not good for her business. 
Stanley Man was also explicit in his views on the actions of unregistered beach 
hustlers: 
The so-called local tour guides are bad for our business. They 
hassle tourists and do not bring business to the tourist taxi 
drivers. They instead walk them to the main road and take the 
yellow taxis. They are bad for our business. 
4.3 “Fridays at the airport and Sundays at the beach”: Knowing the 
Schedule 
Beach hustlers operate in multiple locations. Some are static while others are mobile. 
Registered beach hustlers are mostly static as their cards only allow them to operate in 
specific locations. Un-registered beach hustlers wait for tourists along the beach, but 
they also hang around at the airport, outside hotel entrances and supermarkets and 
street corners where tourists are most likely to frequent. Hotels do not allow beach 




Popular bars and restaurants along the Kololi main road and beach bars along the coast 
also attract un-registered beach hustlers. During the tourist season, some beach hustlers 
offer to work without a salary in bars or restaurants just to get access to toubabs. Andy, 
one of my principal interlocutors who I will introduce in more detail later, told me that 
he offers to work for free at his friend’s bar just to get access to toubabs. 
I help a friend who owns a bar called Tiger Tiger in Kololi. I 
help him arrange tables and chairs during the season when it’s 
busy. This gives me access to toubabs. When the tourists 
arrive, I offer them drinks. If they are first timers, I start the 
conversation by asking about their flight and ask them their 
lovely names. I then introduce myself and ask where they 
come from. I sit and chat with them and we get to know each 
other. I normally conduct business with first timers as they are 
more eager to visit markets, animals and schools.  
Several aspects of this quote illustrate that beach hustlers like Andy do make some 
strategic decisions. Firstly, they volunteer to work for free with the expectation that 
this will provide opportunities for them to access toubabs. Secondly, the status of a 
tourist as a ‘first-timer’ (first visit in the country) or a ‘repeater’ (a multiple visitor) is 
essential information for beach hustlers. It provides an indication of the extent to which 
the tourist is aware of social norms and prices for goods and services in the Gambia. 
Less informed tourists are mostly targeted as it is easier to make money from them. 
This is not only because they are more open to accept offers, but also because they can 
be easily exploited. Hotels and tour operators advise tourists to avoid divulging this 
information to locals, particularly beach hustlers. 
In addition to occupying spaces that tourists frequent, beach hustlers also acquaint 
themselves with their movements. This particularly applies to un-registered beach 
hustlers who must tout for potential clients. Whereas registered beach hustlers 
normally meet clients at their place of work, i.e. kiosks, stalls, craft markets and taxi 
stands, the unregistered ones have to follow the itineraries of the toubabs. Andy, for 
example, has a schedule that is adapted to the tourists’ itinerary: 
Fridays I go to the airport because lots of tourists come on 
Fridays. Although I am not expecting anybody, I still go there 
with nothing and sometimes come back with something. When 




some change from them or by helping them to change their 
currency. The plane arrives around midday, so at 2pm I go 
down to the beach, say hello to people, and try to chat to them, 
asking them where they come from…. I try to convince them, 
propose my work to them. Saturday and Sunday are spent on 
the beach as most will want to relax. Mondays are visiting 
hours before noon but most will come early to go to the beach. 
Normally they come back after four to swim. I know their 
visiting places and I go and wait for them there. I know this 
because I observe their movements.  
Andy is of course not the only beach hustler who makes an effort to inhabit spaces 
where he can easily gain access to tourists. Several other beach hustlers I have spoken 
to have their own ways of making sure they get access to spaces where tourists would 
normally converge. Although none of these follow a strict schedule as Andy does, the 
loose pattern they follow is mostly guided by factors such as instinct, acquaintance, 
previous experience and the time of the season.  
4.3.1 The Airport: ‘Welcome to the Gambia’ 
The Gambia’s airport is also known as Banjul International Airport. It consists of two 
buildings (one old and abandoned and the other new), providing a perfect juxtaposition 
of the infrastructural woes and achievements of the first and the second republic. Some 
would argue that the airport is symptomatic of the modesty of President Jawara and 
the flamboyant virtues of President Jammeh. The old airport building built by the 
government of the first republic consists of a small waiting lounge, a departure hall 
and a small corridor for arrivals. It only has one runway and it looks more like a train 
station than an airport.  
In 1994, after immediately assuming power, the Jammeh government abandoned the 
old structure and built a modern airport complex with an extended runway and a bigger 
waiting hall, partitioned into a check-in area and a waiting area. Facilities in the 
waiting hall include a bar and restaurant and a number of shops selling African art and 
crafts, an information desk and currency exchange bureaus, as well as stalls 
representing local cell phone providers like Qcell and Africell. During the tourist 
season, the airport is always bustling with noise with lots of people occupying the 




Tuesday afternoons are the busiest as most chartered flights from the UK and 
Scandinavia are expected.  
People occupying the waiting lounge are mostly there for two purposes: those 
genuinely expecting visitors like family and friends and those hanging around to find 
ways of making money from newly arrived tourists. Amongst the latter are beach 
hustlers who come to look for potential customers they could sell their services to and 
a few youths who loaf around looking for an opportunity to offer help with carrying 
luggage in return for some coins. Beach hustlers thrive in this bustling environment as 
it provides an opportunity for them to speak to newly arrived toubabs. Some, like 
David, approach newly arrived toubabs, and talk to them as if they have met them 
before. Hustlers use these introductory conversations with toubabs to offer them 
services as local guides. David told me that he has acquired many customers using this 
trick: 
Tourists would like to have a drink first before they go to the 
hotel. This is where I try to meet them and talk to them. But I 
have to be smart so that I am not kicked out by security. I have 
to be theatrical and pretend I know them and that they are my 
guests. I play smart by hugging them and making noise to 
show I miss them, telling them welcome back. At first they are 
scared and bewildered but with time they get to know I am 
nice.  
For beach hustlers, meeting toubabs on arrival is an ideal way to market themselves 
and to establish networks as newly arrived tourists are always eager to get to know 
local people. The papasi in Zanzibar also wait at ferry docks in Zanzibar Town to meet 
newly arrived tourists and to offer them guiding services (De Fransisco, 2004:9). 
4.3.2 From Palma Junction to the Beach 
Besides the airport, beach hustlers extend their activities to the TDA. The hub for these 
activities is Palma Junction. Connecting Kololi village to the shore of the Atlantic 
Ocean is a short road from the popular Bertil Harding highway leading to the beach. 
At the top of this junction (called Palma Junction) is the Palma Rima Hotel. The street 
connecting Palma Junction to the beach is known as ‘the strip’. It consists of a military 




taxi drivers wait for customers. At least five hotels are located along ‘the strip’. The 
military check point controls the movement of people entering and exiting the beach. 
The security officers ask locals to prove that they work in the industry by showing 
their ID cards. Beach hustlers without a valid pass find it difficult to evade the security 
check point.  
The tourist taxi drivers have their stand in the middle of the road, opposite a famous 
restaurant called Bukarabu. Owned by an English woman, Bukarabu is popular for 
serving British food and is frequently visited by British tourists. Bukarabu is the first 
restaurant on that street which makes it a strategic location for the taxi stand. The 
tourist taxis are regulated by the GTB and normally charge fixed prices calculated by 
distance and the prices are displayed on boards placed near the stands. With many bars 
and restaurants, hotels and the famous Bukarabu, Palma Junction is a hotspot for 
tourists looking for a taxi to get into town. The taxi stand itself consists of a makeshift 
roof made out of palm trees and anchored by four bits of wood, a wooden bench and 
some loose bricks where taxi drivers sit to wait for customers. Their taxis parked across 
the road, they patiently sit and wait for customers while brewing attaya. The tourist 
taxi drivers are different from the normal taxis or the so called ‘yellow taxis’. They are 
only allowed to operate within the TDA. They can be distinguished from ordinary taxis 
through their colour, which is all green with a white diamond sign on the sides and 
bonnet as well as their unique tourist number on the sides, whilst ordinary taxis are 
yellow with green stripes.  
Due to the nature of their work, tourist taxi drivers are always involved in bitter 
competition for customers with the ‘yellow taxi’ drivers and other beach hustlers, such 
as bird watchers and craft sellers. For instance, professional bird watchers do not have 
their own cars, and so they rely on tourist taxi drivers to take customers on trips. 
However, feuds over payment occur during these transactions as the taxi driver would 
assume that the bird watcher is offering less than what the tourist is willing to pay. On 
the other hand, the bird watcher would not allow the taxi driver to directly negotiate 
with the tourist as they have a habit of charging the tourists exorbitant prices thereby 
discouraging them. In this situation the bird watcher risks losing the customer unless 




the tourist up to the main road to get one of the yellow taxis, which are comparatively 
cheaper. This decision by the bird watcher does not go down well with the tourist taxi 
driver.  
Conversely, the craft sellers in Kololi and Senegambia also complain that the tourist 
taxi drivers undermine their business by taking customers who want to buy crafts all 
the way to Brikama or Banjul when they are just around the corner. The drivers justify 
this by saying that they earn more money if they take tourists to places like Brikama, 
which are further away, rather than the nearer Senegambia craft market. Stanley Man 
told me that taxi drivers do this to secure their own interests as they want to earn more 
money.   
Heading southwards, away from the taxi stands, one enters the beach area where 
tourists can have a swim, relax and enjoy the sunshine. The beach in the Palma section 
of the tourism industry is lined with about three beach bars. Solomon Fish Bar is the 
one that attracts the most tourists. It is a round house, situated at the northern end of 
the Kololi beach with coconut trees planted outside in a semicircle. At Solomon’s, 
guests are seated inside the bar or outside in its well ventilated seating area right on 
the beach. Close to the beach bars are stalls built by the Gambia Tourism Board (GTB) 
where fruit sellers sell their fruit.  
Before 2003, fruit sellers, who are mostly female, sold their fruits to tourists by 
hawking along the beaches. After the GTB introduced the registration system, a new 
stall, where they now sell their fruits, was constructed for them by GTB. This seems 
to have enhanced business profitability. A Poverty Impact study of fruit sellers 
estimates that, after they started using the stalls, their incomes have increased by 50-
60% as a result of the changes in the way they conduct their business and of improved 
access to the tourists (Bah and Goodwin, 2003). The stall changed the nature of their 
relationship with the tourists and they no longer hawk. Although the stalls have 
provided increased profitability, this has also led to more competition amongst the fruit 
sellers themselves and between fruit sellers and juice pressers. For example, around 
Solomon’s beach bar alone there are 20 fruit sellers sharing a stall and even more juice 












       Figure 8: The new stall built by GTB for fruit sellers in Bakau Beach. 
4.4 To ‘Align’ and to ‘Rhythm’: The Hustling Strategies of Beach 
Hustlers 
To ‘align’ and ‘rhythm’ the toubab are key strategies in a beach hustler’s efforts to 
make money from tourists. To ‘align’ means to understand the toubab’s culture and to 
speak their language. To ‘rhythm’ means to bring the toubab into the world of hustlers 
and make them understand their life situations. For Andy, it is first important to 
establish some form of relationship with toubabs before offering them services. Aware 
that they are normally suspicious of strangers, Andy claimed that he would first clear 
the air of mistrust by initiating a dialogue with the toubab. Some modicum of patience 
is needed to successfully ‘align’ the toubab. Hence, patience is a key skill in beach 
hustling. As Andy told me, “working as a tour guide, you have to have patience and 
be nice to even the toubabs who are not nice to you. They might come to be your friend 
tomorrow”.  
This sentiment was also echoed by Matilda, a Swede I met in the Gambia and who 
later became my acquaintance and agreed to be interviewed. She told me that the 
pleasant character of the beach hustlers she comes across and their ability to be patient 
overwhelm her. For her, this contrasts with what she has heard about beach hustlers as 
people who are only interested in meeting toubabs who will help them with either 




The people I met don’t really want these. Some are happy with 
me standing and chatting with them for five minutes and just 
say goodbye and have a nice day. But most really want to have 
your contact details like Facebook, email, Skype or phone 
number. 
Matilda proceeds to tell me about Bob, a friend she met whilst in the Gambia: 
He is nice and we get along well. Although I am financially 
stronger, he drives me around in his car and will not let me pay 
for petrol. But he has never asked anything from me. He is so 
poor that he buys one cigarette at a time. He sells weed to taxi 
drivers to survive. He sleeps in one of the taxi cars. I will spend 
weeks in his family home but they will not let me pay for food. 
But I once bought them a bag of rice. He has never expressed 
any hopes of travel to me. He says he likes Gambia and would 
not want to travel to Europe. 
Matilda also shared the experiences of one of her friends who visited the Gambia on a 
previous occasion. She was walking around looking for an ATM that accepts 
MasterCard. A guy suddenly approached her and asked what she was looking for. 
After telling him that she was looking for a MasterCard ATM, the guy volunteered to 
take her round to look for one. At first she was hesitant going around with a stranger 
looking for a cash machine. After some persuasion and because she badly needed the 
service, she accepted the offer. It took them the whole day and a long trip in a gele 
gele (a mini bus) to Banjul to find one. The guy paid for all the fares and would not 
accept money from Matilda’s friend. They however exchanged phone numbers. 
This account, together with Matilda’s experience provide examples of how beach 
hustlers can go to any length to establish long-term relationships with toubabs. As we 
have seen, they would even use their last finances to invest in such relationships. It can 
be difficult for an outsider to untangle the motivations behind these goodwill gestures. 
Although Matilda and her friend found this to be a kind gesture and thought that the 
guys were just being nice, I would suggest that this is a strategy that beach hustlers 
employ to gain the trust and friendship of toubabs. A similar motivation was found 
among the beach hustlers that Nynazi et al. (2005: 565) studied in the Gambia. They 




toubabs with the assurance that they will reap the profits at the latter stage of the 
relationship”. 
4.4.1 ‘I am learning Polish’: Learning the Toubabs’ Language 
One of the ways hustlers ‘align’ the toubabs is having the ability to communicate with 
them in their own language. As such, the majority of the beach hustlers I have met are 
multilingual, speaking several European languages including German, Swedish and 
Norwegian that they have learnt through their long interactions with toubabs. This 
helps them to easily communicate with non-English speaking tourists and also to 
initiate relationships.  
Indeed, studies have found that beach hustlers in other contexts also speak several 
European languages (Venables, 2009; Pruitt & LaFont, 1995; Davidson & Taylor, 
2005). Although beach hustlers in the Gambia speak English, which is the official 
language, their command of the English language in both accent and grammar does 
not match their limited schooling. David who speaks almost perfect English despite 
the few years he spent at school told me this when I complimented his language skills:  
As a beach hustler, you have to be able to talk and speak good 
English so toubabs can understand you. You need to be 
flexible, smiley and happy. I have met Polish tourists. Some 
don’t speak English but I can speak a few words and I am 
learning their language. So my language skills are developing.  
According to David, the ability to communicate with toubabs in their language has 
two advantages. Firstly, it is a means of impressing upon them the fact that they care 
enough to try to learn their language. Secondly this engenders familiarity which in turn 
breeds satisfaction as well as understanding and friendliness. Besides, what this quote 
seems to suggest is that interacting with tourists using their language both constructs 
and maintains a relationship based on cultural understanding. As it turns out, David is 
not the only hustler learning Polish to be able to communicate with Polish tourists who 
have started visiting the Gambia in large numbers. Other hustlers I have met in Kololi, 
with Polish dictionaries in their possession, told me that they are learning Polish to 




In addition to speaking the language of the tourists, beach hustlers also endeavour to 
imitate their accent. David, for example, has the ability to speak English with a 
Cockney accent which he acquired through years of interactions with tourists from 
London. Other beach hustlers who knew that I spoke Swedish would insist on speaking 
the language with me. I would sometimes be left impressed by their mastery of the 
language and their accent, which is locally acquired. I would suggest that the ability to 
speak the language of the toubab with a mimicked accent is an important strategy for 
getting their attention and to earn their respect, as David aptly put it: 
We like to imitate toubabs. So we talk like them. We have to 
align or rhythm them. So we take their accent. Aligning them 
is part of the strategy to get the toubabs. This means 
understanding their culture and talking their language. 
David and other beach hustlers told me that to ‘align’ or ‘rhythm’ toubabs not only 
means imitating their culture and lifestyle but also adopting their world view. Bringing 
themselves to the level of the toubabs by demonstrating to them that they speak their 
language and understand their culture is a strategy that beach hustlers use to initiate 
relationships with them.  
4.4.2 ‘Call me Stanley Man’: The Elegance of European Names 
An interesting aspect of beach hustlers’ strategies is the adoption and use of 
nicknames. This is a part of beach hustlers’ strategies to ‘align’ the toubabs. A great 
majority of hustlers have nicknames that they use regularly in the industry to present 
themselves to tourists. Most of these are Western names and are acquired after they 
have started hustling. Both Weiss (2004) and Giddens (1994) attribute the use of 
Western names by local populations to the impact of cultural globalisation which 
represents the formation of complex social ties between the global and the local, 
dubbed the “glocal”. Beach hustlers never use their local or traditional names to 
present themselves to toubabs. David explained to me the significance of adopting and 
using Western names: 
We have to have European names in the industry. It’s easy for 
the tourist to understand. It’s also fashionable. The toubabs 
know these are not our names so they ask what our real names 




Unlike game hustling, where nicknames are adopted for the purpose of disguising 
identity, beach hustlers’ motives for adopting nicknames is a hustling strategy in itself. 
It is therefore a common practice among juice pressers and horse riders to also give 
their kiosks or stalls and horses Western names. Some name their kiosks after a 
generous toubab who sponsored them to start their business. Some use their own 
names or the names of their toubab girlfriends. “ML Juice Bar” is named after the 
proprietor himself, whose name is Momodou Lamin. “New Vision 2014”, “VIP Five 
Star Juice Bar” and “Sulay and Linda’s Juice bar”, which is named after the owner 
Sulay and his girlfriend Linda, are some other examples. 
Also, “Queenie”, “Charlotte” and “Diana” are the names of some horses I have 
encountered being offered for hire around Kololi and Senegambia. Beach hustlers 
consider the use of Western names as a lure to start conversations with toubabs who 
are curious to learn about the stories behind the names. The use of Western names by 
beach hustlers reflects a general pattern I observed across Gambian society. Local 
football teams adopt the names of popular European football teams like “Real Madrid” 
or “Manchester United”. Likewise, football players also adopt the names of famous 
European stars like Messi or Ronaldo. These names will be printed on the back of their 
jerseys. Some are stuck with these names long after they retire from football. Saikou, 
for example, was one of my former classmates in primary school and a very good 
footballer. He adopted the name of a former Italian footballer Del Piero. Though he 





Figure 9: A kiosk of one of the Juice 
Pressers in Kololi Figure 10: ML’s juice pressing Kiosk 
 
 
Figure 11: Sarjo the horse rider 
with his horse Queenie. 
Figure 12: Implements used by juice 




4.4.3 ‘We have to dress poor”: Dress and Appearance as a Hustling 
Strategy 
Using language and Western aliases to ‘align’ the toubabs, beach hustlers also use 
dress and appearance to ‘rhythm’ them. As such, beach hustlers in the Gambia are 
easily recognisable through their outfits and general appearance. However, varying 
styles of appearance are adopted. Whilst registered beach hustlers dress neatly and 
casual as required by the GTB, the usual attire for un-registered beach hustlers is dirty 
ragged jeans or baggy trousers and T-shirts. What Andy describes as his uniform, for 
example consists of a red string vest and baggy shorts with nyambalastic.27 David 
disclosed to me that beach hustlers choose to dress this way because “the toubabs like 
to help the ragamuffins28” and not neat guys. So hustlers have problems with trying to 
be neat.   
The use of dress and body image to give an impression of their socio-economic 
conditions is the subject of anthropological research (Hendrickson, 1996; Newell, 
2005; Venables, 2009). Unregistered beach hustlers in the Gambia portray an image 
of destitution through the way they dress to evoke sympathy from tourists. 
Sympathetic tourists sometimes offer gifts of clothing and other materials to these 
beach hustlers. Registered beach hustlers who must follow a certain dress code as 
prescribed by GTB do not benefit from these gifts, as Stanley Man, a registered beach 
hustler, complained:  
We who dress neatly we don’t benefit from the generosity of 
tourists. They don’t give us left over clothes. They give them 
to those who dress really poor. They say we don’t need them. 
That’s why some hustlers dress poorly.  
Having access to toubabs through language, western nicknames and appearance, beach 
hustlers resort to a variety of other strategies to make money from them. In the next 
section, I use the portraits and accounts of popular and successful beach hustlers to 
                                                 
27 Plastic sandals are commonly worn by Gambian youths. They are not very comfortable but are 
popular during the rainy season.  
28 Term used to refer to someone who is a roughneck or a streetwise tough guy according to the 





show how beach hustlers make money by exploiting the tourists’ lack of familiarity 
with the local setting and mores and by cultivating a relationship with them. Using 
Andy’s case, I describe how unregistered beach hustlers use their work as local tour 
guides to make money from toubabs. Buju’s case highlights the ways hustlers play on 
the sympathy of toubabs by exaggerating their poor living conditions to get assistance. 
Using the case of Stanley Man, I explore the importance of contacts and networks for 
registered beach hustlers, whose success depends on having a good toubab contact, 
which can be a friend, boyfriend or girlfriend living in the West.  
4.5 Andy the Local Tour Guide: ‘Showing them the real Gambia’ 
Andy is one of the most popular beach hustlers around Kololi. Born and bred in 
Brikama, he is 32 years old and has been a beach hustler for nearly ten years. Andy, 
unlike David who started his hustling activities at the tourist market, was introduced 
to beach hustling by friends who had already established themselves in the industry. 
Introducing himself as a local tour guide, he tells me that his job has not only helped 
him provide his family with the financial support they need, but also provided him 
with the capital he used to invest in his businesses. 
I am a local tour guide and my job includes taking a walk 
around the area to meet and talk to toubabs. I meet European 
people and introduce myself. I also introduce what I do for a 
living. I offer the toubabs cheap services because the hotels 
and tour operators charge them expensive rates per hour. But 
we the locals, if we get half the price of those companies, it is 
good for us. Because we can look after ourselves from that 
money and help our families (sic). 
I first met Andy in October 2013 through David, who is a close friend of his. We 
normally met at Palma Junction in the afternoons when he was free or at his house in 
Kololi in the evenings. Andy’s success at Kololi and in Brikama overshadows his 
humble background and poor education. Having completed six years of primary 
education in 1995, he dropped out of school in grade 6 because his father, a night 
watchman, could no longer afford to pay his fees. In 1996, he went into petty 
commerce going round to households renting and selling Nollywood movies.29 His 
                                                 




brother who owned a cola nut shop helped him with his start-up capital of 5000 dalasis. 
He used this money to buy Nollywood movies from some Nigerian businessmen in 
Serekunda market. Gradually, Andy expanded his business by opening a small stall 
along the Brikama highway, renting and selling Nollywood movies. A fire disaster in 
2003 saw him lose all his investments. This coincided with the beginning of the 2003 
tourist season and one of his friends encouraged him to join him on the beach to hustle. 
In the beginning Andy commuted by gele gele from Brikama to Kololi on a daily basis 
to hustle. It was only when he started making enough money after his debut season 
that he rented an apartment in Kololi where he still lives. The apartment is a modest 
two bedroom flat situated in a compound with four similar apartments purposely built 
for renting. Because he knows the owner, he gets a discount and only pays 6000 dalasis 
(around £90) a month, which is low rent compared to similar apartments in the same 
area.  
Andy’s ability to charm and convince toubabs to hire his services is the source of all 
kinds of rumours and gossip among beach hustlers in Kololi. Some of his friends 
believe that he has a good morro (Mandinka for marabout or diviner) in Brikama who 
he consults for this purpose. The fact that Andy is a native of Brikama, a town 
considered the home of good marabouts, fuels these rumours. When I asked Andy if 
this was true, he just laughed, but neither accepted nor denied the claims. He told me 
that his work as a DVD sales man helped him master the art of seduction which is a 
requisite skill that beach hustlers must possess to succeed. To succeed in beach 
hustling, Andy told me that one must possess a certain and rare combination of charm, 
acumen and flexibility: 
We need special skills in this job. You have to know how to 
approach toubabs. You have to be a good listener because if 
you don’t listen you don’t understand and know. You have to 
be able to talk and speak good English so toubabs can 
understand you. You need to be flexible, smiley and happy to 
charm the toubabs.  
Trimingham (1959) has emphasised the role played by divination in most African 
societies. An understanding of contemporary religious praxis among West Africans 




provide an understanding of Islamic religious life through the study of divinatory 
practices. Using Senegal and the Gambia as case studies, the author found that 
divination is one of the most widespread and resilient institutions of Islamic ritual life 
in these countries.  
In the Gambia, divination forms an important element of religious practice and 
divinatory ritual unfolds in the centre rather than at the margins of Islamic practice 
(Graw, 2016). As a technique of anticipation, divination enables people to predict the 
future. The majority of Gambians, regardless of religion, class and ethnicity, 
occasionally consult the morro in order to elicit divine favour, receive advice and signs 
regarding their livelihoods and seek protection from potential dangers (Ibid). In fact, a 
handful of my interlocutors admitted to me that they have at some point in their lives 
sought the services of a morro for the above purposes. 
In the Gambia, and elsewhere in West Africa (ibid), several divination techniques are 
used to solicit information on the nature of and the right ritual remedies to clients’ 
predicaments such as illness, marital complications, unemployment, livelihoods and 
migration. These include throwing cowrie shells and interpreting their patterns 
(kooringo), interpreting outcomes of arithmetic writings on sand (ramulo), and 
interpretation of what the diviner saw in his dream during his sleep following specific 
prayers (listikaaro). Once the morro has been able to ‘see’ the problems of his talibo 
(the person seeking divination), ritual remedies are proffered in the form of giving out 
saada (alms) or prescribing the need for special dua (supplicatory prayers). The saada 
can entail sacrificing the blood of a goat, sheep or chicken or the distribution of cola 
nuts and biscuits to wayfarers, old people or children. In some cases, the morro 
prepares and gives his talibo a nasso (holy water) to wash with or safo (amulet) to 
wear. For hustlers like David, who intimated to me that they have consulted the morro 
to seek help, claim that they have been provided with all the above remedies for the 
purpose of possessing good luck in meeting a ‘good toubab’.Despite its widespread 
use, divination as a local Muslim practice, have come under attack as unlawful 
innovations in the Gambia and elsewhere (Launay, 1992).  
Although Andy never explicitly admitted to me that the ease at which he makes 




Islamic practice in that context is certain to conjure such thoughts. Operating on the 
margins of the industry and having to overcome their negative reputation, beach 
hustlers like Andy have a difficult task of winning the confidence of potential 
customers who normally approach them with suspicion. I have on many occasions 
watched from a distance beach hustlers failing to persuade tourists to take them on as 
a guide. Andy explains their failure, blaming it on the approach of beach hustlers: 
These guys don’t understand the toubabs. They just rush and 
speak to them and tell them let me take you here and there 
(sic). For me I rhythm them and bring them into my world. If 
you don’t rhythm them they cannot come with you because 
they come from another part of the world where they do not 
expect to meet somebody like you. So if you meet them you 
have to talk to them to give them confidence. 
To convince the toubabs to buy their services, the more entrepreneurial beach hustlers 
like Andy and David carry books and albums that they use to publicise the kinds of 
services they offer. Andy showed me his album with pictures of local markets, the 
crocodile pool and other local sites. The albums also contain photos he took with 
previous clients during tours. The book has a handwritten map and a brief description 
of the places he proposes to take the toubabs. Handwritten testimonies and reviews 
were written at the back by previous clients. The pictures and testimonies serve as 
references to prove to future clients the quality of their services as they help to impress 
potential clients. They have to be likeable, but also show themselves to be professional 
as local tour guides. In short, beach hustlers like Andy are adept at making their 
services indispensable through the use of a myriad of skills, methods and artefacts.  
Using these skills and artefacts, Andy and other beach hustlers entice new clients by 
telling them that they can show them the ‘authentic’ Gambia. They stress the 
uniqueness of their services despite taking tourists to the same places week in week 
out. Once a tourist is interested, they are urged to pay the equivalent of either £5 or 
£10 as a deposit, to secure a half day or a full day trip. A normal full day trip includes 




Bakau, the monkey park30 in Senegambia, the Arch 22 in Banjul, Lamin lodge and 
then a boat trip along the river Gambia to watch mangroves. These trips allow beach 
hustlers the chance to spend valuable time with tourists who talk to them and tell them 
their problems. They provide the right opportunity for beach hustlers to make money 
from tourists.  
Sellers of ‘cultural experiences’ (Taylor, 2000:48), like Andy and other beach hustlers, 
can be considered as ‘culture brokers’ who ease the transition into the Gambia for their 
clients. Culture brokers are found in all cross-cultural situations and are very likely to 
appear in tourist resorts where they often play a major role in social and cultural change 
patterns (Brown, 1992). Eric Cohen (1985: 10) talks about the benefits that tour-guides 
both local and official, can bring as ‘pathfinders’ and ‘mentors’. In the Gambia, they 
act as translators in a linguistic sense as tourists do not speak local languages and most 
locals cannot speak English and other European Languages. More significantly, they 
serve as mediators between locals and tourists. Tour guides, like Andy, create a 
physical and cultural landscape for the tourist. They control where the tourist went, 
what they see and how much they paid for it. They also control the amount and the 
quality of communication between the tourist and the local population.  
 
 ‘We do not charge them for our services, yet nothing is Free’ 
Beach hustlers do not charge their clients for their services. Rather, they tell the tourists 
to give them whatever they have and that they are not doing it for money but to help 
make their stay memorable. As Andy explains: 
We normally do not charge fixed prices for our services. We 
instead tell tourists to give us anything. We make a lot of 
money this way as generous toubabs can give 3000 to 400031 
dalasi for a trip. 
                                                 
30 Also known as the Bijilo Forest Park which is located near the Senegambia Beach Hotel in Kololi. 
It is popular for sighting two out of three breeds of monkey in the Gambia. These are the green velvet 
monkey and the red colobus. 




During these trips, hustlers make extra income by acting as interlocutors for their 
clients, bargaining and negotiating prices for them. For example, when tourists want 
to buy something from the shops or at the market, beach hustlers tell them to allow 
them to negotiate the price in the local language so they can get discounts. The beach 
hustler will then make a deal with the seller and the tourist is charged at a higher price. 
The profit is then shared between the seller and the beach hustler. ‘I would then make 
sure that I either leave my hat or spectacles behind so I can go back to get it along with 
my share’, Andy told me. Similar strategies are used by beach boys in the Caribbean 
who make a financial profit from foreign women through their local networks by 
taking tourists for dinner at a friend’s restaurant where they are overcharged and the 
reward is split between the beach boy and the friend (Taylor, 2001).  
Beach hustlers are not the only ones charging tourists higher prices. Local businesses 
outside of the Tourism Development Area also inflate prices for toubabs. The barber 
shop where I normally get my hair cut in Bakau, for example, lists a special price for 
tourists, D250 as opposed to D50. “The toubabs have money. So paying D250 for a 
haircut is nothing”, the owner said to me. He is aware that it costs £10 for a haircut in 
the UK, which is much more expensive than what he is charging. Therefore, his 
services are cheap with regards to the toubabs. Many people in the Gambia feel 
justified to make money from toubabs given the perceived economic disparity. As 
such, there exists two price sets: one price for Gambians living in the Gambia and 
another higher price for “foreigners”, tourists or Gambians living in the Diaspora. This 
is a phenomenon well documented in other countries where tourism is a big industry 
(Wamwara-Mbugua and Cornwell, 2008).  
‘Taking them to our homes’ 
Beach hustlers also use their work as local tour guides to offset the economic pressure 
of sending monthly allowances for the upkeep of their families. Most beach hustlers 
are the breadwinners of their families and they are expected to send monthly 
allowances to their families to buy provisions like rice and other food items, medicine 
and to pay for their children’s or siblings’ education. As such, as part of their guiding 
itinerary, beach hustlers suggest to tourists to visit the “locals” in towns to see how 




compounds. The tourists will be advised to buy gifts like rice, cooking oil and other 
foodstuffs to take with them as gifts according to the dictates of Gambian culture and 
tradition. David narrated to me how he became very popular in his neighbourhood 
when some of his toubab clients bought ten bags of rice for his home and his 
neighbours.  
In spite of the fact that they are advised by tour operators and hotels to ‘be wary’ of 
interpersonal contact with local people, many tourists find visiting locals to be the 
ultimate authentic experience. This gives beach hustlers opportunities to extend the 
benefits of tourism to the wider community. Andy told me that taking tourists to visit 
his family helps him to ease his own burden as a breadwinner: 
Most of them when we take them to visit local people, 
especially our family, they buy them rice and onions and some 
other foodstuffs. This covers another place for me. Because 
then I don’t have to buy it. I don’t have a wife but I buy food 
for my mum and sisters and brothers.  
4.6 Buju the Fisherman: ‘You are poor and I want to help you’ 
Other beach hustlers play on the sympathy of the toubabs they sell their services to by 
exaggerating their poor living conditions to get assistance. This is achieved through 
both appearance and conversation. Nyanzi et al.’s (2005) definition of bumsters 
mentioned above aptly describes this strategy. The popular perception among 
Gambians that toubabs are wealthy and generous compels beach hustlers to portray 
themselves as destitute to evoke the sympathy of and assistance from tourists. These 
beach hustlers aggravate their deprived socio-economic situation to the toubabs by 
fabricating stories about their living conditions. They tell the toubabs that they are 
homeless youths struggling to survive. This is mostly done during conversations whilst 
taking the tourists around. This strategy has worked for many beach hustlers who 
secured help from toubabs to either start their own businesses or who send them 




Buju’s case is a good representation of the beach hustlers that resort to these strategies. 
Hailing from Basse32 in the upper river region of the Gambia, Buju comes from a poor 
farming family and so has never been to school. Instead he helped his dad on the farms. 
He is in his early 40s and has spent half of his life in the industry. Buju told me that 
the poor economic prospects of farming and the distress of seeing his parents live in 
absolute poor conditions compels him to take the journey into the urban areas to hustle. 
A tall guy with long dreadlocks and imposing looks, Buju is revered among other 
beach hustlers. He told me that they call him “Buju” because he is a fan of Buju 
Banton, the Jamaican reggae musician.  
Buju started beach hustling as a local tour guide by taking clients on fishing trips on 
boats owned by others. After a while, he was employed by a company that offers game 
fishing33 trips to tourists. This company was owned by a British couple. Working for 
this company not only helped Buju to master the art of game fishing, but it also 
provided him with the opportunity to access tourists and to establish contacts and 
networks. Due to his likable character, Buju met a toubab couple who got him a boat 
to start his own business:  
The couple enjoy game fishing and they come every year. 
Whilst on our trips I will entertain them and be nice to them. I 
told them I was poor and do this to help my family. They feel 
(sic) me and said you are very poor and we want to help you. 
We have a boat in Holland that we only use in the summer. We 
don’t mind bringing the boat for you so that you can make a 
living, to look after yourself and your family. So they brought 
the boat. It has helped me look after myself and my family.  
“To feel” as used in this context means “to understand”, “to like” or “to feel sorry for”. 
The help Buju got from the toubabs proved to be life changing. With his own boat, 
Buju started his own game fishing business in Kololi and has employed six boys to 
work for him. He takes tourists on recreational fishing trips in the Atlantic. Buju and 
others like him who do this for a living are called “fishermen”. Although they mostly 
engage in game fishing, they do commercial fishing during the off peak season to 
                                                 
32 A major town in rural Gambia. 
33 Game fishing or sport fishing is a form of recreational fishing where large fish renowned for their 




survive. Showing me a photo album of their fishing trips and the fish they have 
captured with clients, Buju proudly described his work:   
Tourists don’t know about artisanal local fishing and so they 




Figure 13: Military officers from the TSU talking to fishermen in Kololi. 






Figure 15: Fishermen’s boats on the beach in Kololi 
 





4.7 Stanley Man the Taxi Driver: ‘In the industry, contact is 
everything’ 
The cases of Andy and Buju show how beach hustlers use their work as local tour 
guides to create opportunities to make money from tourists. We have seen how Andy 
used a combination of tactics to make money from his tourist clients that he used to 
fulfil his aspirations of social and economic advancement. We have also seen how 
Buju portrayed an image of himself to his tourist clients to get the help he needed to 
start his own fishing company. Using the case of Stanley Man, we explore the 
importance of contacts and networks for registered beach hustlers like taxi drivers, bird 
watchers, fruit sellers and juice pressers in their attempts to generate the income they 
need to fulfil their aspirations.  
Due to them being registered with GTB and being forced to follow prescribed 
guidelines, registered beach hustlers resort to different strategies. Their modus 
operandi is quite different from their unregistered counterparts as they do not have the 
latitude to move around marketing their business and touting for customers. Therefore, 
they rely on their place of work as the only marketing or selling point. Competition, 
therefore, among registered beach hustlers is severe. As such, registered beach hustlers 
rely on verbal recommendations by former clients to their friends or acquaintances 
visiting the Gambia. As Mariama told me: “old friends market our business”.  
In addition, written reviews on travel websites such as TripAdvisor are also a way 
through which contacts help registered beach hustlers get new customers. This 
illustrates the ways in which information and communication technologies (ICT) has 
changed the work of some beach hustlers. A few beach hustlers I have met have created 
Facebook pages that they use to market themselves and their businesses. Some have 
created their own websites for the same purpose. Malick Suso, a bird watcher who has 
his own website, told me: 
Before, all the tourists knew about Gambia was through the 
reps. Now the Internet has changed this. Tourists have more 
access to information now through the net. Tourists find us on 
the Internet through good reviews or through 




former clients also write reviews about my business. I also 
have a website.  
Most beach hustlers have an ambivalent feeling towards reps who act as the main 
liaison between the tour operators that bring in tourists and the hotels. They are 
employed by the tour operators and as expected, would market the services of their 
employers. Websites like TripAdvisor and VirtualTourist are littered with reviews 
written by tourists about their experiences and the services they received from beach 
hustlers. The reviews below, for example, were written by tourists who used the 
services of bird watchers while on holiday in the Gambia:  
“Bakary aka Charlie Bojang the Bird Guide is Amazing” 
“I took two different birding trips with Charlie a while back and have never met such 
a knowledgeable or enthusiastic guide in any of the places I've visited. I've been to 
many game parks and over 50 countries but Charlie stands out. He knows all the best 
places to see the incredible variety of birds that the Gambia has to offer. You feel lucky 
to be watching someone do something that they so love to do. He's a treat. See his 
Facebook page for contact information under his full name. Reviewed 12 August 
2014”. 
“Birdwatching with Sanna Manneh” 
“Sanna is very experienced in guiding tourists and he is very friendly. We spent (sic) 
good times with him and can recommend him to everyone who is interested in bird 
watching. If you know where to go to you can see different types of the most beautiful 
birds. Reviewed December 2013.” 
These illustrate the ways in which beach hustlers can access clients globally.  
I use Stanley Man’s case as a good example of the importance of contacts for the work 
of registered beach hustlers and the opportunities it comes with. Reviews on 
TripAdvisor commended him to be “a nice, friendly and reliable guide with his own 
car”. Through this, he acquired many customers, including Linda, the British woman 
who later became his wife. These days, Stanley Man hardly touts for clients and gets 




I once provided a trip for a British couple who were happy with 
my service and put a good review for me on TripAdvisor. 
Since then, I have had many other good reviews and in fact 
most customers I have got to know me through TripAdvisor. 
Most of my customers are repeat visitors and they book for my 
services before they arrive. Some will even ask me to pick 
them up at the airport.  
I first met Stanley Man at the airport during my second field trip to the Gambia when 
he came to pick up his wife, who introduced me to him. Born and bred in Busumbala 
Village in Western Gambia before moving to settle in Kololi, Stanley Man is 
considered by his colleagues to be one of the lucky and talented beach hustlers in 
Kololi. He is also famous for using the phrase: “Call me ‘Stanley Man’”, when he 
presents himself to tourists. As such, many of his friends fondly called him this.  
Born into an extended polygamous family with 16 siblings, Stanley Man dropped out 
of school in grade 6 in 1995 due to his family’s financial situation. His father sells 
wood on the Banjul highway in Busumbala and his mother, like all the other co-wives, 
is a housewife. Stanley Man told me that although his mother sometimes engages in 
horticulture with some other women in her kafoo34, the earnings from this enterprise 
were not enough to pay for her children’s education.  
Dropping out of school and with no prospects of employment, Stanley Man secured 
an electrician apprenticeship position at a hotel called the Wardner Beach Hotel in 
1999 through a cousin who worked there. His stint at Wardner was short-lived as the 
hotel was forced to close in 2002 and Stanley Man lost his job. Now a qualified 
electrician, Stanley Man secured another job at Fajara Hotel in Bakau in 2003 working 
on the same trade.  
Although the salary was not good, Stanley Man managed to save enough to buy a 
second hand car for D22000 which he converted into a tourist taxi and started the 
tourist taxi business in 2009. Stanley Man told me that he did not have a driving licence 
when he bought the car and that a friend taught him how to drive using his car. 
Although he did not go through the normal procedures of obtaining a driving licence, 
                                                 




a cousin brother who is a police officer helped him get one through the “back way”.35 
He then registered with the tourist taxi drivers association, registered with GTB and 
applied for a TDA card. 
Stanley Man started plying his trade as a tourist taxi driver at Fajara Hotel where he 
had already established contacts and networks through his work there as an electrician. 
In fact, he told me that the reason he decided to become a tourist taxi driver was 
because of the opportunity he had to access tourists by working at the hotel. Using his 
work as a tourist taxi driver, Stanley Man also doubles as a tour guide offering guiding 
services to clients who demand such services as bird watching or a trip to up-country. 
It was through this that Stanley Man met Linda, his wife-to-be, at the lounge of a hotel 
called the Bakotu Hotel, in 2012. 
I met Linda on the flight on my second field visit to the Gambia. We sat next to each 
other and a flight delay led us into a conversation. When I told her about my research, 
she was astounded and told me that her husband is a tourist taxi driver and that she 
was going to the Gambia for their official wedding. She then offered to introduce me 
to her husband and I was invited to the wedding, which I attended. The wedding itself 
was a low key affair held at a small guest house in Kololi. It was attended by Stanley 
Man’s family, other beach hustlers and a few toubabs, one of which was Linda’s 
mother. 
Linda is a 39 year old school teacher from Manchester. She told me that she is from a 
conservative, upper-class family with two siblings. She has two children from her 
previous marriage, a 19 year old son and a 21 year old daughter. Her children have 
since moved out and Linda lives alone after divorcing her husband. Linda told me that 
in hindsight she thinks she got married too early when she was still a teenager herself. 
Although her ex-husband was ten years her senior, she felt pressured to get married 
and thinks this played a key role in why the relationship did not ultimately work. She 
felt bored and unhappy after all those years and wanted to explore something new, 
something more exciting. Besides, the relationship with her husband came to a point 
when they hardly travelled together as they did before because he became more 
                                                 
35 Corruption and nepotism within the Police Force makes it easy for people to get a driver’s license 




interested in going on bird watching trips, which she is not too keen on. Consequently, 
their marriage succumbed to all these pressures. 
When Linda’s ex-husband decided to visit the Gambia on a bird watching trip, she 
decided to join him as it was the Christmas holidays and she did not want to spend it 
alone in their expensive home in Manchester. Although her ex-husband had been to 
many countries on bird watching trips, this was the first time Linda decided to join 
him. For Stanley Man it was the hand of destiny that brought Linda to the Gambia: “It 
was God’s wish that I would meet Linda. The first time I saw her I never thought she 
would be my wife as she was already married”.  
Linda and her husband read about Stanley Man on TripAdvisor. They had read reviews 
that he was a nice, friendly and reliable guide with his own car. Upon arrival at Bakotu 
Hotel, they were eager to meet him and the first thing they did after putting down their 
luggage was to ask for him at the hotel reception. It was not difficult to locate him as 
the hotel receptionist knew him because he had left his business card at the reception. 
Stanley Man reminisced about that fateful meeting:  
When I arrived at the reception, I greeted and introduced 
myself as Stanley Man. Linda and her ex-husband told me that 
they had heard about me on TripAdvisor and that they would 
like to book some bird watching trips. The husband was a bird 
watcher and they booked me for the two weeks they would 
stay.  
The use of business cards is common among beach hustlers like Stanley Man. Some 
beach hustlers have visit cards that they distribute to customers and other tourists when 
they have the opportunity to do so. Some leave their visit cards at hotel receptions and 
restaurants and bars. This is done by striking up friendships with the people who work 
in these places. Again, this shows the ways in which beach hustlers tap into local 
networks. More audacious beach hustlers like Stanley Man not only rely on these 
networks but also distribute their business cards directly to tourists when the 
opportunity arises. 
I normally market my business in a civilised way. I distribute 
my visit card to tourists and tell them what services I offer by 




give them my business card and show them my guide 
programmes.  
Stanley Man told me that ‘civilised’ way of marketing means using business cards. He 
believes this leads to less hassling, which can put many tourists off. During my 
conversations with Stanley, he always emphasised to me that he is a hustler who does 
not hassle tourists. This principle not only earned him the admiration of Linda and her 
ex-husband but other tourists as well.  
As per the agreement, Stanley Man was to pick Linda and her ex-husband up from the 
hotel at 8am daily and take them to bird watching hotspots like Abuko Forest, Tanji 
Reserve and the Kotu Stream Area. During these trips, Linda would sit in the car with 
Stanley Man while her ex-husband spent time in the forest watching birds, as he 
recalled: 
When Linda’s husband was spending hours watching birds I 
was spending more time with her. This is how our relationship 
started. When they got back, they divorced and I started an 
online relationship with Linda. After two years, we decided to 
get married.  
Before getting married to Stanley Man, Linda visited him in the Gambia five times 
within a year. It was during one of these visits that the traditional and religious wedding 
took place. They got married in a mosque in Busumbala in October 2013 and Linda 
converted to Islam, adopting the name Aminata Bojang.36 Although Linda told me that 
she is now a very happy woman, she still has anxieties about her marriage to a Gambian 
taxi driver, who is a few years younger than her and whom she met while on holiday 
with her husband. She told me that online stories about the fate of similar relationships 
compounded her fears and anxieties. This is made worse by the apprehensiveness of 
her children, friends and other family members towards her decision to marry an 
African she met while on holiday: “My family was apprehensive about me marrying a 
much younger man who I hardly know. They are also not happy that I converted to 
Islam. Only my mum supported me.” This support was demonstrated in her attendance 
at Linda’s wedding in the Gambia.   
                                                 




As the case of Linda and Stanley Man shows, the significance of contacts is not only 
limited to acquiring customers and making money, but also to building long-term 
relationships that could open doors for other opportunities such as having the chance 
to travel. Although Stanley Man told me that getting a toubab wife and going to Europe 
was not why he started working in the industry, he, however, intends to use the 
opportunity of moving to the UK to study electrical engineering. His ultimate wish is 
to return and settle in the Gambia with Linda and to establish his own business.  
The aspiration to become established in the Gambia and to achieve financial success 
and social status is a theme found in the accounts of many of the beach hustlers I 
encountered during fieldwork and who find themselves in a state of ‘involuntary 
immobility’. However, some of the challenges they face within the tourism industry 
seem to be creating some ambivalence in their efforts to fulfil their objectives. I use 
the incident that transpired between Buju and other fishermen, and the GTB to 
illustrate some of the challenges that beach hustlers face. 
On the morning of the 23rd November 2013, officials of the GTB accompanied by 
soldiers from the Tourism Security Unit (TSU) came to confiscate the boats of 
fishermen, including Buju’s boat. The boats were taken to the TSU post in 
Senegambia. Some boats were damaged in the process. I was in the Gambia by then 
doing the first round of my fieldwork. Although that trip focussed on researching 
internet hustling, I would occasionally go to the beach to speak to beach hustlers in 
preparation for my next round of fieldwork. I had not met the fishermen before this 
incident but once David informed me of what had happened, we decided to pay the 
fishermen a visit. This is how I came to meet Buju. Upon arrival at their base, and after 
introducing myself as a researcher interested in their work as beach hustlers, I was 
directed to speak to Buju, their boss, who explained what had happened: “They said 
we should leave here because our boats cause erosion and we make the place filthy. 
When we refused, our boats were taken to their base”. 
Talking to GTB officials about the issue, I was told that the fishermen had been given 
notice to leave that area of the beach as it is not designated for fishing boat landing. 
Furthermore, GTB claims that the way the fishermen drag their boats in and out of the 




former student who works at the GTB advised me that the order to seize the boats 
“came from above”. Being familiar with the situation, my assessment was that this was 
a political issue that I should refrain from pursuing further, lest I find myself entangled 
in a complex web of Gambian politics. I left the field a few weeks later.   
During my second trip I went to see Buju for an update on the issue. He told me that 
they got their boats back in February:   
We went to the depute37 (pronounced de-pi-tee) in Kololi to 
give our complaint to this depute. He showed us how to fight 
this. We were supposed to see Mr President but unfortunately 
we couldn’t see this Mr President. You understand, and later 
on we complained again to this depute. The depute then took 
the case to parliament. The depute said “ah, but me one thing 
doubt me into my place in the people I live with in the area 
because I have too much complain. The president said people 
have to go back to the land and my people have no land. 
Because you build all the hotels and buildings on my people’s 
land. And what they have to make a living is the sea. How can 
you stop this sea to my people not to fish?” Then a letter was 
sent directly to the Minister of Tourism and they called the 
Minster to come there to parliament. The Minister said no, he 
is not the one who gave the order. Is the director (of GTB) just 
jump and give the order (sic). 
 
 
                                                 

















In this chapter I have shown how tourism in the Gambia has created both formal and 
informal employment opportunities for many of the country’s youths. In particular, 
tourism has created opportunities of income generation for a group of young people 
who find themselves in a state of ‘involuntary immobility’.  Known as beach hustlers, 
they engage in diverse informal economic activities on the fringes of the Gambia’s 
tourism sector to generate the income they need to fulfil their aspirations of social and 
economic advancement.  
I mainly focus on the key strategies beach hustlers employ to strike up conversations 
with tourists, to gain their trust with the aim of getting access to them. In doing this, I 
show the significance of space and how beach hustlers manoeuvre to get access to 
these spaces. Although tourists mostly inhabit public spaces like the airport, the beach 
and restaurants, beach hustlers must negotiate access to these spaces by relying on 
networks or their social skills. For example, we have seen how beach hustlers establish 
relationships with restaurant owners to get access to tourists. 
By presenting ethnographic case studies of the hustling strategies of David, Andy, 
Buju and Stanley Man, I show how beach hustlers resort to diverse strategies, 
depending on their status, not only to gain access to toubabs, but also to financially 
benefit from their interactions with them. Using the case of Andy, I show how 
unregistered hustlers with restricted access to the TDA work as local tour guides. I 
show how they first navigate tourist spaces to get access to toubabs. I further show 
how, by interacting with toubabs through their work, local tour guides use various 
tactics to generate extra income from them. We have also seen how Buju portrayed an 
image of himself to his tourist clients to get the help he needed to start his own fishing 
company. Using the case of Stanley Man, I explored the importance of contacts and 
networks for beach hustlers like taxi drivers, bird watchers, fruit sellers and juice 
pressers, which enable them to achieve both short-term economic achievement and 
initiate long-term personal relationships. I suggest that the use of language, Western 




broader strategies that beach hustlers employ to ‘align’ and ‘rhythm’ so as to gain 





















The ‘Love’ and ‘Deception’ Methods: The Strategies of Chanters 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
A white, dirty curtain separates the small room at the back of the cybercafé from the 
main hall. Inside the room, a young man, whom I will call Bigger, lies down on a 
mattress. Looking feeble and struggling to get the words out of his mouth, he feigns 
helplessness and lets the doctor do the talking for him. A bandage with what seems 
like blood seething through was tied around his head. His guise tells anybody who 
looks at him that he only has a few hours to live. His muscular body is accentuated by 
a dirty conspicuous vest and similarly dirty shorts. His slippers struggle to stay on his 
dusty feet. Two other people, one wearing a white gown and Rahman, one of the café 
managers were standing over him. A laptop with a webcam on top of the screen was 
placed on a small table close to the mattress. From where I was standing, I could see 
the face of a white man with long hair tied at the back talking to the man in the gown. 
He looked worried. His last words before he disappeared offline were “Okay, let me 
rush to the Western Union”. 
The story that follows this scene (given in more detail later in the chapter) characterises 
the techniques and strategies that a group of young men and women employ to make 
money from their interactions with toubabs online. Similar to the previous chapter, 
this chapter explores the hustling strategies and challenges of a group of young people 
who attempt to fulfil their aspirations of social and economic advancement through 
Internet related activities, mostly in cybercafés. The chapter takes up one of the issues 
that the previous chapter touched upon, namely the ways in which young people who 
find themselves in a state of ‘involuntary immobility’ pursue local livelihoods by 
making use of the resources available to them. The advent of the Internet in the 
Gambia, which can mostly be accessed in cybercafés, provided opportunities for many 
unemployed urban youths. Lacking the appropriate education and skills to acquire 




they spend their time in cybercafés employing various tactics to access and make 
money from toubabs by using the Internet.  
The young people who engage in online hustling activities use specific language to 
describe themselves and their activities. They refer to themselves as ‘chanters’ and 
their activities as ‘chanting’. The toubabs they establish online relationships with are 
generally referred to as ‘contacts’. Contacts are further categorised into ‘real contacts’ 
and ‘friends’. ‘Real contacts’ are those that send them money and ‘friends’ are those 
that they are in touch with but do not send them money. Chanters can have as many as 
1,000 online ‘friends’ but only two, three or four ‘real contacts’. Although all ‘real 
contacts’ start as ‘friends’, chanters will delete those friends who do not make this 
transformation from their friendship list as they are regarded as ‘time wasters’. 
Mighty Dre, one of my key interlocutors, told me that chanting involves “making 
friends on the Internet with the aim of establishing a relationship that has economic 
and material benefits”. Zill, an experienced chanter, described chanting as: “searching 
for toubabs on the Internet and sweet talking them into helping you. We tell them 
things that will please them to get them to give us money”. Although none of my 
interlocutors were able to tell me the origins of the term chanting, I suggest that it is 
derived from the English word chant, which means to sing.  
Initially, I had difficulties with understanding why and how online hustling activities 
came to be associated with singing. However, in the social context I find it corresponds 
with the trade of contemporary griots or jelis who use their voices to praise and sing 
to their patrons, expecting to get financial and/or material rewards (Schulz, 1997; 
Janson, 2002). As the above definitions of chanting show, the activity, although it does 
not involve singing, does contain elements of ‘sweet talking’ the toubabs to achieve 
their goals. It also corresponds with the effect of popular Jamaican reggae music which 
has greatly influenced Gambian society, youth culture in particular, during the 1980s 
and 1990s. To chant in Jamaican patois38 means to sing, and I suggest that the use of 
the term chant by young Gambians is partly influenced by expressions in reggae music 
such as ‘Rastaman chant’ or ‘chant down Babylon’. 
                                                 




In this chapter, I first seek to describe the spaces where chanters operate. I then 
introduce the main chanters whose portraits make up this ethnography. I then explore 
their itineraries of accumulation by describing the strategies they employ to access and 
establish relationships with toubabs online and the techniques they use to make money 
from them. I further discuss the challenges of chanters in terms of how they compete 
with each other and the consequences of losing their contacts.    
5.2 Setting the Scene: AON and GAMTEL 
Studies on the spatial distribution of cybercafés in developing countries indicate a 
strong presence in peri-urban settings (Rangaswamy, 2008; Gomez, 2012). It is 
therefore no wonder that Brikama, a peri-urban town lying south of the country’s 
capital Banjul, has experienced a dramatic growth of cybercafé businesses over the 
past few years. The number of cybercafés has mushroomed from just one in 2005 to 
38 in 2013. Anyone visiting the town will not have difficulty in finding a cybercafé 
either on the main Brikama highway or on residential street corners. From Nyambai to 
Kembuje (the areas where Brikama starts and ends), cybercafés are clustered in close 
proximity to each other. 
In one area in Nyambai, I observed five cybercafés within a radius of 200 metres. On 
a busy street in Nema, where local government and administrative buildings are 
situated, there are three cybercafés (Global link, A&B and Millennium) between the 
former commissioner’s office and the governor’s office (with just ten compounds in 
between). This distance is not more than 220 metres. These configurations are mainly 
coincidental and do not amount to a ‘model of spatial competition’ (Hotelling, 1929), 
which involves businesses clustering in groups instead of spreading evenly throughout 
a community to maximise their market share. In her work on small-scale African 
enterprise clusters, McCormick (1999) suggests that small business clusters may help 
small enterprises to overcome growth constraints. 
With the exception of the Gambia Telecommunications Company Limited 
(GAMTEL)39, a government owned cybercafé, the cybercafés in Brikama are privately 
owned and located within residential buildings. This indicates the growing use and 
                                                 




adoption of technology outside of development interventions. It is in these privately 
owned cybercafés that chanters start hustling before moving their operations to 
GAMTEL as they provide comparatively cheaper connection rates. The cybercafés in 
Brikama are always busy, with peak patronage in the late afternoon and evening. 
The sizes of the cafés range from those with only just 5 computer terminals to one café 
(GAMTEL) with 42 terminals. Mostly accommodated in small rooms initially built to 
be rented out as local shops (or bitiques40 as they are locally known), the cybercafés 
are normally small with very poor ventilation. The majority of the cybercafés lack 
proper windows, making the rooms dark and stuffy. It is in these cybercafés that I 
spent time observing and talking to chanters. Although I conducted observations and 
interviews in all the cybercafés in Brikama, the AON and GAMTEL served as my 
main research setting. 
5.2.1 AON: “IT, Electronics and Beauty Solutions” 
 
Figure 18: A graphic representation of the inside of the AON cybercafe (produced 
by the author). 
                                                 




Cybercafés in Brikama are named after their owners (for example Bas Internet Café, 
named after the owner Bas), or a famous landmark adjacent to it (for example FMB 
Internet Café named after the community Radio FM Brikama or Montego Bay Internet 
Café, named after the popular Montego Bay mini market to which it is adjacent), or 
global buzzwords (for example, “Global Links”, “IT Solutions” or “Millennium” 
Internet cafes). The name given to the AON cybercafé is unique in this regard. A 
family run business, it is overseen and managed by Alkali, the second son in a family 
of twelve. It has nine PCs and has been in operation for almost three years. It is open 
seven days a week from 9am until midnight.  
The great majority of AON’s customers are students. They usually come either before 
or after school as evident by their uniforms. Some spend the whole day in the café in 
their uniforms. Children as young as 12 years old are also among the AON’s customers 
and can sometimes be found browsing until late at night. These kids, like those found 
in Indian cybercafés (Rangaswamy, 2007), enjoy the informal ambience of the café 
and its relatively unconstrained rules about Internet browsing. This is not surprising 
given the fact that Burrell finds cybercafés ‘appealing spaces’ for young people to 
escape the surveillance of authority (Burrell, 2012: 43). Although government 
regulations prevent cybercafés from allowing those under the age of eighteen from 
browsing after 10 pm, Alkali told me that he does not implement these controls as he 
does not want to lose his customers. 
The AON is in the middle of a small nondescript residential street. A blackboard 
advertising the services (printing, scanning, photocopying and browsing) it offers and 
the accessories available for sale (laptops, hard drives, webcams, phones, earphones 
and pen drives) is placed outside the café. An A4 size paper, displaying the prices for 
services, is pasted on the glass door, which serves as the main entrance. Browsing at 
the AON costs D10 for 60 minutes or D5 for 30 minutes. Customers who buy two or 
more hours of browsing time receive an extra 30 minutes for free. Similar to cybercafés 
in other African contexts (see Smith, 2008; Steiner, 2011; Burrell, 2012), no cold 
drinks or coffee are available for sale. Burrell (2012: 28) therefore argues that referring 
to facilities that provide public access to ICT in developing countries as cybercafés is 




The veranda of the AON serves as a waiting area for customers. However, the two 
benches placed on the veranda are not only used for this purpose as non-customers, 
mostly neighbours and Alkali’s acquaintances, hang around to chat and drink attaya. 
This form of socialisation found in Gambian cybercafés serves as a point of contrast 
to what has been reported in Accra’s cybercafés (Burrell, 2012) where a limited 
amount of sociability occurs. For example, Smith (2008) observes that although the 
most popular cybercafés in the towns of Umuahia and Owerri in Nigeria serve as 
meeting points for young people, the lack of sitting spaces except for the computer 
terminals discourages any form of social interaction.  
The AON café itself is a room of not more than 6m x 4m and PCs are placed on tables 
in an integrated fashion. The seating configuration inside the AON leaves no room for 
extra seating inside the café, making social interactions less than ideal. In addition, and 
similar to most privately owned cybercafés in Brikama, this arrangement does not 
ensure private browsing. Alkali’s own desk, which consists of a laptop, a 
printer/photocopier and a scanner, is placed in a small corner inside the café. Internet 
connections at the AON can be so painfully slow that one wonders why customers do 
not go elsewhere. It turns out that the situation is as bad if not worse in other 
cybercafés, except GAMTEL.  
The AON is similar to other privately owned cybercafés in terms of their raison d'être. 
The cybercafés are either run as a family business to provide basic subsistence for the 
family or owned by a person, normally a civil servant, who opens it as a side business 
to complement their salary. Situated in residential buildings, they are all similar in 
layout, price, and clientele. Their interiors are modest and minimal in décor. Although 
they bear some resemblance to the cybercafés in Accra (Burrell, 2012), they deviate 
from past studies that have focused on the rich material culture and spatial 
configuration of cybercafés in Western countries (Wakeford, 2003; Laegran and 
Stewart, 2003). The cybercafés in Brikama also share the same challenges, prominent 
among which is erratic electricity supplies, high taxes and duties, poor Internet 











Figure 20: Inside the AON cybercafé. 
 
 
Figure 21: Young people busy browsing inside 










5.2.2 GAMTEL: “Where big things happen” 
 
Figure 23: A Graphic representation of the inside of the GAMTEL cybercafe 
(prodcued by the author) 
Unlike the AON and other privately owned cybercafés, GAMTEL is at a different level 
in terms of comfort and general technical provisions. With round-the-clock electricity 
(the facility has a big generator that automatically starts up in power cuts) and a high 
speed Internet connection, it is a government run cybercafé. GAMTEL is a parastatal 
company, charged with the task of overseeing the provision of telecommunications 
and Internet services in the country. In accordance with its aim to provide Internet 
access to every Gambian, GAMTEL runs cybercafés in different towns in the country.  
Among these, the Brikama GAMTEL cybercafé is the biggest with 42 PCs.  
GAMTEL is the hub for chanting activities in Brikama. It has a reputation as being the 
cybercafé where young people go to establish online relationships to make money. 
This reputation has made many avoid going to GAMTEL lest they be associated with 




cautioned me to “be careful lest they mistake you for one of the GAMTEL boys” when 
I told him I was going to GAMTEL.   
The GAMTEL cybercafé is situated on a busy road linking the market and the car park. 
With many shops and street hustlers selling mobile phone top ups, SIM cards, mobile 
phone accessories, peanuts, fruits and food, the immediate surroundings are always 
intense with activity. The sound of music (mbalax, reggae or zouk) emanates from an 
adjacent recording studio that sells CDs and audio cassettes. Wooden benches are 
placed outside the recording studio under a neem tree. Here, people either sit to pass 
time or to wait for a vehicle that will take them to their destination. Most of my 
conversations with chanters took place under this tree on the wooden benches where 
they normally sit either to wait for online appointments or just to hang around. 
The building of the GAMTEL cybercafé is nestled in between the post office and a 
Western Union outlet. Chanters gain a lot from this location, as we shall see later in 
this chapter. Unlike the smaller cafes, GAMTEL boasts a more sophisticated décor, 
with modern flats screens and new computers. The seating arrangements also ensure 
some modicum of private browsing as workstations are partitioned by thick piece of 
cardboards. However, a glance from a position behind the customers enables anybody 
inside the cafe to see what the customers are doing online. The manager’s desk is 
positioned in a way that they have full view of the activities taking place inside the 
café. A PC, a scanner and a printer are placed on the desk. A long wooden bench is 
situated near the manager’s desk for waiting customers. Further inside is an empty 
room the size of a standard prison cell which is used as a makeshift mosque.  
Notices are plastered on the concrete pillars that serve as anchors for the building. 
These notices include the browsing tariffs (the cost of browsing in GAMTEL is D12 
for a 30 minute session compared to AON’s D5) and the general rules and regulations 
such as “only one person to a PC”. This rule, however, is almost always flouted as it 
is difficult to enforce due to new users needing someone to sit near them to teach or 
help them. One notice that was of particular interest was written on a poster pasted 
outside the GAMTEL door and on two pillars inside and on the regional manager’s 




Do you know what your little sister is doing online? This photo 
shows a young girl (under 15) on a dating website. Recently, a 
teenage boy was caught sending pictures of his private parts to 
his gay friend….. Internet providers like GAMTEL should 
assume responsibility for protecting our children from online 
paedophiles. And also GAMTEL Internet cafes are the most 
popular venues for these children. Let’s act before it’s too late. 
Although GAMTEL’s policy is that kids under the age of 18 (ID cards are required to 
prove this) are not allowed to browse, this is difficult to enforce as most youths do not 
have ID cards. Children as young as twelve years old can be found browsing. The two 
managers on duty at any point in time, and whose job is to enforce GAMTEL’s rules 
and to coordinate the activities of the café, lack either the will or the capacity to do 
their job. Hence, the relationship between the chanters and the managers is defined by 
a tacit understanding of reciprocity where favours are given and returned. For example, 
employees will help chanters scan and upload photos (sometimes obscene) and 
receipts to their toubab contacts or allow them to do things that contravene 
GAMTEL’s rules and in return, chanters reward them for their help by giving them a 
share of the money they receive. 
“20 minutes for PC 25”: The Ambiance 
The social ambience of GAMTEL on a normal day is reminiscent of activities in a 
busy stock exchange. The majority of customers are glued to their screens chatting 
with online partners through Skype using headsets. Web cams are positioned on top of 
the computer screens to facilitate face-to-face interactions. Multiple conversation 
windows intermittently flash on their screens. The sounds of keyboards, pings from 
instant messages and purrs of conversation are clearly audible. Occasional shouts of 
“manager 20 minutes for PC 25”, for example, can be heard from customers wishing 
to extend their browsing sessions. 
GAMTEL is normally busiest between 6pm and 9pm when both students and workers 
arrive. It can sometimes be difficult, if not impossible, to get access to a PC during 
these times. As I sat on the bench inside GAMTEL one evening, an army officer (in 
full military uniform) came and sat next to me, complaining that he has been coming 




girlfriend in the UK who he is so desperate to talk to, he told me. He did not get to 
speak to her either that evening as no PCs were free before closing time. To avoid 
finding themselves in such situations, customers who can afford it either buy a full 
day’s session or bring their own laptops that they connect to GAMTEL’s wi-fi by 
paying the prescribed browsing fee.  
The social ambience at GAMTEL extends to its outer space. At any point in time, 
around 100 to 150 people will be occupying these spaces, just hanging about waiting 
for free PCs or socialising. However, social events can see these numbers reduce 
noticeably. For example, GAMTEL is almost empty during feasts like Tobaski and 
Koriteh.41 GAMTEL is also normally quiet during big football games in the English 
Premier League, UEFA Champions League and the nawetaan42 as most chanters will 
congregate at video clubs or at the box bar mini stadium to watch football.  
The Gamtel Boys 
I started chanting at GAMTEL and that was about eight years 
ago. Many people have made it here. Some have gone to 
Europe and some have built houses, bought cars and started 
their own businesses. Big things happen here. That is why the 
place is popular today for chanting. – Zill, a chanter. 
The chanters who normally ply their trade in GAMTEL are locally known as the 
‘GAMTEL boys’. A typical GAMTEL boy is in his early twenties. He normally spends 
the whole day in GAMTEL or around its vicinity and buys on average four hours 
browsing time a day and spends on average D1600 a month, which he can easily afford. 
His style of dress and his general comportment is determined by his earning capacity. 
He dresses modestly before making his first money but abandons these clothes for 
more expensive and colourful clothes once money starts coming in. He loves football 
and is a fan of one of the best teams in Europe, donning replica jerseys on match days. 
He wears expensive Nike trainers and American baseball caps and his jeans are drawn 
down in a “kriss-kross” style exposing his underwear. He wears gold plated or silver 
earrings and huge necklaces with an assortment of finger rings. He possesses and likes 
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to display expensive gadgets like his iPhone or iPad. These items are sent to him from 
abroad by his toubab contact and he collects them from the local post office adjacent 
to GAMTEL.  
His style of dress and his general comportment is also symbolic of his success. This is 
measured by the amount of toubab contacts he has and how much money he receives 
from them. His success is also translated into the plane tickets he buys to send his 
parents to the pilgrimage in Mecca, the new house he is building and the car he drives. 
This guarantees him upward mobility and status in society as his perceived fortune and 
social transformation will be much talked about. He is popular and unknown people 
from far and wide will come to seek financial assistance from him. Chanter’s lifestyles 
and consumption patterns as expressed by the GAMTEL boys can be located in 
theoretical debates on masculinity and identity.  
A few scholars have looked at how the appropriation of different styles, material goods 
or ideas shape masculine identity (Schoss 1996; MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 
2000; Weis, 2004). In particular, MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga’s (2000) study 
of the Congolese sapeurs is of theoretical relevance. The French verb se saper means 
to dress well or elegantly and become famous and respected. For the sapeur, looking 
good was a sign of upward social mobility and a way of achieving recognition for 
one’s accomplishments. In addition, Spiteri’s (2014) study of Jamaican beach boys 
revealed that masculine identity in that context is constructed on “conspicuous 
consumption, ostentatious costumes and the need to provide economic support for 
one's family as well as to achieve some sense of status, respect, and reputation among 
one's peers” (xi). Similarly, whilst conducting ethnographic research on the hustling 
activities of low income African-American men in the USA, Whitehead et al. (1994) 
found that, “little men” (low in socioeconomic status) often talked of becoming “big” 
by establishing a “reputation” through the exhibition of wealth. Chanter’s style of dress 
and general lifestyle patterns is symptomatic similar aspirations. 
Although the Gambian hustlers I discuss in this thesis are not internationally mobile 
in a migratory sense (even though they aspire to do so but without having the ability), 
they aspire for upward social mobility through the display of wealth and the 




economic needs in the context of scarcity. Being able to provide for their families and 
having the capacity to distribute wealth amongst other community members enhances 
their social status as well as their respectability in society as I shall show in the next 
chapter. Chanter’s consumption practices enable them to objectify and redefine both 
their self-perceived and other-perceived social position and also their desire for social 
mobility. Like the fashionable sapeurs, chanters, through their consumption patterns, 




Figure 24: Inside the GAMTEL Cybercafé. 
 
Figure 25: Young people busy 






5.3 “You have to be a good liar to become a good chanter”: Chanters 
and the Tactics of their Trade 
5.3.1 The Chanters 
The chanters whose portraits account for this ethnographic chapter do not constitute a 
homogenous group in terms of the specific activities they engage in, their experiences 
and their professional backgrounds. For example, and in addition to Dem who we have 
already met in the introductory vignette, we have Bigger who is an enigmatic, medium 
height, well-built and very dark in complexion young man. A loner who hardly 
interacts with other chanters, he has a reputation of coming up with smart tactics to 
make money from toubabs. Everything I know about him is through his few 
acquaintances as he turned down every request for an interview.  
Mr Fatty43 is a 27 year old primary school teacher. Skinny and tall, he is the first son 
of a polygamous family of eight. His father is a retired janitor and his mother is a house 
wife.  
My dad is not working so I am the breadwinner. I survive with 
my salary which is not enough and so I have to chant to 
complement my salary. I started chanting when I was looking 
for universities on the Internet. During these visits, I saw 
others looking for toubab friends on the Internet. I later saw 
that these were making more progress and so I diverted to also 
look for toubab friends. I started an operation I called operation 
find a toubab.  
Being the eldest son, the responsibility lies on him to support his parents and younger 
siblings. These responsibilities prevent Fatty from getting married and having his own 
family. Hence, he is caught up in what Honwana (2012) refers to as ‘waithood’.  
Like many government employees, Mr. Fatty has seen the real value of his salary fall 
over the years and has thus struggled to fulfil his obligations. This is why he decided 
to start looking for universities abroad in search of better prospects. It was during these 
visits to the cybercafés that he was introduced to chanting. His experience resonates 
with that of many would-be chanters, who first went to cybercafés for a variety of 
                                                 




reasons, including simply playing games or watching music videos. Initially, Fatty 
only chanted during weekends but as his number of contacts grew, he started chanting 
every day after work. Most days he first goes to GAMTEL until 9pm, when it shuts, 
and then proceeds to the AON for the rest of the evening. 
Mighty Dre has just turned twenty one years old, and has been hustling since he was 
nineteen. A school dropout, he calls himself a ‘full time chanter’. Popular among his 
peers for his ability to easily get women to fall in love with him due to his handsome 
looks and charming personality, he has made a lot of money through chanting. Dre, as 
he is fondly called, drives a nice BMW and has built a house for his parents in the 
suburbs of Brikama. He however spends his money living an ostentatious lifestyle with 
a penchant for girls and partying. Dre told me that he is aware Gambian girls follow 
him for his money and not because they love him as they do not even care how he gets 
his money. Encouraged into chanting by his friends two years ago, he told me: 
I started chanting at GAMTEL. My friend whose toubab 
contact was sending him a lot of money convinced me to get 
into it. I also saw my mates taking care of themselves and their 
families so I decided to chant and try my luck. I have been 
chanting for two years. I normally target old women of 50 and 
over. I have a white old lady friend I called mama. She is from 
Sweden. She is 52. I have another real contact in Germany who 
helps me a lot.  
Kaddy is one of only a few female chanters in Brikama. She is eighteen years old and 
has never been to school. From a very poor family, her mother sells fruit and vegetables 
at the Brikama market. I got to know Kaddy at the AON where she normally goes to 
communicate with John her American boyfriend. Her mother, a middle-aged lady with 
a fair complexion, usually accompanies her to the cybercafés when she is not selling 
at the market. She normally sits behind Kaddy while she has Skype conversations with 
John.  
Buba is a lean, baby-faced young boy. He is eighteen years of age. He is usually 
modestly but neatly dressed. His enthusiastic smiles conceal a sadness caused by his 
very poor background. He started coming to GAMTEL three years ago after dropping 
out of school. He told me that he started chanting to look for sponsors who would pay 




his first contact and was struggling to get money to browse. It was my second day at 
GAMTEL and I was occupying one of the PCs when he suddenly came over to me and 
greeted me in a nice way. He then told me that he wanted to browse but had no money 
and wanted me to give him my remaining time if I did not need it. He said he needed 
to talk to his friend on Skype. I then offered him my remaining minutes. He sat down 
and logged into his Facebook account. He called me over and showed me the picture 
and profile of his friend together with their conversations. He must have been in his 
50s and was bare chested. 
5.3.2 ‘Friends and Real Contacts’: The Accumulation of Friends  
To fully appreciate the intricacies of a chanter’s money making tactics, we first need 
to explore how they are introduced to chanting, by whom, the techniques they are 
taught and how they initiate contact with toubabs. Calhoun’s (1992) assertion that 
male hustlers are introduced to street prostitution through “peer introduction” and/or 
“situational discovery” is consistent with my findings on Gambian youths’ 
introduction to chanting. The majority of my interlocutors confirmed that they were 
introduced to chanting through their association with a friend and/or family member 
who is already an established chanter. A few indicated that they learnt about chanting 
by chance. Mighty Dre and Mr. Fatty, for example, illustrate these situations. They 
started going to cybercafés for other purposes such as searching for universities 
abroad. 
The first thing chanters are taught by those who introduce them to chanting is the basic 
use of a PC. This includes the ability to use the keyboard, the mouse and to open email 
and social networking accounts. The would-be chanter is also given instructions on 
how to send friendship requests and tips to ensure that the potential friends are genuine. 
The chanter is also briefed on the general rules of engagement with the toubab. Would-
be chanters are also exposed to some general tactics they can employ to make money, 
although these are improvised as the chanter becomes familiar with the trade. Once 
these skills have been mastered, the chanter is left on his own to create Hotmail, Yahoo 




Accounts are created on all the above sites using different usernames and passwords. 
The email accounts are then used to sign up and open accounts on social networking 
sites. The principal sites used are Facebook, Tagged, Moco Space, Gay Romeo and 
Bull Chat. The first three are general social networking sites, while the latter two are 
exclusively gay social networking sites where gay and bisexual men meet to network, 
send instant messages and date. Some chanters only create accounts on gay networking 
sites, while others restrict themselves to other sites like Facebook. A few make use of 
a combination of both.  
Discussing the accounts he has and how he uses them, Mr. Fatty explains: 
I have accounts on Moco Space, Facebook and Tagged. But 
my favourite sites are Moco and Facebook. I open my account 
and upload my nicest photos and write nice things on my 
profile. I include information such as my age, occupation, 
education and hobbies. I then send requests to add friends.  
He told me that he prefers Moco Space because it has a game component and that 
mostly mature professionals use it and it is easier to relate to them. In tandem with 
having multiple accounts, chanters make use of multiple ghost profiles. This enables 
them to expand their chances of accumulating as many friends as possible and also to 
separate their normal life from their chanting life. For example, chanters open three to 
four Facebook accounts with different names and profiles which are used for different 
purposes and audiences. Their genuine profiles are used to connect with Gambian 
friends and family (mostly abroad), while the ghost profiles are used to search for 
toubab contacts. 
Chanters’ aims, objectives and world view determine which social networking site 
they join. For example, those seeking to make quick money join gay networking sites 
as the general perception among chanters is that it is not only easier to establish 
relationships on these sites, but also easier to make money. Despite this general 
perception, a few chanters claim that they would never open accounts on these sites 
out of the conviction that dealing with gay people violates their religious beliefs. For 




as he does not like to deal with men and considers “gay money” as haram44: “I never 
add men as a principle because most are gay. Those who make quick money are those 
that deal with batimen”.45 
Fatty and others who share his views told me that only chanters who want to make 
money from the “batimen” have accounts on gay networking sites. They argue that 
they are Muslims and their religion prohibits them from ‘eating’ the money of a 
‘homosexual’. Therefore, Fatty narrated to me that he became incensed when a male 
friend on Facebook made comments like “gorgeous” and “sexy” on his photo. He 
interpreted this as an insult to his manhood and personality. He blocked the friend. 
The issue of making money through gay networking sites can be contentious and is a 
source of stigma amongst chanters. As such, those who use these sites do not openly 
acknowledge this, as guys can be taunted for dealing with gay men. I once witnessed 
a quarrel between two chanters and heard one saying to the other: “You cannot impress 
me with your gay money”. That is why Buba never refers to his online male contacts 
as his partners but only as friends. He would also conceal the fact that he has accounts 
on Gay Romeo and Bull Chat.  
Regardless of which social networking site is used and the type of relationship sought, 
chanters then proceed to send friendship requests. This is not done at random as some 
certain factors influence a chanter’s choice of request to get successful outcomes. 
Firstly, chanters start by viewing the profiles of people on the networking site and send 
requests to those who are single or to those they share the same “likes” with. Generally, 
chanters carefully target “older and fat white women” as they consider these people to 
be the most plausible prospects to establish relationships with. As such, Fatty told me 
that his preference is “old ugly women” who he can “sweet talk by giving them 
confidence”. Guys who look for online relationships with men have no particular 
preferences. They mostly seek single men, both young and old, who state on their 
profiles that they are looking for relationships. It should, however, be noted that in 
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some very rare cases toubabs also send friendship requests to chanters. This is 
particularly common with gay men looking for online relationships. 
Once a potential contact accepts a friendship request, the chanters then start 
communicating with that person through the social networking site’s chat room. These 
communications take the form of basic and/or general information sharing such as 
location, occupation, weather, and life in general. After a few chats, the chanter then 
urges the friend to share his or her Skype details. Insistence by chanters to 
communicate through Skype serves a few purposes. Firstly, talking to someone they 
can see through the webcam not only ensures the authenticity of the person they are in 
touch with, but also enhances flirtation and intimacy in the communication. Chanters 
cut all communication with those who refuse to share Skype details after a few 
unsuccessful attempts to convince them to do so. 
Secondly, ‘face-to-face’ conversations have benefits for chanters who lack a high level 
of written English. They normally rely on verbal communications and do not have to 
ask others for help with reading and writing messages. Moreover, face-to-face 
conversations eventually take the relationship to another level. From then on, chanters 
consider the toubab now ‘belongs’ to them. During this stage of the relationship, the 
communication becomes more intense and takes place on a daily basis. Chanters are 
normally careful at this stage not to rush things and scare away the toubab, as to make 
money, it is crucial that the relationship is taken to the next level. The final level is 
where chanters resort to various tactics to make money from the toubab. 
A cardinal rule of chanting is to avoid begging or soliciting help from the toubab 
contact in the early stages of the relationship. Instead, chanters invest their money by 
buying and sending African art and crafts as presents to the toubab in the initial stages 
of the relationship. The toubab reciprocates this gesture by sending shoes and other 
items to the chanter. Facilitating this exchange is the local post office where chanters 
can be found queuing outside on Thursday afternoons when the mail arrives to receive 
the parcels posted to them.  
Communicating with toubab partners online who cannot speak English can be 




languages, chanters only speak English, and for some their English is not that good. 
Chanters use tools such as Google Translate to communicate with non-English 
speakers. For example, when a chanter wants to send a message in Dutch, he first 
writes it in English and then translates it into Dutch using Google translate. He then 
copies and pastes the translated version into the chat box. The reverse is done when he 
receives a message. Chanters find this service very useful as it helps to break down the 
language communication barrier between them and their online partners. 
5.3.3 ‘Lovers and Deceptors’: The Accumulation of Wealth 
Chanters resort to various strategies to make money from the toubabs they meet online. 
These strategies can be broadly categorised into the “love method” and the “deception 
method”. These two methods are not mutually exclusive and chanters use a 
combination of both.  
The Love Method 
By far the most common, this entails establishing multiple relationships with several 
toubab men and/or women and claiming to be in a serious relationship with them. Once 
a relationship is established and the chanter senses some emotional attachment, he then 
gradually starts demanding money and soliciting other forms of help from the toubab. 
Chanters are also sent monthly allowances from their toubab contacts/lovers.  
Mighty Dre is renowned in GAMTEL for using the love method. He has a string of 
women that he is in relationships with. He told me that he does not demand large sums 
of money so he does not scare the toubabs away. He often asks for as little as £20 from 
each one of them for his monthly upkeep. Using this strategy, Mighty Dre sometimes 
makes as much as £120 a month if six women send him £20. This is a lot of money 
when changed into Gambian currency and far exceeds the monthly salary of a 
lawmaker. Mighty Dre also demands extra money to pay for social events like Tobaski. 
One afternoon, a few days before Tobaski, Mighty Dre invited me over to his PC. He 
was simultaneously chatting with no fewer than six women on both TAGGED and 
Facebook as shown by his screen. Appearing in one of the Facebook chat windows 




“Chastity G in Allentown P” appeared at the top of the chat window and below the 
conversation read as follows: “I am here sweetie. How are you doing?” Dre replied 
“Am cool love, just missing ya”. The ladies in the other chat windows were “Shirlene”, 
also roughly the same age in Asheville, “Cathy O”, slightly older, say about 50 in 
Cheyenne, WY and “Tammy S” in Topke, KS. All the conversations revolved around 
love and missing each other and how they wished to be near each other. The message 
that, however, drew my attention was the one from “Jane”, one of Dre’s lovers, which 
read:  
“32 Euros sent through W Union. The answer is Facebook. Please no more money 
talk if we shall remain friends on Facebook. The purpose is not economic as I see it. I 
hope your Tobaski will be good”. 
Dre interacted with all these women, shifting from one chat window to another and 
replying to their messages without getting distracted or raising any suspicion from the 
women. Dre told me that this is what he does for a living and that in a good month and 
depending on how many women he is in contact with, he can make around D25,000 
(around £350) a month.  Dre’s engagement with the toubab women he meets on online 
somewhat correspond to the activities of the ‘players’ in the tourist resorts of the 
Dominican Republic who use their relationships with female tourists to their 
advantage, ‘performing’ at being in love in the hope of being able to leave the island 
(Brennan,2004: 202). 
Female chanters also use the ‘love method’ to make money from their online male 
partners who occasionally send them money to pay for education and basic 
subsistence. Kaddy, for example, applies this method to John, her ‘sugar daddy’ she 
met on Tagged. Kaddy told me that John is a wealthy movie star in Hollywood. 
Whether this is true or not, the idea that Kaddy is dating a movie star in the US was a 
cause for hope for a brighter future for Kaddy and her family. John has promised to 
marry Kaddy and to take her to the US. In the meantime, the man is sponsoring Kaddy 
and her family, as she told me: 
I am very happy and lucky as well. He is the first man I added 
when I opened an account on Tagged and now we will get 




do not accept requests from other people. I do not want to spoil 
my chances. He has been kind to me. He is rich and he sends 
me money all the time. He loves me a lot. 
Unlike the male chanters, Kaddy does not have multiple relationships. She told me that 
she has not sent any more requests to other men since she met her John and does not 
accept requests from other men. The reason for this is that she does not want to spoil 
her chances. It seems that Kaddy is content and grateful with what John is doing for 
her and her family. Among the female chanters I had conversations with, Kaddy is the 
only one exhibiting this level of loyalty, suggesting perhaps that she is not chanting 
for short-term financial returns but a long term relationship based on ‘companionate 
love’ and marriage. In their quest for short term financial gains, chanters who use the 
love method use the discourse of love and marriage to convince the toubabs they meet 
online into believing that they are in a genuine relationship. 
Studies of marriage in contexts similar to the Gambia46 have underscored the 
importance of marriage as a long-term project that balances reciprocal fulfilment for 
the partners with communal objectives of strengthening kinship ties and meeting 
religious expectations. In the context of post-neoliberal reforms, however, economic 
challenges and a growing gap between expectations and opportunities, particularly for 
young urban Gambians, are undermining this balance of motives. As many young 
Gambians struggle to fulfil socio-cultural obligations in a context of ‘involuntary 
immobility’, my young interlocutors are turning to establishing online relationships 
for financial and material profit. This alternative form of income generation, based on 
orchestrating online love relationships with foreigners, represent a shift away from the 
values of ‘companionate love’ and marriage that adhere to traditional understandings 
of love and marriage in a predominantly Muslim Gambian society.  
Chanter’s us of the ‘love method’ contradicts companionate love’s ‘prioritization of 
and greater personal investment in the marital bond over other relationships’ (Hirsch 
& Wardlow 2006: 4). Chanter’s use of the love method involves a sacrifice of both 
emotional closeness and sexual intimacy in favour of anticipated economic gain. 
Though recent anthropological literature proposes a global transition toward 
                                                 




companionate love and marriage, evidence from my encounters with chanters suggest 
that young urban Gambians are prioritizing short-term material gain over longer-term 
projects of social reproduction.  
In a similar vein, drawing from their ethnographic research on marital and non-marital 
relationships in Senegal to explore the varied and contradictory effects of late 
modernity and the neoliberal moment on marriage and social reproduction, Hannaford 
and Foley (2015) found evidence which suggests that desire for marriage grounded in 
intimacy and love is receding in the face of persistent economic challenges in urban 
Senegal. While marriage remains compulsory for Senegalese women, new 
socioeconomic challenges are motivating them to innovate and improvise within it. 
They claim that  ‘many Dakaroises are pursuing relationships with the hopes of 
securing immediate financial benefit, with waning regard for formerly central concerns 
with kinship ties, caste endogamy, emotional closeness, and social reproduction’ 
(ibid).  
In using the love method, chanters also demonstrate their ability to ‘perform love’ 
(Patico, 2010). As illustrated by Dre’s many ‘love’ relationships with toubab women, 
chanters relationships with their online partners is not based upon a relationship of 
mutual affection and intimacy between two partners. Patico (2010) underscores that 
the lines between “actual” and “fake” performances of love are often fuzzy. Hence, 
Brennan’s work on Dominican sex workers examines how they perform love in their 
encounters with their clients. Understanding love as something to be ‘performed’ and 
as entangled with strategic, economic activity for the workers who feign love in order 
to secure economic benefits (particularly in the form of visas), corresponds with the 
situation of chanters.  
A second variation of the love method involves looking for gay partners on either Bull 
Chat or Gay Romeo and establishing a relationship with them. Buba told me that this 
method is the most lucrative. Despite this, Buba revealed that most chanters never meet 
their online gay partners even though some express the desire to come and visit them. 
When this happens, the chanters scare the toubab by telling him that Gambian society 




Gambian president’s threats that any gay man who sets foot in the Gambia will be 
beheaded. 
Most of the communication takes place through Skype where nude photos are 
exchanged which eventually escalates into online sex. Before explaining to me how it 
works, Buba nervously looked around to check no-one else was listening: 
Gays have money and once you tell them you are gay, they 
send you money. You tell them you are gay but that you face 
a lot of stigma. Your family has abandoned you and you have 
no one to help you. They will feel sorry for you and start 
helping you.  
As evident in the above quote, chanters not only lie about their sexual orientation to 
their online partners, they also give them the impression that their choice to associate 
with them is making them experience harsh conditions from both their family and 
society in general. In other words, the chanter indirectly tells the toubab that he is 
being abandoned by his family because of the sacrifice he has made to be with him. 
This in itself is a strategy to make money as the gay partner will feel partly guilty for 
the chanter’s situation and so will send money to him. 
In an attempt to generate wealth by pretending to be homosexuals and sometimes 
engaging in online homosexual activities, young Gambian chanters face a particular 
challenge. Operating in a society where Islam is the predominant religion, a religion 
that rejects homosexuality and homosexual acts, the majority of chanters who identify 
themselves as Muslims face the challenge of reconciling their religiosity and sexuality.  
Hence, to earn a living in the context of scarcity, young chanters negotiate their 
everyday religion and sexuality. In Indonesia, Boellstorff (2005) has found that 
dominant social norms render being gay and being Muslim "ungrammatical" with each 
other, especially in the public sphere. In the Gambian, to some extent, same-sex sexual 
relations is a cultural and religious taboo and have recently become a political 
controversy through President Jammeh’s anti-gay rhetoric. Despite this, some chanters 
view homosexual relations as a strategy and as solution to poverty, unemployment and 




Some chanters are of the view that gays are wealthy. Hence, they present themselves 
as gay men living in a gay hostile society in an effort to not only benefit financially 
but also to position themselves in larger international networks. Among the youths in 
Accra, Burrell’s (2012:28) ethnography explores how the Internet promises young 
cybercafé users a route to ‘change the humdrum daily fight for livelihood, challenge 
claustrophobic cultural norms, construct cosmopolitan identities and seeking social 
and economic mobility’. For the chanters in this study, who find themselves in a state 
of ‘involuntary immobility’, this strategy provides them the opportunity to pursue 
mobility through non-migratory means.  
Looking for Men Online. 
One of the ways in which chanters make money from online gay partners is by 
engaging in online sex with them. I have on many occasions observed chanters having 
online sex with male partners in full cybercafés without drawing the attention of 
anyone else. The first time I encountered these scenes was at the AON, where upon 
entering, I saw the screen of PC 1 showing blurred images of an old naked man lying 
on a couch masturbating. The boy using the PC was around 19 years old. He was also 
pretending to be masturbating by holding his penis, although he had his clothes on. 
For chanters, sending a photo of their private parts or just pretending to be 
masturbating in front of a screen for a few minutes is an easy way to secure them a 
considerable amount of money. Dem confided that he sometimes engages in such 
activities. He tried to defend his actions by adding that his relationships with gay men 
are only virtual and never become physical. In fact, he described the toubabs who 
enjoy these online romances as ‘foolish’. Dem told me he finds it hard to understand 
the pleasure their online partners get from these encounters.  
The online sexual encounters for profit of young Muslim chanters like Dem and the 
young boy whose activity I mentioned above does not only challenge popular 
perceptions of sexuality in Africa, the Gambia in particular, but also reveals 
contradictions inherent in chanter’s masculine self-identity. Similar to the 
bodybuilders who sell sex to gay men in California (Klein, 1989), Chanters who 




behaviour with their heterosexual identity. It is ironic that chanters engage in online 
homosexual activities to generate the income they need to construct masculine 
identities based on fulfilling socio-cultural roles in context where such activities are 
condemned. Hence, chanters create a psychological framework that permits hustling 
while rejecting the possibility that they are gay. Reiss's (1971) study of street 
delinquents as hustlers and the norms they generate to separate themselves from 
homosexuals is particularly applicable here.  For chanters like Dem and Buba, 
remaining emotionally removed from the homosexual relationship by keeping it at the 
level of exchange, distinguishes them from the gay male who would do it for lust or 
love. 
Nonetheless, chanters like Dem capitalise on their partners’ desire to have an online 
romance with them to make extra income. They tell the partner that having an online 
romance at the cybercafé is not safe any longer and that for the romance to continue 
they need their own private laptop. Once the partner is willing to provide this, the 
chanter inflates the price of a new laptop but buys a second hand one upon receiving 
the money. Some will not even buy the laptop and will use the money for other 
purposes. Dem bought a laptop with the money his contact sent him but later sold it as 
it became too expensive for him to maintain. Internet data in the Gambia is expensive. 
Although Buba still comes to GAMTEL despite having been bought a laptop by one 
of his partners (because he enjoys the ambiance), his best friend, Sehu, stopped coming 
to GAMTEL when his contact sent him money to buy a laptop. He now mostly browses 
from home. He only usually comes to GAMTEL when he runs out of money to buy 
Internet data. He, however, uses his laptop in GAMTEL by connecting to the Wi-Fi.  
The Deception Method 
In addition to the love method, chanters also resort to using deceptive methods to make 
money from their toubab contacts. This method involves fabricating plight stories to 
get financial assistance from toubab contacts. To achieve the desired outcome, 
chanters fabricate stories which are backed up by supportive documents like receipts. 
These include telling lies about being sent away from school, to being involved in an 




The whole thing about the Internet is begging and deceit. We 
explain our conditions to the toubabs. We make life seem hard 
for them. We exaggerate our poor living conditions. We tell 
them we lost our parents and we have no one to take care of 
us. Through this they feel sorry for us and send us money.  
Dem added that: 
When they want to help us, we inflate the prices. We send false 
invoices and false school admission letters. But we have to be 
a smart liar to succeed in this. To be a smart liar is to have a 
good memory and to avoid lying all the time. 
Mr. Fatty has been less successful in using the love method. However, his success in 
using the deception method has gained him recognition and respect amongst his peers. 
Like Mr. Fatty, the chanters that employ the deception method are those who are 
reluctant to engage in online sexual activities as a source of income. Instead, they find 
various ways to make money from toubab contacts whose relationships with them are 
primarily based on friendship. For example, a few of Mr. Fatty’s contacts are families 
who regard him as a son. They occasionally send him money and pay for his education. 
Despite him being a teacher and not a student, he told the families that help him that 
he is a student. For instance, a Dutch family sends him D10, 000 (£150) every term to 
pay for his fees. As evidence that he has indeed paid the fees, Mr. Fatty prepares a 
forged receipt that he scans and sends to the family. With his access to school 
documents, he also forges the term reports that he sends. He also sometimes poses and 
takes photos in a school uniform that he sends together with the term reports.   
A variation of the deception method that is used by all chanters, regardless of the type 
of relationship they have with their contacts is called the “emergency trick”. All my 
interlocutors have told me that they have at one point used this trick, particularly when 
they urgently need money. The trick involves terminating all communication with 
toubab contacts for a couple of days. This, according to my interlocutors, will make 
the contact become worried about their welfare and they will be inclined to ask about 
their whereabouts once they resume communication again. Chanters use this 
opportunity to fabricate stories that will prompt the contact to offer financial 
assistance. Some of the stories I heard from my interlocutors include fabrications such 




medication or that a big storm has brought down their home leaving him and his 
siblings and parents homeless’. These stories are supported by forged medical bills, 
pictures of small children standing in front of a broken down house or a picture of an 
old woman lying in a hospital bed, which are scanned and sent to the contact. Chanters 
gain by inflating the cost of the medical bill or the cost of anything that the contact is 
ready to help them with. 
Although not all contacts send money to help, having many contacts and telling them 
the same story opens up opportunities for at least one or two to provide assistance. The 
story of Bigger that I briefly narrated in the introduction of this chapter provides a 
perfect scenario of how the emergency trick works. 
It was two days before Tobaski and GAMTEL was busy as usual as chanters need 
money to buy rams for their parents and new clothes to celebrate the event. Whilst 
sitting chatting with Rahman, the café manager on duty that morning, Bigger came in 
and asked to speak to him in private. They went outside and after a few minutes, 
Rahman came back and explained what Bigger wanted to do. Basically, Bigger had 
requested to use the small empty room situated in the corner of the cafe. Bigger said 
he needed money badly as Tobaski is fast approaching and things are hard. He said his 
toubab friend had sent him money a few weeks ago but he used that money for some 
other purpose and would not just want to demand more money.  
Bigger planned to tell his friend that he was involved in a motor accident and urgently 
needs lifesaving surgery. He wanted Rahman to allow him to use the small room as a 
makeshift hospital room. Ten minutes later, Bigger showed up with another man, a 
laptop and a small mattress which was to be the hospital bed. The man he came with 
was to act as the ‘doctor’. Bigger also came with a bandage and a small bottle 
containing red liquid that looked like blood. Once in the room, he tied the bandage to 
his head and a small amount of the liquid was poured on the bandage to make it appear 
that he was wounded on the head.  
Once the laptop was connected and the web cam fixed onto it, Bigger lay down on the 
mattress. The Skype call was made and his friend (Hendriks) picked up. After 




pretending to be too weak to speak narrated that he was involved in a motor accident 
and that he could not talk but the ‘doctor’ would explain. The ‘doctor’ then took over 
and explained the situation to Hendriks and told him that his friend needed urgent 
surgery if he is to survive from the injuries sustained from the accident but that the 
clinic’s policy dictates that the money needs to be paid up front which is about 15,000 
dalasis (around 300 euros). Hendriks pleaded with the ‘doctor’ to go ahead and do the 
surgery and said that he would send the money after work as he was at work but the 
doctor refused. He left work straight away and went to the nearest Western Union 
outlet to send the money. He promised he would call back in half an hour.  
After exactly 25 minutes, Hendriks came back online and gave Bigger the Money 
Transfer Control Number (MTCN) and the amount which was about three hundred 
euros. Bigger thanked him and told him he would keep him updated. As the Western 
Union office is just adjacent to GAMTEL, Bigger went straight there and collected the 
money. He came back and saw Rahman outside and then left with his mattress and the 
doctor. He had already removed the bandage from his head. But for the next few visits 
to GAMTEL, whilst talking to Hendriks he would have the bandage tied to his head. I 
am not sure how much he gave Rahman but I am sure he got something for his Tobaski.  
This is just one of Bigger’s many tactics that made him popular in GAMTEL. 
Although this method might be morally questionable to an outsider, the general 
perception among chanters is that it is okay as long as it is done to get money from the 
toubabs. As Rahman confirmed to me, “When you know how to lie to get the money 
from the toubabs, people respect you and you become popular as someone with a smart 
brain”. 
This incident reveals that, with a ‘smart brain’, little effort and some collaboration 
from café managers, chanters can make easy money. This is, of course, facilitated by 
ICT. Within just a few minutes, Bigger made three hundred euros. This is more than 
the monthly salary of a government minister in the Gambia. It also shows that chanters 
have the ability to evoke trust, sympathy and assurance from their contacts. The time 
I spent with chanters made me understand that to be a good chanter, one needs to 
possess certain qualities. Chanters are very assertive and they never give up. They have 




the many contacts they have and the patience with which they give them the attention 
they need is just incredible.  
Nonetheless, in employing the love and deceptions methods, young chanters’ everyday 
lives are not only presented as a site of economic creativity, but also of religious 
transgression. A line of studies have sought to inquire how young Muslims try to solve 
the problem of living piously in a society dominated by materialist tendencies and 
secular rationality. Being young Muslims, hustling forces some of my interlocutors to 
contradict or evade strict religious principles and moral norms. Although a few 
chanters interrupt their hustling activities to perform, salaat (daily prayers), sometimes 
practiced in the makeshift mosque inside GAMTEL or a nearby Mosque, the majority 
of chanters ignore the call to salaat and would miss Jum’ua (Friday prayers) so as not 
to miss their online appointments. Even though the majority of the hustlers perceive 
religion, Islam in particular, as an integral part of their cultural identity, acts of worship 
as prescribed by Islam, such as the five daily prayers and fasting during Ramadan are 
either practiced irregularly or postponed until the latter stages of their lives.  
The experiences and daily practices of young Muslims living in secular societies has 
been captured by anthropological works that focus on their everyday experiences of 
religion in the notion of ‘islam mondain’. This notion helps us to understand the variety 
of ways in which Muslims reflect upon religion and religiosity (Otayek and Soares, 
2007). For instance, Debevec (2012) writes on “moderate” Muslims in Burkina Faso 
who, although they recognize the importance of salaat for their religious practice, 
nonetheless postpone these salaat until a later stage of their lives. For the large 
majority of chanters, being Muslim is not about engaging in pious acts (daily prayers, 
fasting, and so on) so much as it is an expression of their religiosity. In discussing what 
it is like to be both young and Muslim in rural Niger, Masquelier (1996), finds it useful 
to distinguish religious identity (a sense of belonging to a religious community) from 
religiosity (the performance of religious acts) as the two do not necessarily go hand in 
hand. Some people perceive religion to be an integral part of their cultural identity 
even though they do not regularly engage in acts of religiosity. For others, conversely, 




Moreover, Chanter’s engagement in online homosexual activities to make money 
raises some fundamental moral questions. For instance, how do young Muslim hustlers 
reconcile their online homosexual activities with their religious beliefs? For the 
majority of my interlocutors, who practice Islam in a secular context, religion is more 
a matter of negotiation ‘than some immutable normative codes’ (Bayat and Herrera, 
2010: 18). These youths strive to perceive and interpret their Islam in ways that can 
accommodate their marginal socio-economic situations. By engaging in online 
homosexual encounters, the young generate a youthful Islam that is more plural, open, 
ambiguous, and seemingly contradictory.  
Young hustlers’ negotiation of everyday Islam is also demonstrated in their refusal to 
get married and build a family as sanctioned by Islam. It was striking that, unlike the 
majority of Tablighi youths in the Gambia who featured in Janson’s (2014) study, none 
of my principal interlocutors mentioned getting married and building their own 
families as part of their aspirations. The young Gambian Tablighis that Janson 
encountered considered early marriage as a ‘divine contract with God that should be 
entered into as early as possible to prevent the dangers of having pre-marital sex’ 
(Janson, 2014: 16). However, it should be noted that the young chanters in this study 
and the Tablighi youth featured in Janson’s study live parallel lives. The former group 
engage in activities for worldly material rewards and the latter striving for divine 
rewards in the hereafter.  
I suggest that, for the majority of my interlocutors, marriage constitute part of their 
long-term strategies, hence a postponement of their Islamic duties. The hustlers told 
me that marriage and family has to wait as supporting their parents’ takes precedence. 
Besides, the majority claim that having a family will not only give them an increased 
burden but will also restrict their freedom. Moreover, circumstances of dwindling 
economic opportunities and ever-escalating inflation caused by the effects of neo-
liberal economics has forced the majority of my male interlocutors to ‘postpone’ or 
altogether ‘avoid’ getting married. Masquelier (2005) observed a similar situation 
among the young Mawri men in Niger.  
This is quite understandable as, in contemporary Gambia, getting married remains a 




conspicuous displays of wealth due to the spiralling bride wealth inflation to untenable 
levels and the high expectations from in laws for the groom to offer a generous maay 
bu njekk (first gift) (Buggenhagen, 2012). However, my female interlocutors 
considered getting married early (in the early 20s) and having children as an important 
aspect of their lives. My female interlocutors expressed this view by using a popular 
Wolof saying, ‘taaaru djigueen seey la’ (meaning the beauty of a woman lies in 
marriage). This supports Bledsoe’s (2002: 70) view that marriage, for Gambian 
women, is of major consequence. 
In a country where around 60 per cent of the population are young people under the 
age of twenty-four (Janson, 2014), Gambian hustlers are not the only religious actors 
whose immoral activities deviate from their Islamic beliefs. In fact, Islam is not the 
only way to lead a moral life in Gambian society. In her study on the Gambian Tablighi 
youths, Janson (2014) found that different groups of youth deploy different strategies 
in manoeuvring between being young and Muslim, and these strategies are not 
necessarily of a religious nature. This study contributes to a recent trend in social 
science scholarship that focuses on young Muslim’s daily lives (Marsden, 2005; 
Debenev, 2012) by attending to how young Gambian hustlers negotiate their 
youthfulness and Muslimness against the general backdrop of socio-economic 
constraints. 
5.4 “Who stole my toubab?” Interactions among Chanters 
In various types of hustling activities, including male street hustling or 419 scams, 
patterns of hustling exist to which participants respond and adhere to. These take the 
form of norms and etiquette that regulate behaviour and organisational structures to 
ensure stability. However, chanters in the Gambia operate within the context of non-
existent norms and social organisation. Very little collaboration exists amongst them 
and they do not work in networks. They sometimes exchange ideas and show each 
other new tactics or refer each other to new websites but they never conspire to make 
money from a toubab. The exchange of ideas mostly takes place outside the cybercafés 
(under the veranda of the AON or the neem tree of GAMTEL) where chanters hang 
around either to take a break, drink attaya or to wait for online appointments. The 




a chanter narrates how he eventually made money from a toubab who was initially 
reluctant to send any. He will describe the trick(s) he used.  
Rivalry and competition also defines the relationship between chanters. This revolves 
around who makes the most money and who has the best contacts. Chanters have a 
habit of boasting about how rich their toubab is and how they have more real contacts 
than anybody else. The wealth of their toubabs is displayed by the vehicles they drive 
and the amount of money they receive weekly from the Western Union. This display 
of wealth does not go down well with other chanters who would be envious of the 
chanter’s achievements. This engenders rivalry. 
Another related element that defines a chanter’s relationship is mistrust and suspicion. 
This was confirmed by Alkali who told me: “My customers don’t interact and are 
always suspicious of each other. They work individually and do not work in networks”. 
Chanters do not interact because they do not trust each other. This mistrust came about 
as a result of past experiences where chanters are involved in stealing each other’s 
online contacts. These occurrences have led to physical fights among chanters and in 
some cases end up at the police station.  
Contact stealing can be done in various ways and chanters known to have good 
contacts are targeted. One way is to pretend to be standing behind a chanter while he 
is online and memorise the name of one of his contacts. The chanter then sends a 
friendship request to the contact and once in touch, he will say bad things about the 
original chanter. As a result, chanters hate it when other chanters stand behind them. 
Contact stealing is also done by inspecting PCs where previous users did not sign out 
of their accounts because they forgot to do so or because the electricity went off in the 
middle of their browsing period. The contact thief will then change the password of 
the account so that the account holder is denied access. He will then open a new 
account and transfer all the contacts to the new account”. A café manager narrated an 
incident to me involving a regular chanter who came in to chat with his toubabs but 
soon realised that all his contacts had been deleted from his account. He then suddenly 




In other ways, stealing is done by a trusted interlocutor. Some chanters are not 
educated and so require the services of a “middle man” to communicate with their 
toubabs. These middlemen can either be the chanter’s friend or one of the boys who 
hang around in the cyber cafes purposely to render this service. Sometimes this service 
is provided by café managers. The “middlemen” offer their services as interlocutors 
between chanters and their contacts. After learning their passwords and everything 
about their contacts, the middlemen will then sneak into the account to steal the 
contacts or tell them bad stories about the chanter.  
Kaddy almost lost John to Clutch, a café manager who was acting as her middleman. 
As she has not been to school, she found it difficult to communicate with John and so 
had to rely on his services. Having access to her Facebook account, Clutch went behind 
Kaddy’s back and told the American that Kaddy had died a sudden death and that her 
family needed money for her funeral. To convince John, Clutch brought an old woman 
in front of the web cam and presented her as Kaddy’s grandmother. The man sent some 
money to Clutch for the supposed funeral which he pocketed. When Kaddy realised 
that Clutch was no longer willing to help her, she started going to the AON where 
Akali helped her access her Facebook account and she uncovered Clutch’s lies. She 
then changed her password and started communicating with the American again. 
Incidences of the above nature and how chanters react to them illustrates how the 
internet is perceived to be providing opportunities for chanters to access global wealth 
through the ‘ownership of a toubab’. Chanters perceive foreign connections to be 
‘enriching’, and so when Kaddy thought that she had lost John, she felt completely 
shattered thinking that her coveted place has been lost in the process.  
 
5.4.1 The Nightmare of Losing a Toubab  
Chanters can lose their toubabs as a result of their contacts being stolen. This situation 
can be very distressing for many chanters. However, chanters do not only lose toubabs 
through someone stealing their contacts. In most cases, they lose the toubab when they 




situations, the toubab suddenly stops communicating with a chanter when he or she 
meets someone else. When this happens, toubabs terminate all contact with them. 
David, my research assistant, and Dem are two of my interlocutors who are yet to 
recover from the trauma of losing their toubabs. Dem started chanting in 2009, and he 
got a good toubab contact who was not only paying for his education but also sent him 
money to survive. He met him at Gay Romeo and they became “friends”. After 18 
months, he lost this toubab contact when a friend who had access to his emails went 
behind his back and requested 75 euros from his toubab. The friend told the toubab 
that Dem had fallen ill and had been admitted to hospital and that they needed money 
to pay for his bills. Because he had sent Dem 13000 dalasis (£200) a week before that 
without any knowledge of the friend, the toubab became angry and ceased all 
communication with Dem. Though he did not delete Dem from his contact list, he 
would not reply to either his emails or online conversations.   
Dem fell into a state of limbo and depression as losing his contact created an uncertain 
future for him as he was not only sponsoring his lifestyle, but also paying for his 
education. Dem wrote 25 emails to the toubab begging and pleading with him to tell 
him what he had done but the toubab never replied. Dem was furious when he found 
out what his friend did (he was told by another friend who knew about it) and nearly 
got into a physical fight with him. Although they are no longer friends, Dem is hopeful 
that the relationship with the toubab will be restored one day.  
I asked Dem how felt when he realised he had lost his toubab: 
I felt depressed and confused. I thought my whole life was 
destroyed. The man did everything for me and was sending me 
money at least every month. I used the money to help my 
grandmother, to pay her medical bills, to buy rice and other 
basic commodities for the house. Since I lost him, I have been 
struggling to do these things as I still can’t find a good contact 
like him. 
As for David, he lost his toubab when his lies were exposed. He was very young, about 
16 years old, when he started beach hustling and was lucky to meet a Dutch family. 
The family sympathised with his situation and promised to take care of him and 




a holiday house for them in the Gambia. However, David misappropriated these funds 
on bad investments, girls and other family members. He bought two cars, lived the 
high life and spent the money frivolously. David summed up his life during this period: 
I thought I was never going to be poor. I ate meat whenever I 
wanted to. I had accounts that were replenished every month. 
I had easy access to money. I was helping my mum and 
sponsoring the schooling of my siblings. I was also good to 
other people and helped many people. I also used most of the 
money to party. I knew they were going to come one day but I 
thought that I would make enough money from my other 
investments to be able to buy land and build on it before they 
came. I was using this money irresponsibly and this to some 
extent affected my school. No one advised me as all they 
wanted was my money. 
When the family eventually visited and realised that David had not built any house but 
instead misused the funds, they ceased all communication with him on their return. 
David became frustrated and almost went insane. He started abusing drugs, blaming 
his misfortune on the wider society, believing that some people had taken him to the 
marabouts to destroy him. With hindsight, David believes that the help provided by 
toubabs does more harm than good. He considers himself a victim of the toubabs’ 
generosity by declaring that “this kind of help is destructive”. 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, I have documented the hustling strategies of a group of youths who call 
themselves chanters. Drawing on their accounts, I have shown how young 
marginalised Gambians who find themselves in a state of ‘involuntary immobility’ 
make use of accumulative opportunities provided by the Internet to achieve socio-
economic advancement. The chapter specifically described the strategies employed by 
chanters to make money from their unsuspecting online partners, mostly toubabs. By 
resorting to a variety of strategies, chanters are able to accumulate the wealth they need 
to fulfil their family obligations and also to ensure future financial security. Although 
some of the strategies can be morally questionable, chanters justify their hustling 




The accounts of the chanters in this chapter underlined the importance of a unique kind 
of income generating strategy for which opportunities have flourished in the wake of 
the proliferation of ICTs in developing countries. To secure economic advancement, 
young Gambians, mostly men, cultivation of relationships with foreigners is perceived 
as highly desirable. As they struggle to make something of themselves, some young 
men end up breaking religious and moral rules to ensure economic survival. 
We can see clear similarities in the way beach hustlers in the previous chapter and 
chanters’ use of toubab contacts provides them with income earning opportunities. In 
relying on the generosity of and assistance from toubabs, they portray an image of 
poverty and social exclusion and how these are used as a way of appealing for help 
from their toubab contacts. Chanters’ strategy of acquainting themselves with the 
interests of their potential candidates before sending them a friendship request 
corresponds to beach hustlers’ strategies of ‘aligning’ the toubabs. It provides a 
platform for easy conversations and makes it easier for chanters to know what the 














Hustlers’ Aspirations and how they are Shaped 
6.1 Introduction 
In the introductory chapter of this study, I argued that the Gambian youths who find 
themselves in a state of ‘involuntary immobility’, such as the majority of my 
interlocutors, pursue local livelihoods to generate the income they need to achieve their 
aspirations of social and economic advancement. Drawing on the life stories and 
hustling activities of ‘beach hustlers’ and ‘chanters’, I have described how a group of 
young Gambians take advantage of the resources and opportunities available to them. 
By employing a variety of strategies, they make money from their interactions with 
toubabs in the tourism industry and through Internet mediated encounters to achieve 
their aspirations. In this chapter, I move away from describing the hustling strategies 
of beach hustlers and chanters. I will now attempt to describe in as much detail and 
depth as possible the aspirations of the hustlers in this study and the forces that shape 
and influence these aspirations, and to analyse how their hustling activities provides 
them the opportunities to fulfil their aspirations.  
The primary aspiration of beach hustlers and chanters is to achieve social and 
economic advancement. This aspiration is shaped and influenced by socio-cultural and 
family dynamics such as gender, generation, reciprocity and the attainment of social 
status. In the Gambia, this involves expectations of breadwinner responsibilities such 
as providing financial and material support for parents, children, siblings, the extended 
family and the community in which one resides and the quest for economic stability 
and a self-owned compound. In addition, access to consumer goods such as designer 
clothes, cars and ICT gadgets like mobile phones is also a sign of upward social 
mobility.  
In this chapter, I interconnect the trajectories of beach hustlers and chanters in terms 
of their aspirations and how they are shaped. I start with an analysis of the socio-
cultural and family dynamics in the Gambia and how they influence and shape the 




study and provide examples of how these aspirations are achieved based on forms of 
livelihood not based on international migration.      
6.2. Generation, Reciprocity and Status: Shaping Hustlers’ 
Aspirations 
Inter-generational relations, reciprocal social exchange and upward social mobility are 
perhaps the most potent theoretical constructs that can help us to understand the ways 
through which socio-cultural and family dynamics shape the aspirations of beach 
hustlers and chanters. The beach hustlers and chanters of this study expressed their 
aspirations of social and economic advancement in terms of fulfilling the expectations 
of intergenerational relations and reciprocal social exchange. Although the majority 
claim that the aspirations of fulfilling these are born out of cultural and religious values 
and moral obligations, a few cited affection as the primary influence.  
For instance, Stanley Man’s conversations with me were always punctuated with talk 
of using part of his earnings from the taxi business to make sure that his mother lives 
as comfortable as possible. As such, he has set her a fixed monthly allowance in 
addition to sending her money occasionally when the need arises. For instance, when 
she gets ill, Stanley takes a break from his business and takes her to a private clinic, 
buys all her medication and provides her with dietary necessities. Although Stanley 
expressed support for his mother as fulfilling a moral and religious obligation, he cited 
his strong affection for his mother as the principal driving force. Whenever our 
conversations touched upon the issue of his relationship with his mother and the 
support he provides for her, he reminisced how she struggled to raise him and his 
siblings in a difficult polygamous context where his father had to deprive them of basic 
necessities to provide for his other children. His mother had to use her meagre earnings 
from the sale of her horticultural produce to make sure that her children were well fed. 
Stanley Man has resolved to pay back this debt. 
But like all other forms of social exchange, reciprocity between parents and their 
children is not simply based on pure affection or religious values. It also involves 
matters of interest and expectation (Jonsson, 2012). In the Gambia, I observed that 




affection children have for their parents or vice versa. It is also an expectation that 
must be fulfilled. Children who fail to fulfil this expectation are not given the regard 
they deserve in their family and society in general. The case of David illustrates the 
extent to which reciprocal social exchanges have become based on interest in some 
Gambian families. Despite his young age, his status within his family was elevated 
when he was receiving huge sums of money from his toubab friends that he was 
sharing with his family members and others in society. However, when the funds dried 
up, he felt that the affection he received both from his family members and the wider 
society ended:  
If you don’t have money, even your own mother does not love 
you. Money elevates one’s social status and gives you a special 
place in society. When I was having money, I became big (sic). 
My status was elevated within the family. I was consulted for 
all the decisions even though I was the youngest in the family. 
My sisters washed my clothes by offering to do it. People start 
offering me their services. I was welcomed to social gatherings 
and wherever I went people showed me love and showered me 
with praises. But all this stopped when my money got finished. 
Family members started talking about my downfall and started 
blaming me. The people I was helping in society started 
avoiding me.  
From David’s experience, we learn that giving money was part of the relations that 
ensured not an intimate tie to one’s family members but respect from siblings and 
society at large. Affection in some Gambian families, in this sense, reminds us of 
Carsten’s (1995) description of the Malays in Pulau Langkawi where kinship is not 
considered a fixed position, but is a constant process of being determined by the kinds 
of exchange relations that exist between family members and others in the community.  
Barako 
In addition to the aspirations of beach hustlers and chanters being shaped by the 
dynamics of generational relations and reciprocal social exchange both within the 
family and the society at large, almost all of my interlocutors also recognised the 
importance attached to acquiring `barako, the Mandinka word for ‘blessing’, in their 
hustling aspirations. Although the concept of barako (or baraka, the adjective) is 




Islam (Von Denffer, 1976). However, barako is an important notion among Muslim 
populations in a number of African contexts, including the Gambia. 
Whilst barako is indeed a central concept in Muslim minds worldwide, its precise 
meaning, usage and source varies somewhat from one society to another depending on 
the history of the cultural context. Within these contexts, there is sometimes a shift of 
meaning from the primary meaning of blessing/empowering to mere power itself 
(Goerling, 2010) For example, in many West African animistic groups baraka is one 
of the terms for power rather than blessing. This power is charismatic power or the 
magnetic emanation of persons endowed with it (Cruise O’brien and Coulon, 1988). 
In most North and West African societies, baraka means blessing transferred from one 
person to another through descent, inheritance, sharing a meal with someone who 
holds baraka and through physical contact between the holder (mostly holy men) and 
the receiver of baraka, such as the marabout and his disciple (ibid).  
In exploring the concept of baraka, Gelner defines it as “plenitude”: “Above all it is 
blessedness manifested amongst other things in prosperity and the power to cause 
prosperity in others by supernatural means” (1970:43). In his study on ideas of success 
in Bornu, Nigeria, Cohen (1966) found baraka to be a sacred power that blesses its 
holder and allows him to bless others and succeed in life through supernatural means. 
In the African Islamic tradition, the concept of barako is considered to be a close 
equivalent to charisma (O’Brien and Coulon, 1988). The term has been translated to 
mean ‘benign force of divine origin, which bestows superabundance and prosperity 
and psychological happiness’ (Searcy, 2010).  
Within Gambian society in general, and among my interlocutors in particular, barako 
is an important component of social life and parents are considered to be its principal 
source47. In essence, Gambians believe that to accumulate wealth, secure already 
accumulated wealth or prosper in life, one must get barako from their parents. As Andy 
told me, “I go to the beach and hustle. When I have something, I take it back home 
and help my parents and family, so that I will have barako. This helps me to prosper 
                                                 
47 It is important to note that according to the Quran, GOD is the unique and direct source of all 
barako. Hence, the barako that children acquire from their parents originally comes from GOD 




on the beach and opens so many doors for me”. In addition to Andy, the majority of 
hustlers I spoke to also equate their success in whatever they are doing to be partly 
dependent on the barako they get from their parents. The importance of barako in 
Gambian society is also reported by Gaibazzi (2010: 146) in his study on young 
Soninke migrants in the Gambia who invest whatever money they make in their 
parents (both subsistence and other materials) with the hope that this will acquire them 
the barako to succeed in life.  
Barako as a source of success and prosperity is earned and, according to my 
interlocutors, it has to be deserved. Children acquire barako by providing material and 
financial support to their parents and making their old age as comfortable as possible. 
As such, acquiring barako is a matter of obedience and devotion to parents. Devotion 
is rewarded by supplicatory prayers or duwa and in general it flows from the state of 
satisfaction which the child is able to induce in his/her parent. The attachment of 
barako to an individual’s success or failure is so ingrained in Gambian society that 
idiomatic expressions such as baraka dingo or mo barakalingo and mo barakantango 
are used to describe successful and unsuccessful individuals respectively. Success here 
is measured in the amount of wealth or materials such as cars and compounds on 
display and the financial and material support provided for parents and others in 
society. In some cases, the loss of an individual’s wealth is also connected to his or her 
lack of barako. I found the acquisition of barako to be an influential motivation for 
the aspirations of beach hustlers and chanters. This aspiration is motivated by the 
desire to prosper and the avoidance of stigma. Children who are accused of not 
providing care for their parents are not only considered to lack barako but are publicly 
criticised and incur a loss of reputation within their families and communities. 
Although, in the Gambian context, barako is mostly associated with material 
connotations as in the idiomatic expressions used to describe those who have or lack 
barako, it should be noted that barako has spiritual dimensions as well. For instance, 
among the murids in Senegal, the barako or blessings that male and female disciples 
receive by offering cash to the big marabouts are thought to be spiritual and material 
at once for, through them, disciples gain access not merely to eternal prosperity but 




expressed the material dimensions and rewards of barako through material success, a 
few claimed that they also hope to secure a place in Janna (Heaven) by providing for 
their parents as prescribed by Islam.  
Upward Social Mobility 
In addition to generational relations, reciprocal social engagement and the acquisition 
of barako from parents, achieving enhanced social status and upward social mobility 
has an important, if less direct influence on the aspirations of hustlers. Because beach 
hustlers and chanters consider their social positions as marginal, they believe that their 
only chance of upward social mobility is to earn money to fulfil the expectations that 
will give them societal recognition and elevate their status. In Gambian society, the 
possession and display of wealth and modern consumer goods are important markers 
and determinants of enhanced social status. Previously, markers such as level of 
education and membership of a particular family lineage were among the determinants 
of social class. However, these have been largely eroded and social class in 
contemporary Gambian society is, to a large extent, now determined by factors such 
as wealth. It used to be that the elder siblings were consulted before key family 
decisions were made. That has now changed and the one who provides the money is 
given that respect and status.  
Most of my interlocutors, both young and old, pointed out that respect is bestowed 
primarily upon those who are successful, and the most convincing evidence of success 
is money. The issue of who is wealthy and who is not is quite problematic in Gambian 
society. Some people who display markers of wealth such as nice cars are not in fact 
always wealthy but just engage in activities to get by. In some cases, the Serahule 
ethnic group have a particular strong reputation of being wealthy individuals who 
avoid flaunting their wealth and just live as modestly as possible. Nonetheless, many 
young people from marginal backgrounds with limited or no education have been able 
to enhance their social status through international migration. These young people 
return home as semesters after hustling in Europe or the US for a few years. They drive 
nice cars and build houses in opulent and upper class neighbourhoods like Senegambia 




their ability to live and work in the West provides them with the opportunity to earn 
enough money to be able to live a middle class life in the Gambia.   
However, due to ‘involuntary immobility’, the majority of the hustlers in this study 
took advantage of the income earning possibilities available to them to enhance their 
social status. They take advantage of local opportunities to earn the income they need 
to acquire the markers of enhanced social status. These include providing types of 
support for parents and other family members that are visible to the rest of society, 
owning a compound and displaying modern consumer products like cars. Indeed, 
pursuing local livelihoods, as those described in the previous chapters has helped the 
majority of my interlocutors to achieve their aspirations of upward social mobility. 
Using the money they earn from their hustling activities, the majority of beach hustlers 
and chanters display their new found wealth by providing material support to their 
family, such as buying cars and other modern consumer goods like flat screen TVs for 
parents and other family members, buying them satellite disks so they can watch global 
TV channels, and helping other members of the community. In addition, some hustlers 
invest in profit making enterprises which are also considered to be markers of wealth 
and success and, hence, upward social mobility.  
For instance, Stanley Man told me that he was ‘nobody’ before he left his village of 
Busumbala to go and hustle in the industry. Nobody knew him and elders would pass 
by without even greeting him. However, once he had made it on the beach and started 
visiting his village with some toubabs and helping sponsor projects and using his own 
car to drive his family members on their diverse errands, he became popular and 
respected:  
When I didn’t have money here, I was nothing, nobody knew 
me, nobody cared about me, nobody respected me, nobody 
talked to me, nobody says hello to me. All of a sudden, because 
I have a car and come around with toubabs, they think I am 
rich. I have become big, and my status is elevated in the social 
hierarchy from being lower class to upper class.  
The aspiration of hustlers to enhance their status and to achieve upward social mobility 
is also expressed through the desire to acquire modern consumer goods which are 




consumer goods they need to achieve these aspirations. For example, the gifts that 
beach hustlers and chanters receive from toubabs range from gadgets like mobile 
phones and watches to designer clothes. These are markers of economic success and 
upward social mobility in Gambian society and so those who display them are 
considered to be economically successful.  
Similar to the lifestyle of the sapeurs in Congo-Paris MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-
Ganga’s (2000) hustlers aspire to construct individual reputation and status through 
the ostentatious display of designer clothes and gadgets. Hustlers ostentatiously 
display their material goods when visiting family and friends or attending social 
occasions. For example, although beach hustlers dress very poorly while hustling on 
the beach, they sport expensive designer clothes and brandish their mobile phones to 
demonstrate their success when they go back to their villages or towns. One Sunday 
afternoon, I coincidentally bumped into Andy in Brikama. He was neatly dressed 
sitting in a grand palace with his friends drinking attaya. He was not wearing his usual 
“uniform” and when I teased him about this the next time we met at Palma, he 
amusingly told me:  
As hustlers, we have to dress poorly so that the toubabs can 
feel sorry for us and give us stuff. But when we go to visit our 
parents and family, we have to dress nicely to show that we are 
successful. We take with us the clothes, mobile phones and 
other materials that we get from toubabs. This makes our 
friends envy and respect us.  
The above quote indicates that hustlers do not only hustle for short term survival but 
also to be considered successful. Success, in post-colonial Gambian milieu, is assumed 
to be read off by the possession of status markers and by the capacity to consume. 
Rowlands (1999) argues that success, evaluated according to such a set of ideals is 
motivated by the outcome of escaping from poverty. Moreover, Andy’s statement 
indicates that hustlers engage in what Veblem (1994) refers to as ‘conspicuous 
consumption’ in that their specific goal is to advance personal success and impress 
others thereby gaining their esteem and envy. Since success elicits envy and hence the 
danger of sorcery attacks (Rowlands, 1999), hustlers like Andy enlist the services of 




Although hustling has helped the majority of hustlers in this study to achieve upward 
social mobility, the case of chanters indicates that some of the activities they engage 
in to make money from toubabs risks tainting their reputation and jeopardises their 
projects of achieving upward social mobility. As I have shown earlier, one of the 
strategies that chanters employ to make money is to pretend to be gay and establish 
intimate relationships with gay men they meet online. Rumours of such activities have 
circulated in Brikama and many people consider the chanters to be making their money 
through these means. Homosexuality and homosexual acts are frowned upon in a town 
like Brikama. Hence, chanters and their activities are stigmatised. 
For instance, when I asked a school teacher about the GAMTEL boys, his first reaction 
was to associate them with ‘gay activities’. He also regretted the fact that most of them 
had dropped out of school and lamented their ‘bad attitude’. Despite making enough 
money and that they display this by helping people and living large, chanters’ 
aspirations of achieving social status can be a setback as the teacher’s perception that 
the GAMTEL boys are involved in gay activities is widespread in Brikama. Fanding, 
a grade twelve student, when asked for his opinion of the GAMTEL boys, told me that 
“they make a lot of money, I want to be like them but I don’t want to be gay”. Chanter’s 
seemingly miraculous accumulation of wealth attracted vociferous criticisms. 
The extent to which some of the activities of chanters are widespread in Brikama and 
the potential it could destroy their reputation was illustrated during my conversation 
with a group of parents who were all women. There was consensus among the women 
that, through chanting, some boys had lifted their families out of poverty. One woman 
said, “If you go to GAMTEL, you will find them there, that is where they live and 
work.” An older woman said her neighbours were renting until one of their children 
started going to GAMTEL where he met a friend who built them a house, bought them 
a car and took the parents to Mecca. Although they saw these acts as good, one of the 
younger women who had been quiet and attentively listening joined the conversation. 
She told me that whilst she appreciated what chanters are doing for their parents, she 
was apprehensive about the manner in which some of them make their money. She 
gave an account of a conversation she had heard between her younger brothers: “I was 




about GAMTEL. The younger one was telling the older brother about how a man had 
offered him money to show his private parts but that he had refused”. Although the 
women expressed their surprise and consternation with this revelation, they attempted 
to defend the chanters by claiming that trying to stop the activity would pose serious 
problems as most families depend on the money they get from their children who go 
to GAMTEL for their daily survival.  
6.3 Aspirations of hustlers 
In the previous section, I discussed the factors that shape the aspirations of beach 
hustlers and chanters. I draw on the accounts of key hustlers to provide an 
understanding of the aspirations of hustlers. Their accounts suggest an analytical 
categorisation of hustlers’ aspirations according to the following typology: providing 
financial support for subsistence purposes for parents and other family members, 
buying a compound and building a house, sending parents to perform the pilgrimage 
in Mecca, establishing businesses to ensure economic stability, providing help for the 
community and achieving upward social mobility. To this typology, we can add the 
aspirations of hustlers, chanters in particular, whose initial aspirations were based on 
acquiring educational qualifications to secure better paying jobs.   
At this stage, it is worth mentioning two things. Firstly, this typology reflects the 
narratives of my interlocutors and, therefore, does not imply that all young Gambians 
can be placed in these categories. Data gathered from other sources indicate that there 
exists a minority of young people whose aspirations are based on earning money to 
live a life of partying, drugs, women and alcohol in Senegambia and other popular 
places of amusement. However, this typology provides a schematic representation of 
the aspirations of the beach hustlers and chanters of this study. Secondly, although all 
my interlocutors consider providing subsistence support for parents and other family 
members as their principal aspiration, their earning capacity determines the priority 
given to each aspiration. In general, hustlers aspire to achieve all the aspirations 
included in this typology.  
As mentioned in the introduction to this study, the ability to migrate to the West and 




In a few rare cases, it was also connected to the ability to get a top civil servant or 
international organisation job. The increasing difficulties of international migration 
and the limited level of education and lack of skills of the youths in this study have 
seen them make use of informal opportunities to achieve their aspirations. The great 
majority of the hustlers in this study have managed to achieve some or all of their 
aspirations through either beach hustling or chanting. The majority of them expressed 
general satisfaction about their present situation. Dre, for instance, always boasts to 
me that he does not envy the semesters anymore as he has done whatever they do. This 
has engendered some competition between those who hustle at home and the 
semesters. David told me that “chanters make enough money and so they compete with 
the semesters. They copy their lifestyles and compete with them by driving nice cars 
with loud music, building big houses and showing off their wealth”. 
Hustlers’ ability to fulfil their aspirations by pursuing local livelihoods can be 
illustrated by drawing on the life stories and outlining the trajectories of chanters such 
as Mighty Dre, Biggar, Kaddy and Buba, and beach hustlers such as Andy and Stanley 
Man. All of these hustlers came from low socio-economic backgrounds with limited 
education and requisite skills that could get them good jobs. Their chances of migrating 
to the West to hustle are also restricted by their lack of finances and the proper network 
to secure a visa. Hence, to achieve their aspirations of social and economic 
advancement, they make full use of the income earning opportunities and possibilities 
available to them. 
Rice and Rams 
The majority of beach hustlers and chanters who took part in this study intimated that 
hustling has helped them to fulfil their aspirations of providing food, medical and other 
expenses for their parents and other family members, and contributing to social events. 
Dem, for instance, is one hustler who makes sure that he buys a bag of rice for his 
grandparents every month and pays for their medical bills and other expenses. 
Although his grandparents get help from other sources, for example their own children 
and other relatives, Dem claims that he feels it is his responsibility to do whatever he 




to help them. One day I hope to send them to Mecca”. Just like Dem, Fatty also told 
me that he makes sure he sends ‘chop money’ to his parents in Dobo every month.  
In addition to providing basic subsistence, hustlers also contribute to supporting their 
parents and other family members during social events like naming ceremonies, 
funerals and Muslim feasts like tobaski. This is particularly the case during Muslim 
feasts when people have to wear new clothes. Muslim feasts are normally expensive 
occasions as every family will want to celebrate in style. Western Union outlets and 
banks are full with people receiving remittance support from family members and 
friends during the days approaching these occasions. Beach hustling and chanting have 
become a source of income for my interlocutors to provide the financial support that 
parents and other family members need during these occasions. They buy the ram to 
be killed during tobaski, as prescribed by Islam, and the new clothes that family 
members wear to celebrate the day. Fatty told me that regardless of the circumstances, 
he must make sure that he buys the ram that his father will kill during tobaski.  
Although the price of rams has skyrocketed in the past few years, hustlers told me that 
they must do everything to buy a ram. Fatty told me that failure to provide a ram for 
his father will incur ‘shame’ and a general sense of ‘hopelessness and failure’ on his 
side. Thus, Fatty and other hustlers who find themselves in this situation make sure 
that they buy a ram during tobaski. It is no wonder that Bigger resorted to deceiving 
Hendriks to send him more money just before tobaski so that he could fulfil this 
obligation. Buying a ram for one’s parents and other family members is a measure of 
success in the Gambia and hustling provides this for many of my interlocutors. It is 
also considered by my interlocutors to be a performance that will give them barako 
through the duwa of their parents and other beneficiaries.   
In general, the norm in the Gambia has been that providing subsistence and a ram for 
the annual tobaski festivities is a masculine role that ‘marks the men from the boys in 
a typical Gambian family’ (Nyanzi and Bah, 2010). However, with gender roles 
changing, it is now socially acceptable, as is sometimes the case that female members 
of the family like daughters and wives contribute to the family and support other family 
members. A few of my older interlocutors told me that their adult daughters sometimes 




for the upkeep of her family through the money she receives from John, her American 
boyfriend. She provides all the support the family needs during social occasions and 
buys the annual ram. The fruit and vegetables that Kaddy’s mother sells in the market 
are not enough to provide for all the needs of the family. Although Kaddy has an elder 
brother who claims to be an oustaz (a Quranic teacher), his pay is poor. I learned from 
Kaddy that even her older brother sometimes depends on her earnings from John. 
Kaddy’s contribution to the family is indicative of trends in changing gender roles in 
Gambian society.  
The above situation, where young men rather than family heads are acting as 
breadwinners and young women buying the tobaski ram, suggest that post-neoliberal 
Gambian society is experiencing changes in gender and intergenerational relations. 
What we are seeing is an inversion of the respective positions of parents and children 
in family and household responsibilities, resulting in a decrease in traditional familial 
patriarchal norms. Janson (2014) provides evidence for the inversion of gender roles 
when she found a reconfiguration of gender norms amongst the Gambian Tablighi’s 
she studied as a result of new forms of piety. The inversion of gender and 
intergenerational roles inevitably led to ongoing negotiations among household 
members (Buggenhagen, 2012). For instance, as discussed in chapter three, young 
adults new roles as breadwinners of the household has put them in a stronger 
negotiating position as they have become independent from the authority of their 
elders.  
In addition, the majority of my female interlocutors with the financial capacity to 
provide for their households told me that they are experiencing a process of ‘liberation’ 
since they benefit from the relaxation of gender divisions and patriarchal control. This 
liberation comes in the form of having access to resources by taking part in economic 
activities thereby not being consigned to solely domestic responsibilities. Mbataru 
(2007) observed similar dynamics at play in Kenya’s post-coffee society where he 
reported a reversal of gender roles at the household and societal levels. According to 
Mbataru (2007: 101), “the post-coffee society is characterised, firstly, by new 




characterised by women increasingly taking over responsibilities hitherto labelled 
masculine threatening both male potency and morality”.  
Sending Parents to Mecca 
In addition to owning a compound, beach hustlers and chanters also aspire to send their 
parents to Mecca to perform the hajj. During the 1980s and 1990s, most parents who 
went on the pilgrimage were paid for by their sons and daughters living and hustling 
abroad. Although this still happens, young Gambians who find themselves in a state 
of ‘involuntary immobility’ and who aspire to achieve this goal make use of local 
opportunities for income generation. Performing the hajj is a very important religious 
rite of passage and constitutes one of the five pillars of Islam. It is also an important 
marker of success and prestige not only for the provider, but also for the beneficiary. 
The return of the parents from Mecca is celebrated with elaborate ceremonies that will 
be announced on the radio. Cows will be slaughtered to cater for guests. The child who 
sent the parents to Mecca is praised and honoured by both his elders and his 
contemporaries.  
Andy told me that since he was young, all he dreamt of was sending his mother to 
Mecca whenever he could afford it. After hustling on the beach for a couple of years, 
he gathered enough money by having a good season. He fulfilled this aspiration by 
paying for his mother to go on the pilgrimage two years ago. Andy told me that he 
believes one of the reasons for his success on the beach is because he sent his mum to 
Mecca. According to Cohen (1966:132), baraka can be obtained by anyone who goes 
on a pilgrimage to Mecca and presses himself against the Kaaba wall whose special 
sanctity can impregnate the pilgrim with baraka. Andy believes that his mum’s 
supplications for him at the Kaaba enhanced his success and brought him prosperity. 
By sending his mother to perform the hajj, Andy believes that he did not only get 
Barako, but also enhanced status among family members, neighbours and friends in 
Brikama. He is now consulted on family decisions, and elders will greet him with 
reverence when they meet him. He also observed that his fellow hustlers accorded him 





Owning a Compound 
The aspirations of beach hustlers and chanters go beyond providing basic subsistence 
to include buying a compound where they build a house for themselves and/or their 
parents.  Those who can afford it buy two compounds. For my interlocutors, owning a 
compound is a symbol of success and a marker of upward social mobility. Building a 
house for one’s parents is a way of acquiring barako. As such, a man who cannot do 
this is seen as someone who lacks barako. Therefore, a man’s status in society is 
mostly determined by whether he owns his own compound. This is so important that 
compound heads display their surnames on the gate of their compounds, for example 
in the way that reads “Turay Kunda”, meaning the home of the Turays. The compound 
becomes a symbol of success. By displaying their names on the property, compound 
owners transform economic wealth into social status. This social life of properties, to 
paraphrase Appadurai (1986), is precisely what aggrandizes their owner’s name, and 
transforms economic wealth into prestige and renown. 
Mighty Dre is one hustler who achieved this aspiration and when I asked him whether 
he considered himself a successful hustler, he replied “Yes of course, I have my own 
compound”. I found his family name visibly painted on the main gate of his compound 
in Misira, a suburb of Brikama. Through the money he makes from hustling on the 
Internet, Mighty Dre has built a house for his family to move into. Initially, Dre and 
his family lived in a two bedroom rented house. When Dre grew older, he slept at his 
friend’s house as the rented apartment became too small to accommodate them all. Dre 
told me that he was born in this overcrowded house as his father has two wives and 
eleven children. As a young boy growing up, Dre told me that all he dreamt of was to 
grow older and get a job to build a house for his parents. He recalled an instance when 
the landlord threatened to evict them for not paying the rent. He grew up with the aim 
of sparing his family “the humiliation of living in rental houses for the rest of their 
lives”.  
In a society where one’s achievements and status is determined by the ownership of a 
compound, renting from others is often an emblem of failure, shame and humiliation. 
Hence buying a compound and building a house is an important ‘achievement-related’ 




Moore (2013:3) argue that what people might consider as an achievement varies 
depending on a particular context, and that much of the literature considers phenomena 
such as academic attainment, sporting prowess or business success as synonymous 
with ‘achievement’, my interlocutors experienced ‘achievement’ by houses they build, 
the new cars they buy and the fancy clothes they wear. 
In addition, the provision of an own compound for parents and other family members 
is not only linked to achieving and aspiration but also to acquiring barako. In the case 
of Mighty Dre, the house he built for his parents will both bring him baraka and elevate 
his social status and that of his family. Dre is not educated and his chances of migrating 
or getting a well-paying job were slim. Hustling provided him with the opportunity to 
fulfil his childhood dream. Even formal employment could not have provided this 
opportunity for him and he mentioned some of his family members who have worked 
as civil servants all their lives without being able to buy their own compounds. Andy 
has also bought a piece of land in Jamissa (a new settlement on the outskirts of 
Brikama) where he built a modest two line house structure for his parents and siblings. 
For Andy, this was one of his aspirations when he started hustling. 
 
Figure 26: The new house built by Mighty Dre in Misira. 
As suggested above, hustlers’ aspiration to provide subsistence and other forms of 




building houses for them and paying for Muslim ceremonies such as tobaski, are born 
out of the desire to acquire barako. Barako, in this sense, involves both material 
success and spiritual salvation. However, the immoral manner and nature through 
which hustlers, chanters in particular, make their money can raise questions. Even 
though the chanters who engage in homosexual activities to make money know fully 
well the money is haram (forbidden by Islam), they still use it to pay for halal 
(prescribed by Islam) activities such as buying the tobaski ram and sending parents to 
Mecca. Islam forbids haram money to be used to pay for the hajj and it is cited that 
Allah, the source of all barako, will not accept the supplications of such pilgrims. 
Cohen (1966:132) claims that barako can be obtained by anyone who goes on a 
pilgrimage to Mecca and presses himself against the Kaaba wall whose special sanctity 
can impregnate the pilgrim with barako. For the chanters who send their parents to 
Mecca by using ill-acquired money, it leaves one to wonder whether they will get the 
barako they expect through this deed.  
Establishing Businesses  
Beach hustlers and chanters also expressed their aspirations in terms of establishing 
their own businesses. Prompted by the economic success of some semesters who had 
started their own businesses and are doing well, a few hustlers considered acting on 
the economic opportunities that interactions with toubabs gave them to establish their 
own enterprises. For them, this does not only ensure self-employment but also a stable 
income and a secure future. It is also a way of contributing to the family. Hustler’s 
investment can range from taxis, stores that sell provisions and second hand materials 
like clothes and spare parts, cybercafés and grocery shops. These businesses provide 
hustlers’ parents and families with the income they need for daily expenses like 
medical bills.       
Andy is one hustler who has been successful as a local tour guide in a chain of small 
scale businesses in Brikama, managed by his family: 
I opened a video club in Brikama New Town and I have a shop 
that sells mobile phones and accessories. I also have a taxi in 
Brikama. This helps me a lot because when business is not 
good at the beach my family can use the money from the 




For Andy, these investments fulfil three purposes. Firstly, it provides both employment 
and subsistence for his family. Although Andy sends money back home every month, 
the businesses serve as insurance during months when he cannot make enough money 
to send any back home. This mostly happens during the off season when business at 
the beach is slow. Secondly, Andy believes that with no education or skills his business 
investments will provide a safety net for him during old age when he can no longer 
work as a tourist guide. Thirdly and most importantly, unlike the beach hustlers in 
Kenya and the Caribbean who define success as having more than one foreign 
girlfriend (see Eid Bergan, 2011; Cabezas, 2004; De Franscisco, 2004), one of the 
basic thresholds of success among beach hustlers is having fringe investments in the 
form of shops, taxis and other income generating enterprises. Therefore, Andy’s 
business investments are not only considered as success by his colleagues at the beach, 
but also by his friends and family back in Brikama.  
Other chanters I encountered during my fieldwork have also managed to invest the 
money they made from chanting into small businesses like mini-markets, taxis and 
cybercafés. Boy Sere is one such chanter:  
Personally, chanting gave me lots of opportunities. Many of 
my toubab contacts came to visit me here and they opened 
businesses for me and this is helping me a lot. I also have 
friends whose toubab friends bought taxis for them, opened 
cybercafés for them and other businesses. 
Boy Sere does not chant anymore and he told me that he makes enough money 
from his businesses. I normally met him in one of his shops in the New Town 
area of Brikama where he sells used tyres that he imports from Sweden. He was 
one of the first chanters in Brikama and started around 2003 when the activity 
was not very popular but was highly rewarding. Although he does not chant 
anymore, Boy Sere is making enough money to meet his obligations and to fulfil 
his aspirations. As the only chanter among my interlocutors with his own family 
(a wife and two children), his obligations include feeding his family, supporting 
his parents and helping other relatives when he can. Boy Sere told me that he 
started chanting whilst he was going to cybercafés to explore the opportunities 




becoming hard to achieve, he diverted his attention and energies to chanting. Boy 
Sere’s aspiration when he started chanting was to get a toubab contact who would 
help him to open a big shop in Brikama, and to own a compound. Now, he has 
two compounds and his parents are occupying one of them. Once this goal was 
achieved, Boy Sere stopped chanting and is now focusing on his business. 
Bass, the owner of Bass Cybercafé, is also another chanter who, through 
chanting, achieved his aspirations of establishing his own business. Bass opened 
his cybercafé business through chanting. He met his Dutch partners through the 
Internet. Because he was educated and unemployed, they sent him some 
computers to start his own business. They also came down to help him build the 
structure of the cybercafé, which is located in Bass’s family compound in 
Nyambai. Now Bass runs a successful cybercafé and during an interview in his 
cafe, he told me: 
The café business is mine and I started it almost six months 
ago. Before going into this business, I used to be a chanter. 
Through this, I had some partners based in Holland and they 
wanted to help me start a business. I decided to go into the café 
business partly because I studied computer science. I was 
donated some computers from Holland and after realising that 
I have an empty space in our compound, I thought venturing 
into the café business will be worthwhile and my friends from 
Holland came down to help me build the structure. 
Charity begins at Home 
The aspirations of beach hustlers and chanters are not limited to providing 
support for their parents and other family members. It also extends to 
providing help and supporting others in society such as neighbours and 
friends. Although all of my interlocutors first express their aspirations 
towards their immediate and extended family, a few expressed their 
aspirations in terms of providing support for the community in which they 
either hailed from or resided. This form of generalised reciprocity refers to 




community. In the Gambia, social status is not only earned from helping 
family but also the wider community in which one resides.  
Stanley Man is one hustler who emphasised his aspiration of helping people in his 
community. Using the phrase ‘charity begins at home’, (meaning that whatever 
opportunities he comes across on the beach, he would prefer to take it back to his 
village rather than some other place), he told me that it is the obligation of every 
individual to help people in his community. Working as a taxi driver in the tourism 
industry is providing him the income he needs to fulfil his aspirations in terms of 
helping his family and community. He was able to fulfil this aspiration through his 
association with toubabs. Stanley takes the toubabs who he provides guiding services 
for to his home village of Busumbala. He convinces them to sponsor school projects 
like libraries. Stanley has been successful in this as some of his toubabs are now 
supporting schools by donating materials and offering scholarships to students. Stanley 
explained the strategy he uses to fulfil his aspiration of helping his community: 
I take my toubab customers to Busumbala as charity begins at 
home. So my presence in the industry provides an opportunity 
for my community. My job also brings other opportunities for 
other families as I will take tourists to visit poor people and 
they will sometimes offer help by buying them a bag of rice 
and giving them money.  
In 2012, Stanley Man took some toubabs from the UK to Busumbala to visit some 
schools. They started a charity called “Wing Dreams” to provide support for the 
schools. They sponsored projects ranging from building toilets and classrooms to 
providing running water for three schools in the village. In addition, the charity also 
provided financial help for many poor families by sending them monthly allowances. 
Stanley Man coordinates the activities of the charity in Bususmbala: 
The charity supports individual families by sending them 
money every month. I coordinate the activities of the charity. 
They send a lot of money. They help about eight families in 
Busumbala. Each family receives a bag of rice every month. 
They also provide scholarships for 10 boys and girls including 
those with handicaps. Each receives a monthly stipend of 3500 




As illustrated by the quote, Stanley Man can be considered as a local philanthropist 
who brings people who want to help his community and people in addition to the 
education opportunities provided by Stanley Man to the people of Busumbala. 
The culminating effect of fulfilling aspirations of providing support for parents and 
other family members, owning a compound and establishing a business helps beach 
hustlers and chanters to attain upward social mobility. As I have argued, these are 
markers of success. In addition to this, enhanced status is also achieved through the 
display of modern consumer goods like cars, designer clothes and ICT gadgets like 
mobile phones. Hustlers, chanters in particular, use the money they make from hustling 
to buy modern consumer goods like designer clothes and expensive mobile phones. 
Some get these goods from their toubab contacts. They also spend their wealth on 
expensive cars and living expensive lives. The new-found wealth of hustlers has 
elevated them in the social hierarchy with some people now admiring, respecting and 
looking up to them. A student told me that he thinks they are cool: “They have nice 
cars and they build big houses. Many respect them now”. Mighty Dre, the hustler with 
the many toubab lovers, told me that hustling has enhanced his social status: “People 
admire and respect me now”. 
Unfulfilled Aspirations? 
Even though the above cases have demonstrated that pursuing local livelihoods has 
provided opportunities for beach hustlers and chanters who find themselves in a state 
of ‘involuntary immobility’ – an aspiration to migrate but the inability to do so – to 
achieve their aspirations of social and economic advancement, the case of a few 
hustlers I encountered during my fieldwork shows that the aspirations of some hustlers 
remain unfulfilled. This mostly involves those hustlers who had aspirations of finding 
sponsors to pay for their education. In fact, the majority of the hustlers I spoke to 
intimated that their initial aspiration when they started hustling was to find someone 
to help them pay for their education. They all claimed that the rising cost of education 
and the inability of their parents and other family members to pay for their education 
was one of the motivating factors that forced them into hustling. For them, the initial 
thinking was that education was the key to them fulfilling their aspirations of social 




they could get a good job that can provide them with the means to achieve their 
aspirations.  
For instance, Buba and many chanters like him link their aspirations of finding formal 
employment with their aspirations to achieve a school leaving certificate, without 
which their chances of getting formal employment are restricted. However, once 
hustlers start receiving money, they become entangled in social pressures. Instead of 
using the money to pay for the education, they prioritise solving family problems. As 
David explained to me, “you cannot have all that money and give it to the headmaster 
whilst your mother is sick with no medication or you see your younger siblings going 
hungry”. So most hustlers divert the money intended to pay for their education to cater 
for their family’s social needs. Buba told me that the first money he received from a 
toubab friend was meant to pay for his school fees but he used the money to pay for 
his mother’s medical bills and ‘took care of other stuff’. 
Apart from being entangled in social pressures, another factor that contributes to 
hustlers abandoning their educational aspirations in favour of full time hustling is the 
perception of the value of schooling among many Gambians. There exists some 
disillusionment among young Gambians that school education can provide a decent 
job, money and good social status. The majority of my interlocutors challenged the 
widely held notion that a school certificate translates into success and social mobility. 
The school certificate, which many considered to be a panacea for success and upward 
social mobility, has all but lost its lustre among Gambian youths. Now, instead of 
aspiring to achieve educational achievement, many Gambian youths aspire to engage 
in activities that can generate them enough money to build a house, own a flashy car 
and distribute money to family, friends and others in society. Through these acts, 
success is measured and upward social mobility is assured. Beach hustlers and chanters 
have come to realise that the school certificate can no longer help them fulfil these 
aspirations, as all it gives you at best is a low paying job or at worst, no job at all.  
The most explicit evidence among my interlocutors that school education is no longer 
able to fulfil their aspirations is the semester syndrome. Semesters are Gambians living 
in either the US or Europe who return home on holidays flaunting their wealth and live 




Some send their parents to Mecca for the pilgrimage. Although semesters are known 
as Gambian hustlers living in the West, what is not known is the nature of their 
hustling. Most claim that they have decent jobs, but there are suspicions that some are 
engaged in the drug trade as no paying job can provide them with the amount of money 
they display after being away for one or two years. 
As the majority of semesters are normally school drop outs who after a year or two of 
hustling achieve what their teachers could not afford in their entire working life, many 
young people I spoke to draw inspiration from them. During an informal conversation 
with some pupils at a primary school in Brikama, I asked them what they wanted to 
become when they finish school and one of the girls, probably about ten years of age, 
answered that she wants to become ‘a semester’.  
6.4 Summary 
Although international migration still forms the life trajectory of many young 
Gambians who wish to fulfil their aspirations of social and economic advancement, 
the beach hustlers and chanters of this study who find themselves in a state of 
‘involuntary immobility’ pursue local livelihoods to achieve their aspirations. The aim 
of this chapter has been twofold. Firstly to explore the aspirations of the beach hustlers 
and chanters whose hustling activities are described in the previous chapters and to 
illustrate how their hustling activities provides them the opportunity to achieve their 
aspirations? Secondly, to highlight the factors that shape and influence the aspirations 
of beach hustlers and chanters and how these aspirations are negotiated in a context of 
familial and societal dynamics. I showed and argued that familial and societal factors 
such as intergenerational relations, reciprocal social exchange and the desire for 
upward social mobility are key factors that shape the aspirations of beach hustlers and 
chanters. To illustrate this, I drew on the cases of my key interlocutors. 
Using a typology drawn from the narratives of key hustlers, the chapter further 
identified the aspirations of beach hustlers and chanters. It argued that these aspirations 
go beyond the mere responsibility of providing subsistence for parents and other 




businesses and helping other people in the wider society. Achieving these aspirations 




















Summary and Conclusion 
Taking refuge from a scorching June afternoon heat during the rainy season of 2014, 
a few days before I was due to leave the field to return to Edinburgh, I sat with my 
young nephew, Sax, and his friends in their grand palace in Nyambai, one of the 
neighbourhoods in Brikama. Called Orlando, their grand palace is situated on the 
Brikama highway on the veranda of a grocery shop. One of my nephew’s friends was 
brewing the attaya as we all sat quietly enjoying the ambiance of the main road while 
we listen to music playing from the small CD player placed on a small wooden stool 
at the corner of the veranda. The overwhelming feeling of lethargy that I usually 
experience around this time of the day during the rainy season and the thoughts about 
my impending journey back to Edinburgh occupied my mind. I was not particularly 
listening to the lyrics accentuating from the dull speakers of the CD player until a song 
by a young Gambian teenager called ST, caught my attention.    
ST is a ‘Brikama Boy’ and a newcomer in the Gambian music scene. However, his 
breakthrough came in 2013 when he released his debut single called aling domo 
(meaning ‘eat me up’ in the Mandinka language). This was quickly followed by the 
music now playing on the CD player called respecko or respect. The song, a genre of 
rap hip hop sang in Mandinka with some English lyrics, depicts the experiences of 
young Gambians who find themselves in a dilemma of not getting the proper education 
and skills needed to either get a better paying job or a visa to travel to the West. He 
elaborates on how it has become difficult for young Gambians to achieve their 
aspirations of social and economic advancement. What makes the song particularly 
interesting for me is that its lyrical intent is to drive home the conditions of young 
Gambians who consider migrating to Europe as their only means of achieving their 
aspirations of earning respect and upward social mobility. As such, they risk their lives 
by embarking on the dangerous journey to Europe through ‘the back way’. The 





Am feeling so lonely as all my boys have left for Libya…. 
Hardship upon hardship makes them to take this way…… 
They have waited in vain for the plane which never came, air Dabai48 
Inspired by friends who have gone and succeeded…. 
Brought electricity to their homes and built big houses…. 
Rejected by the embassy when they sought visa…. 
This song on the aspirations of young Gambians to get to Europe by all means in order 
to change their conditions resonates with what has been written so far in the 
anthropology of young Gambians aspirations and their livelihoods strategies. 
Certainly, the majority of youths in contemporary Gambia embrace a gripping desire 
to migrate, although the ability to do so remains to be out of their reach. This condition 
of ‘involuntary immobility’ (Carling 2002), which is epitomised by the ‘nerves’ 
phenomenon (Gaibazzi, 2010), has seen young Gambians resorting to various 
endeavours to respond to their situation. For some, the prospect of migrating to Europe 
or the US to ‘hustle’, is the only means of changing their present conditions. Much as 
some young Gambians are drawn to this prospect, an exploration of the endeavours of 
those who refuse to sit and ‘wait for mobility’ (Jonsson, 2008) by pursuing alternative 
forms of livelihoods that are not based on migration indicate the desires of some young 
Gambians to achieve their aspirations in a context of ‘immobility’.  
Generally speaking, the current trends of ‘immobility’ have made it hard for many 
Gambian youths to fulfil their aspirations of social and economic advancement. 
Previous generations of young Gambians resorted to international migration to fulfil 
their aspirations thanks to visa-free travel between the Gambia and most European 
countries. However, the introduction of strict European visa requirements has seen 
some young Gambians looking inward for opportunities.  Thus they engage in and 
pursue local livelihoods as a way of displaying agency while refusing to accept a life 
of poverty and economic hardship. Having the opportunity to fulfil their aspirations at 
home is important, and in this thesis hustlers claimed that it is better for them to have 
“tried to succeed at home rather than failed to migrate, than not to have tried at all”. 
With the above in mind, this study represents the first detailed ethnographic study 
                                                 




focussing on youth hustling within the Gambian urban context. The study deconstructs 
the myths and dominant social perceptions among Gambians that one has to migrate 
to Europe or the US to achieve aspirations of social and economic advancement.   
The life stories of the hustlers that constitute this ethnography challenge both scholarly 
and popular conceptions that migration to the West is considered to be the only means 
of achieving social and economic advancement. Their cases represent the lives of 
many young urban Gambians with whom I conducted research. They do not view 
hustling abroad as the main exit option from a situation of impasse in which economic 
and political uncertainty prevents them from progressing towards a more economically 
secured future. Europe for them is not necessarily an El Dorado or the only opportunity 
or possibility for socio-economic advancement. In addition, the hustling activities that 
the beach hustlers in this study employ to achieve their aspirations diverges from the 
hustling strategies of Gambian bumsters who provide sexual services to tourists as a 
key strategy to achieve their aspirations. 
The current environment of economic crisis, political uncertainty and constraints to 
migration in the Gambia is giving rise to an urban context in which young men, 
grappling with ‘visa problem’ (Gaibazzi, 2014) and tired of waiting, become agents of 
creativity and hope. They realise that the world around is changing partly due to 
globalisation and that Western countries are no more willing to open their borders to 
unskilled migrants who they consider to be social and economic liabilities. This study 
shows that, whether they stay in the Gambia or get the chance to migrate, some young 
Gambians do more than just sit and dream and fantasise about their unfulfilled 
aspirations. Some youths actively construct a place for themselves in their families and 
communities. Similar to the young men Jonsson (2012:114) studied in Kounda, the 
hustlers of this study apply ‘various strategies to make meaning out of non-migration 
and to construct their identities without migration’.   
As I argued in Chapter One of this thesis, my research on the aspirations of young 
Gambians and the strategies they employ to achieve them diverges from other 
approaches that put emphasis on international migratory aspirations of young 
Gambians in terms of achieving social and economic advancement (see Brown, 1992; 




of those who pursue local livelihoods by taking advantage of the resources available 
to them to achieve their aspirations.  Drawing on the life stories of a group of hustlers, 
the study has sought to shed light on the ways young Gambians who find themselves 
in a state of ‘involuntary immobility’ employ a variety of income earning strategies in 
order to fulfil their aspirations. For these groups of young people, the possibilities of 
migrating to the West are limited. Hence, they internalise the opportunities provided 
by their interactions with toubabs both within the tourism industry and Internet use in 
cybercafés.  
In illustrating how a group of young people make use of limited but available resources 
to respond to social and economic pressures, to improve their life circumstances and 
control their destiny, I put particular emphasis on the introduction of tourism in the 
country and the role it plays in creating informal employment and unofficial ways of 
making money for many of the country’s youths within the industry by benefiting from 
the presence of tourists. I suggest that the co-incidence of tourism development in the 
Gambia and the economic situation of the majority of Gambian youths led to the 
advent of beach hustling as young unemployed Gambians identified livelihood 
opportunities. In the same vein, I established the emergence of new technologies and 
the impact it has on the hustling patterns of many Gambians. This is demonstrated in 
the ways some families are making a living by investing in cybercafé businesses. It is 
also explicitly evidenced in the ways Gambian youths or ‘chanters’ adopt and 
appropriate ICT as a tool for income generation.  
In this conclusion, I reflect upon and summarise the main findings of this study and 
consider their implications while showing how the ethnographic cases used throughout 
this thesis differ from other literature of a similar genre. The three ethnographic 
chapters provide the central findings of the study which attempts to fill a gap in 
Gambian studies, more specifically in the anthropology of Gambian livelihoods and 
urban ethnography (see Chant and Evans, 2010; Moseley, Carney and Becker, 2010; 
Chant and Jones, 2005 and Gaibazzi, 2015 for a few examples). It is hoped that 
utilising an ethnographic lens to reflect upon young Gambians’ contemporary 
responses to their economic situations and their socio-economic aspirations will offer 
a new way of studying an already existing issue. As already highlighted in the 




young urban Gambians. It focusses on the lives of young urban Gambians who ‘stay 
put’ Gaibazzi (2015) due to restrictions in international migration. In particular, it 
explores the strategies they employ by drawing on the opportunities provided by 
locally available resources to fulfil their aspirations of economic and social 
advancement. I will now discuss each chapter individually and reflect on their 
scholarly implications.   
Following the introduction of the study in the first part of Chapter One, where I 
provided the background, focus and theoretical relevance of the study, I dedicated the 
rest of the chapter to a review of the works of a number of social anthropologists whose 
approach to hustling and aspirations frame and motivate this study. This helped us to 
situate this study within broader theoretical frameworks. The theoretical concepts of 
hustling and the livelihood strategies of urban youths and how these provide 
opportunities for social and economic advancement were tackled. In addition, the 
literature on aspirations and aspiration formation were reviewed to make sense of the 
factors that shape and influence the socio-economic aspirations of Gambian hustlers.  
This was followed by a methodological discussion in Chapter Two. This discussion 
centred on how the research was conducted as well as the challenges of doing 
fieldwork ‘at home’ and the hazards of ethnographic field work in general. Chapter 
three provided the political and economic context of the Gambia. After briefly 
describing the social context of and family dynamics in the Gambia, I showed how 
external shocks and poor policies precipitated a grim economic climate, pushing many 
Gambians into abject poverty. Unemployment is pervasive, salaries are poor, and the 
cost of living is rising on a daily basis causing a sharp fall in the standard of living of 
many Gambians. This culminated in a situation where the majority of youths find 
limited possibilities to achieve social and economic advancement through formal 
means such as employment. 
In Chapter Four, I principally drew on the accounts of four beach hustlers to provide 
an insight into the lives, career trajectories and income earning strategies of youths 
who make a living in the Gambia’s tourism industry by engaging with tourists. I 
showed how beach hustlers employ different strategies depending on their status as 




toubabs and contacts with them for their hustling activities. Accessing these spaces 
and establishing contacts with toubabs paves the way for beach hustlers to play on the 
naivety and sympathy of the toubabs to make money or to get material help from them. 
I suggest that the strategies of beach hustlers are multi-level. Firstly, they utilise certain 
strategies to get access to toubabs and these include learning and speaking the toubabs’ 
language, adopting and using Western nicknames, and utilising dress, image and 
appearance. The success of these strategies in facilitating access leads to the use of 
other strategies to make money or to get material help.    
To illustrate this, Andy showed us how he first acquaints himself with the schedule of 
the toubabs, to find ways to navigate their spaces and then ‘rhythm or align’ them to 
get access to them. He then shows us how he uses his work as a local tour guide to 
employ a combination of tactics to make money from his tourist clients. We have seen 
how he advertises his services by using personal souvenirs and luring tourists to buy 
these services by not charging them, although he makes more money through this. 
Playing on his customers’ naivety of the social context, Andy and other beach hustlers 
like him not only make money from toubabs, but also get them to provide material 
help for their families by taking them to visit their homes.  
Through these activities, Andy is not only providing subsistence for himself and his 
family, but he has also secured his economic future by investing some of his earnings 
into other private businesses run by his family. As it turned out, this investment was a 
wise move for Andy. With a very poor tourist season due to the Ebola epidemic in 
West Africa, 2014 and 2015 have been a difficult period for many beach hustlers. 
Andy’s investments mitigated for him this hard financial period. In addition, Andy has 
also bought a compound where he built a house for his family to stay. The economic 
ability to provide subsistence and a home for his family and to have his own business 
enterprises is widely seen as an achievement of social and economic advancement. 
When I called Andy to check how he was coping under these circumstances, he told 
me that after spending a month in TDA and not making anything and still paying rent, 
he decided to return to Brikama to focus on his businesses. He revealed that he has 
opened a new mini supermarket near the main petrol station where he spends most of 
his time. He, however, still intends to go back to the beach when the fortunes turn 




If Andy uses his work as a local tour guide to use various tactics with his toubab 
customers and to make money from them, other beach hustlers portray an image of 
themselves to seek sympathy from the toubabs to get material help. We have seen how 
Buju was able to establish himself as a key player in the tourism sector by playing on 
the sympathy of the toubabs he took around for game fishing and who later sent him 
a boat to start his own fishing company to “help himself and his family”. Buju’s case 
is indicative of a trend where unregistered beach hustlers, through their activities, can 
get the contacts they need to transform themselves not only as registered hustlers but 
also as major economic operators in the industry. This view is supported by Stanley 
Man’s case. His work as a taxi driver and his contacts with many tourists provided him 
with opportunities for short-term economic achievement and allowed him to initiate 
long-term personal relationships.  
The chapter on beach hustling illustrates not only the importance of tourism in 
‘shaping local articulations of culture’ (Ebron, 2002: 163), but also on the hustling 
practices of young Gambians. I have argued that tourism was introduced in the Gambia 
as a response to the country’s poverty, lack of mineral resources and reliance on a 
single cash crop of peanuts. Now, Gambians vie for the attention of tourists and craft 
themselves to their desires as demonstrated by the majority of beach hustlers. Through 
the activities of beach hustlers, we have seen how tourism in the Gambia has become 
an economic process ‘that comes into being through performing Africa’ (ibid: 166). 
Hustlers like Andy through their work, market an aura of Africa by using books and 
albums to show images of places that can attract tourists. 
In Chapter Five, I described the hustling activities and strategies of a group of hustlers 
who call themselves chanters. Just like beach hustlers, chanters are a group of young 
people who saw the possibilities of migrating to the West to hustle and to achieve 
social and economic advancement diminish as a result of strict visa restrictions. Hence, 
the advent of the Internet and the proliferation of cybercafés in their neighbourhoods 
made possible their dreams of interacting with Westerners through virtual means. They 
use this opportunity to their advantage by employing different methods to gain 




I have shown how chanters first endeavour to be knowledgeable in basic IT to be able 
to chant. Knowledge of using basic IT and opening accounts in forums where they can 
access toubabs is followed by the use of various tactics to make money from them. I 
have also identified the income earning strategies of chanters to principally include the 
‘love method’ and the ‘deception method’. I have argued that the basis of these two 
types of strategy is to make as much money as possible from toubabs with relatively 
little effort. I demonstrated this by showing how Mighty Dre, a young chanter with a 
number of white online lovers, uses the love method to target and make money from 
‘older fat white’ women. This approach seems to work for Dre. With his string of 
girlfriends sending him money on a regular basis, he has achieved upward social 
mobility through earning enough money to buy his own compound, to take care of his 
family and to access consumer goods such as cars and mobile phones. 
We have seen how chanters like Dre’s use of the strategy they describe as the ‘love 
method’ provided them income earning opportunities.  Although love, in the romantic 
sense of the word, is considered a universal human experience (Jankowiak, 1995), 
Gambian youths, my interlocutors in particular, experience, imagine and perform 
romantic love differently in the context of urban poverty. In using the love method, 
chanters like Dre’s conception of love differs from older generations, whose notion of 
love is based on emotional satisfaction, gendered norms and identities, kin-based 
expectations, concerns for social respect (from parents as well as peers), marital 
prospects and social reproduction (Chant and Evans, 2010; Hirsch and Wardlow, 
2006). In a context of post-neoliberal reforms, the hustlers I encountered in this study 
negotiate love outside marital relationships based on the desire to fulfil various basic 
survival needs and/or aspirations for socioeconomic (and geographic) mobility, even 
if relationship decisions and behaviours are also driven by other factors such as 
physical attraction and pleasure. This illustrates the ways through which ‘young love’ 
(Chant and Evans, 2010) is negotiated in the context of economic scarcity and shows 
how relationships form part of diversified livelihood strategies used by young 
Gambians.  
If Chapters Four and Five provided insights into the activities of Gambian hustlers in 
terms of their strategies of accumulation, in Chapter Six I showed how hustling 




and economic advancement. Drawing on hustlers’ stories, I described the socio-
economic aspirations of hustlers, how they are shaped and the ways through which 
hustling provides opportunities for them to fulfil those aspirations. They expressed 
these aspirations in terms of fulfilling social and cultural obligations, acquiring 
consumer goods and achieving respect, as ST alluded to in his song, and social status.  
The aspirations of hustlers and the factors that shape them are embedded in 
expectations from their families and communities. These are further influenced by the 
notion of acquiring barako. The social obligations that hustlers aspire to fulfil are born 
out of the principles of reciprocity and social exchange. Relations of reciprocity, in 
turn, are based on both intergenerational obligations which assume highly moral and 
religious overtones in Gambian society. In this sense, young Gambians feel that it is 
an obligation to reward parents for bringing them into this world and to take care of 
them by providing financial assistance and other social luxuries. Hence, in Chapter 
Six, I analyse in detail how generational and gender relations and interactions 
influence and are influenced by hustling. The norm of reciprocal social exchange 
informs the structures and values that hustlers use to justify their hustling activities. I 
showed how customary emphasis on redistributing wealth to help parents and other 
family members puts unique pressures on hustlers. 
The findings that emerged in this ethnography can significantly contribute to the 
theoretical literature in the field of youth studies and livelihoods, the contextual use of 
ICTs and non-migration in terms of how young people experience and adapt to 
conditions of immobility.  
Firstly, although this study focuses on the livelihood strategies, exploring the dynamics 
of ‘staying behind’ among young urban Gambians, it evokes issues that have a wide 
resonance in Africa and in Africanist scholarship on youth. In many gerontocratic 
African societies, youth is seen as a transitory phase to adulthood, and its elongation, 
in contrast to the Western view, is not perceived as a desirable outcome (see Honwana 
and De Boeck 2005; Alber, Van der Geest and Reynolds-Whyte 2008). With 
increasing socio-economic restraints and scarcity in neoliberal Africa and the decay of 
post-colonial states, African youths have progressively faced difficulties in securing 




and their households, and thus be considered adults (Cruise O'Brien 1996; Masquelier 
2005; Vigh 2006; Roth 2008). This impasse has determined a relative marginalisation 
of youth in several contexts, particularly in urban Africa. 
In the midst of this perpetual economic crisis, young Gambians who dream of a better 
future in an ‘imaginary elsewhere but must generally contend with the scarce 
opportunities of the here’ (Masquelier, 2005:64) now eke out a precarious living with 
little hope of ever overcoming marginalization. Unable to secure the promises of a 
regime change in 1994, which gave new hope of the attainment of social maturity and 
economic prosperity, some young Gambians turn to hustling along the beaches or in 
the cybercafés to change their situations. Yet, others defied the odds of death by taking 
the perilous ‘back way’ to Europe. Their predicaments are similar to that of youths in 
many other African regions (Cruise O’Brien 1996). 
Moreover, recent theoretical insight on prolonged economic distress in Africa 
emphasizes that economic hardship and the scarcity of resources transforms the 
context in which young people construct new ways of “being in the world” to fulfil 
old and new aspirations (Makhulu et al. 2010:19). As elsewhere on the continent, 
economic scarcity and lack of opportunities in the Gambia have left young men unable 
to become “successful and respected adults in their community” (Honwana & De 
Boeck 2005; Mains 2007; Masquelier 2005), and neoliberal reforms have disrupted a 
clear linear narrative leading to social adulthood. Hence, many youths resort to both 
licit and illicit ways of making a living 
Consequently, writing on the situation of post-colonial African youth, (Comaroff and 
Comaroff  (2005: 23) states that due to their dire economic situations, the youths of 
Sub-Saharan Africa find their own ‘‘ways and means’’ to survive which sometimes 
‘involve the supply of hitherto unimagined services, that may involve illicit or 
stigmatised forms of work blurring the lines of legality/illegality’. Hence, they create 
their own social worlds and ‘innovative spaces for action’ and their own modus 
operandi. Maira & Soep, (2005: xvi) refers to these spaces of action as ‘youthscapes’ 
where young people invent strategies of survival by subverting authority and 
fashioning new ways of functioning and manoeuvring on their own (Honwana, 2012: 




casual work, licit or illicit activities (Chigunta, F., Schnurr, J., James-Wilson, D., and 
Torres, V. (2005) or youth-led enterprises (Thieme, 2014). 
In the case of chanters, we have seen how by employing various tactics (de Certeu, 
1984) to make money from toubabs, they transgress the boundaries between the licit 
and illicit. For instance, we have seen how chanters illicitly acquire fake receipts and 
school fees invoices that they send to their toubab contacts as evidence to back their 
deceitful tactics. In addition, some of the tactics that chanters use can be morally 
questionable. By preying on ‘old, fat and ugly’ single women on the internet and 
manage to convince them to send them money, chanters like Dre are involved in the 
type of ‘romance scams’ that can be perceived to be immoral.  
Secondly, migration seems to be one of the main ways in which many African youths 
have chosen to change their situation. Besides the fact that migration might be a well-
entrenched livelihood strategy in many African contexts, African youths’ compelling 
aspiration to travel (out of Africa) is thus symptomatic of an actual or imagined exit 
option from situations marked by abjection and by a lack of perspective in relation to 
self-realisation at home (Horst 2006; Pandolfo 2007; Vigh 2009). Gambia does not 
seem to be an exception. By the late 1980s, Gambians’ hopes in postcolonial 
modernization had vanished in the face of socio-economic stagnation and political 
uncertainty. Many urban youths began to explore the prospect of migrating particularly 
to the West, whether to still pursue education or to work.  However, the introduction 
of stringent visa restrictions by mostly the UK and the USA in the post-coup era 
curtailed the migratory aspirations of many young Gambians. Finding themselves in a 
condition of ‘involuntary immobility’, they pursue local livelihoods by taking 
advantage of the resources (the tourism sector and internet availability and access in 
cybercafés) to fulfil their aspirations of social and economic advancement. Hence, 
social mobility was sought in the context of physical immobility.  
Third, through the discussion of the activities of chanters in Chapter Five, I 
demonstrated how ICTs and Internet access in particular have implications for the 
literature on ICT use in developing countries. As mentioned elsewhere, this literature 
distinguishes two primary research foci (Brown & Grant, 2010; Avgerou, 2010). These 




that focus on understanding technology “in developing” countries (Qureshi, 2010). 
Recent anthropological work has focussed on the nexus between agency, marginality, 
communication and technology in Sub-Saharan Africa (De Bruijn, Pelckmans and 
Sangare, 2015). The majority of these works focus on how ICTs have infiltrated and 
changed people’s lives in these settings.  
For instance, Mirjam de Bruijn, Francis Nyamnjoh & Inge Brinkman’s (2009) edited 
work on the appropriation of the internet in marginal communities is illustrative of the 
ways new technologies are re-shaping social realities among marginal populations in 
African societies, and how Africans and their societies are, in turn, shaping the 
technologies of communication. Similarly, Katz’s edited volume (2008) makes a 
valuable contribution to literature on non-developmental and contextual use of ICTs. 
This collection not only shows how ICTs have an impact on ‘developing countries’ in 
terms of economic and technological development, but on the way that their users 
appropriate technologies in a way that is meaningful to them (Katz 2008). What this 
collection demonstrates is that ICTs are involved in the daily lives of ordinary people 
across the globe yet are adapted in different ways in different contexts. Thus, chanters 
like Dre, Buba, Kaddy, Dem and Biggar represent the stories of young people whose 
contextual and non-developmental patterns of Internet use in cybercafés is considered 
to provide opportunities of social and economic advancement. 
Even though the chapter on online hustling concentrates on the appropriation of the 
internet by marginal populations as a livelihood and survival strategy, I do not 
categorically propose that this phenomenon overshadows internet use in developing 
countries. It does however provide us with a new lens through which to think and 
contextually understand about ICT use in developing countries. Hence, this 
ethnography will contribute to our understanding of the ‘non-developmental’ and 
‘contextual use of ICT’ by marginal populations as it focuses on the type of public 
access Internet use that so far has not been given any attention within the ICT for 
development and public access discourse. This will greatly contribute to research on 
the role of the Internet in supporting the subsistence and livelihoods of poor youths 
(see Wyche at al., 2013). In addition, the study will help to fill the empirical void in 
public access to ICT research in the Gambia with respect to their patterns of use, 




Fourth, the case of Gambian hustlers also show how acts of adopting special lifestyles 
and consumption patterns are considered to be part of a broader strategy for advancing 
personal success (Rowlands, 1999). In contemporary Gambian society, success, status 
and social mobility have come to be determined more by the capacity of consumption 
and conspicuous display of modern consumer goods (wearing expensive clothes, 
having and displaying ITC gadgets like tablets and expensive mobile phones, building 
big houses and driving nice cars) and wealth distribution than by previous capacities 
based on educational qualifications or profession. This ‘material culture of success and 
status’ (ibid) has led to a shift from as society that rewards production to a society that 
recognises consumption. Hence, in contemporary Gambia, heightened involvement in 
consumption has become the privileged means of making value and marking identity 
(Friedman 2002; Miller 1994). 
Finally, the findings of this ethnography express well the inherent contradictions that 
characterise the lives of hustlers as reflected in the ways they struggle to reconcile    
their activities, social and religious beliefs and lifestyles. For instance, in their quest to 
acquire barako from parents, chanters use the money they acquired immorally, through 
either deceit or by engaging in homosexual activities. This money is used to sometimes 
pay for their parents to go for the pilgrimage in Mecca or used to buy the ram needed 
for the Islamic feast of tobaski.  Hence, chanters convert immoral money into moral 
money. The money they use to pay for what Islam prescribes is acquired through 
means that Islam prohibits. In addition, many chanters also struggle to reconcile their 
homosexual hustling identity with their off-line heterosexual identity. By acting as gay 
men online, chanters adopt and juggle between contradictory characteristics and 
disparate roles.  Being associated with immoral activities and yet striving to fulfil their 
social, cultural and religious obligations is a key paradox for hustlers.  
In addition to the above theoretical contributions, this study methodologically 
contributes to the field of ethnography by applying integrative qualitative research 
methods and bringing to the fore the complex socio-cultural, economic, and political 
hazards of doing ethnography at ‘home’. The findings of this study and the subsequent 
descriptive accounts are to a large extent influenced by the design of the field study. 
The literature on fieldwork and ethnography has long highlighted and debated the 




the results grounded in a few cases to a larger population? It has been noted that the 
approach one takes is dependent on whether the research is directed towards “the 
development and testing of a theory or towards a generalisation about a finite 
population of cases” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). If the goal of the research is 
theory development, the strategic selection of cases is deemed appropriate. 
With hindsight, the trajectory of this study could have taken different approaches and 
there are many areas that could have been explored. I would like to hear and tell the 
stories of the toubabs - both tourists and the ones online. I would also like to tell the 
stories of more female hustlers to illustrate the changing nature of family dynamics in 
the Gambia and the significance of local gender politics. Although I sought to include 
women’s voices in this study and to offer some descriptions about their economic 
activities as hustlers, I have not been able to deeply explore the link between their 
activities and gendered identities in as much depth as I would have liked. My access 
to them was limited by the cultural and social context in which they resided and they 
were mostly embarrassed to share their stories with me.  
This ethnography tells the stories of a selection of urban youths in a certain period of 
time, and while I cannot claim that their accounts and lives reflect youths across the 
country, their life situations and aspirations are by no means unique. Moreover, 
although this study was, on the whole, with young Gambian men and women, their 
accounts and experiences echo and supplement literature on the ways that young West 
Africans experience ‘involuntary immobility’ (Gaibazzi, 2015;  Jonsson, 2008; 
Carling, 2002). The study also provides theoretical insights that add to our 
understanding on how young people living on the margins of society respond to social 
and economic pressures within a context mired by political and economic 
uncertainties. 
Whereas scholars have identified international migration as a primary means of 
adapting to their situations, my argument has been that the lack of possibilities to 
migrate have seen some young Gambians taking advantage of local possibilities to 
achieve social and economic advancement. Moreover, focus on how aspirations are 
formed and how they develop in response to and in relation to different environments, 




interlocutors. I found the hustlers in this study to be influenced by a strong sense of 
community, social support and social influences in general. Both the environment 
close to them and the broader societal context therefore influence their aspiration 
formation. This includes socio-cultural influences and the ‘degree of social-
embeddedness’ (Leavy & Smith, 2010). Throughout the ethnographic chapters I have 
shown how my interlocutors voiced their aspirations of economic advancement and 
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APPENDIX A  
List of interviews 
 
In this section, I provide a comprehensive list of all the people that I interviewed 
throughout the course of my research. I have excluded informal conversations from 
the list due to their impromptu nature. Interviews appear in chronological order and 
the places where the interviews took place, dates, names and occupations of the people 
interviewed are noted. 
Interviews conducted during first phase of fieldwork-September-December 
2013 
Name/Occupation    Date    Location 
Alkali, Café Operator           25 September 2013       AON cybercafé 
Dem, Cyber hustler                      27 September 2013         Brikama 
Dem, Cyber hustler           28 September 2013 My Residence 
Mr Fatty, School Teacher/Cyber Hustler   29 September 2013 My Residence 
Sait Matty Jaw, Research Assistant     29 September 2013  My Residence      
Joseph Mendy, Café Operator        1 October 2013  A&B cybercafé 
Buba, Cyber hustler           1 October 2013  My Residence 
Mr Fatty, School Teacher/Cyber Hustler   2 October 2013  My Residence 
Buba, Cyber Hustler                      3 October 2013   My Residence              




Dem, Student/Cyber Hustler                    5 October 2013  My Residence 
Buba, Cyber Hustler          5 October 2013  My Residence                
Mr Barrow, Café Operator         5 October 2013       GAMTEL Cybercafé 
Dem, Student/cyber hustler         6 October 2013             My Residence 
Mr Turay/ GAMTEL Regional manager   6 October 2013             GAMTEL 
Modou, QNET Worker          7 October 2013         Quantum Net, Kotu 
Mai Bojang, Café Operator          7 October 2013   Global Links Cybercafé 
Mighty Dre, Cyber hustler                   10 October 2013    GAMTEL Cybercafé                  
Neneh Jawara, Café Operator                   10 October 2013    GAMTEL Cybercafé 
Mighty Dre, Cyber hustler        12 October 2013              My Residence 
Max Jonga, ICT Manager, PURA       13 October 2013 PURA Office, Serekunda
  
Biran Manka, Café Operator                   14 October 2013        Silla Kunda cybercafé 
Mr Njie, Vice Principal            14 October 2013     Brikama Upper Basic school 
Kaddy, Cyber Hustler   14 October 2013           My Residence                       
Kaddy, Cyber Hustler   15 October 2013           My Residence                       
Mighty Dre, Cyber hustler  15 October 2013  My Residence 
Mr. Fatty    17 October 2013  My Residence 
Lat, Student/Cyber Hustler   17 October 2013  My Residence 
Buba, Cyber hustler   17 October 2013  My Residence 




Mr Camara, Deputy Permanent Secretary 20 October 2013 Ministry of Information 
  Technology, Kanifing 
Kaddy, Cyber hustler                          21 October 2013   My Residence 
Mighty Dre, Cyber Hustler  21 October 2013   My Residence 
Papa Jobs, Cyber hustler  22 October 2013    My Residence 
Bas, café owner/Operator  25 October 2013    Bas Cybercafé 
MP, Youth Leader   25 October 2013    My Residence 
Kebba Ceesay, Café Operator 26 October 2013    Millennium Cybercafé 
BJ, Youth Leader   27 October 2013     My Residence   
Boy Sere, Former Cyber hustler 27 October 2013      His Shop  
Omar, Cyber Hustler   30 October 2013           Outside GAMTEL 
Cham, Cyber Hustler   31 October 2013       My Residence    
Mr Fatty    2 November 2013       My Residence 
Mighty Dre    2 November 2013       My Residence 
Kaddy     3 November 2013        My Residence 
Foday Barrow, Café Operator 3 November 2013    Light Cybercafé 
Musa Secka, Café Operator  3 November 2013 Montego Bay Cybercafé
  
Buba Jallow, Café Operator  4 November 2013 Net Solutions Cybercafé
  
Papis Konateh, Unemployed Parent 14 November 2013        His Residence 




Babu, Cyber Hustler   16 November 2013           Outside GAMTEL 
Yassine Manneh, A Parent  16 November 2013       Her Residence 
Aunty Khaddy, A Parent  18 November 2013       Her Residence 
Ajaratou Binta Bojang, Mother of Cyber hustler 20 November 2013    Her Residence 
Alhaji Dambele, A Pensioner  19 November 2013       His Residence 
Young B, Cyber hustler  22 November 2013       My Residence 
Zill, Cyber Hustler   22 November 2013       My Residence 
David, Cyber Hustler/Beach Hustler 24 November 2013       My Residence 
Mighty Dre, Cyber Hustler  27 November 2013       My Residence 
Lamin Kargbo, Student  27 November 2013       My Residence 
Dem, Student/cyber Hustler  28 November 2013        My Residence 
Mustapha Dampha, Police Officer/Cyber Hustler  29 November 2013    GAMTEL 
Bakary Ndow, Mechanic/Cyber Hustler  30 November 2013          Outside GAMTEL 
Lamin Jammeh, Café User  4 December 2013   Outside AON cybercafé 
Kaddy, Cyber Hustler   4 December 2013        My Residence 
Yankuba Njie, Parent of cyber Hustler  4 December 2013        His Residence 
Foday Jaiteh, Parent of Cyber Hustler   7 December 2013        His Shop 
Mighty Dre, Cyber Hustler                  8 December 2013        My Residence 
Buba, Cyber Hustler         8 December 2013        My Residence 
Rahman, Café Operator        10 December 2013                  GAMTEL 




Alakali, Café Operator        12 December 2013    AON cybercafé 
Mbasi Sanneh, Parent of Cyber hustler    13 December 2013      Her Residence 
Lanky, Cyber Hustler         13 December 2013      My Residence 
Bob, Cyber Hustler                    13 December 2013          Outside GAMTEL 
* All interviews, except where specifically stated, took place in Brikama 
Interviews conducted during second phase of fieldwork-April-July 2014 
Name/Occupation    Date   Location 
David, beach hustler    2 April 2014  My Residence 
Demba, art & craft boutique owner  2 April 2014  Kololi 
Simon, bar and restaurant owner  2 April 2014  Kololi 
Dickson, souvenir seller   2 April 2014  Kololi 
David, beach hustler    3 April 2014  My Residence 
Robby, local tour guide   3 April 2014  Bakau 
Buju, fisherman    4 April 2014  Kololi 
Longs, hotel worker    4 April 2014  Senegambia 
Jacki, taxi driver    6 April 2014  Palma Junction 
Andy, local tour guide              6 April 2014  Kololi 
Stanley man, taxi driver   12 April 2014  Kololi 
Ricki, juice presser    12 April 2014  Kololi 
Gregory, juice presser               12 April 2014  Senegambia 




Peter, beach hustler    17 April 2014  Senegambia 
Luke, guest house owner   17 April 2014  Keur Serign 
Alex, beach hustler    19 April 2014  Palma Junction 
Dan, bird watcher    21 April 2014  Bakau 
Andy, local tour guide              21 April 2014  Kololi 
ML, fruit seller    24 April 2014  Bakau 
Anti Jon, Gambia Hotel Association (GHA) 28 April 2014  Senegambia 
Buju, fisherman    28 April 2014  Kololi 
Steve, fisherman,     28 April 2014  Kololi 
Mr Bah, GTB officer    30 April 2014  Senegambia 
Kejau Kambi, life guard   4 May 2014  Bakau  
David, beach hustler    4 May 2014  His Residence 
Dobs, back way aspirant   5 May 2014  My Resident 
Chat Singhateh, former migrant  8 May 2014  His Residence 
Lamin Saidy, Bird Watcher   13 May 2014  Kololi 
Stanley Man, taxi driver   14 May 2014  Kololi 
Fish, beach hustler    14 May 2014  Kololi 
Mariama, fruit seller    14 May 2014  Bakau 
Sarjo, horse rider    16 May 2014  Kololi 
Buju, fisherman    19 May 2014  Kololi 




Andy, local tour guide              20 May 2014  Kololi 
Danny, Stanley Man’s friend, beach hustler 20 May 2014  Bijilo 
Basiru Manka, a parent   23 May 2014  My Residence 
Nyimatou, beach hustler   25 May 2014  Kololi 
Matilda, Swedish tourist              25 May 2014             Senegambia 
Captain Danso, commander of TDA security     25 May 2014 Senegambia  
Isatou Conteh, parent of beach hustler     28 May 2014           Her Residence 
Nyimatou, beach hustler       30 May 2014           Kololi 
Fish, beach hustler        1 June 2014  Kololi 
Jabbi, Operation No Back Way      4 June 2014  Kololi 
Pa Kujabi, parent        7 June 2014  His Residence 
Ebrima, hotel receptionist       11 June 2014 His Residence 
Mikey spice, tourist entertainer      11 June 2014 Senegambia 
Stanley Man, taxi driver       11 June 2014           Kololi 
Andy, local tour guide                  15 June 2014           Kololi 
Alagie Sillah, parent        23 June 2014 His Residence 
Mr Jobarte, GTB worker       27 June 2014 GTB Office 
Penda, fruit seller and parent      29 June 2014 Senegambia 
Joko Sarr, mother of beach hustler     29 June 2014            Bakau 
Buju, fisherman           5 July 2014 Kololi 




Linda, British tourist          16 July 2014 UK 
 
APPENDIX B 
Selected List of Themes/Topics Covered in Interviews with Hustlers 
Interviews with cyber hustler 
Personal background information 
Occupation 
Family and household situation 
When they start using the Internet and what for? 
How they started using Internet and who introduced them? 
Where they started using Internet? 
When/Where/ how they started hustling? 
Who introduced them to hustling? 
Why they started hustling? 
Do they use the internet for anything else other than hustling? 
Do they interact among themselves? 
What were they expecting to achieve? 
What are their hustling strategies? 
How do they learn and improvise these strategies? 




What factors shape these aspirations? 
What opportunities did cyber hustling provide for them? 
What is the view of their family members, neighbours and wider community on their 
hustling activities? 
How does cyber hustling take place? 
Have they met any toubabs online? 
How many toubab friends do they have? 
How many real contacts do they have? 
What have did the toubabs do for them? 
Do they have aspirations to migrate to the West? 
What prevents them from migrating to the West? 
Will they migrate to the West if they have the opportunity to do so? 
How do they view returning migrants or ‘semester’? 
How do they spend the money they make from hustling? 
Why only engage in cyber hustling and not other economic activities? 
What particular strategy of hustling do they use? 
Has hustling helped them achieve their aspirations? 
Work background and employment history 
Interviews with beach hustlers 





Family and household situation 
Work background and employment history 
Reasons for moving to the tourism industry 
What type of economic activity they engage in 
Are they registered or unregistered? 
Why did they register or failed to do so? 
What is their relationship with GTB? 
When/Where/ how they started beach hustling? 
Who introduced them to beach hustling? 
Why they started beach hustling? 
What were they expecting to achieve? 
What are their hustling strategies? 
How do they learn and improvise these strategies? 
What are their aspirations? 
What factors shape these aspirations? 
What opportunities did beach hustling provide for them? 
What is the view of their family members, neighbours and wider community on their 
hustling activities? 
How does beach hustling take place? 
How many toubab friends and contacts do they have? 




Do they have aspirations to migrate to the West? 
What prevents them from migrating to the West? 
Will they migrate to the West if they have the opportunity to do so? 
How do they view returning migrants or ‘semester’? 
How do they spend the money they make from hustling? 
Why only engage in beach hustling and not other economic activities? 
What particular strategy of hustling do they use? 
How do they market their businesses? 
How do they tout for customers? 
How do they interact among themselves? 
What is their relationship with the hotels? 
Has hustling helped them achieve their aspirations? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
